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In response to colonialism, apartheid and contemporary ills, the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”) builds its legitimacy on the 
fundamental restructuring of South African society in line with human rights. Human 
rights violations often involve companies and corporate structures in some form, such 
structures being central to South Africa’s political-economic history since 1652, and 
continuing to permeate modern South African life. The Constitution’s project of 
transformative constitutionalism extends to all legal and economic relations, including 
companies, but domestic corporate regulation does not yet exhibit any meaningful 
transformative change in favour of human rights. This thesis thus examines the 
implications of the South African Bill of Rights for companies and company law, using 
the lens of transformative constitutionalism. The current business and human rights 
law literature generally follows an atomistic conceptual approach to understanding 
companies, focusing on companies as individual entities capable of committing 
violations. Transformative constitutionalism, however, requires a critical and contextual 
systemic understanding of companies as part of a holistic political economic system. 
Such an approach implicates companies, company law, the wider economy and the 
State in an alternative transformative paradigm. 
As products of the law, companies and company law itself are fully subject to the 
Bill of Rights, the question rather being of how the Bill of Rights applies where they are 
concerned. Several constitutional provisions are implicated where companies and 
company law are involved, namely sections 7(2), 8, 39(2) and 239 of the Constitution. 
These constitutional mechanisms often overlap, and the jurisprudence on them is 
generally doctrinally unclear. Further, international business and human rights law also 
needs to be coherently integrated into the domestic system for it to be transformative. 
To address these concerns, this thesis proposes a transformative and systemic 
conceptual approach to companies, coupled with a rights-centric doctrinal approach. 
This gives rise to a simultaneous multicentric binding of the State, companies (and 
other business actors and structures), and law. This thesis outlines the possible 
contours of such a corporate regime, informed by international human rights law. Such 
reform requires not only a change in how the law and companies are conceived, but 
also a fundamental normative shift in favour of human rights foremost, with wide 




In reaksie op kolonialisme, apartheid en hedendaagse euwels, bou die Grondwet 
van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika, 1996 (“die Grondwet”) sy legitimiteit op die 
fundamentele herstrukturering van die Suid-Afrikaanse samelewing in 
ooreenstemming met menseregte. Ondernemings en korporatiewe strukture in een of 
ander vorm is dikwels betrokke by menseregteskendings – strukture wat al sentraal is 
tot Suid-Afrika se politieke-ekonomiese geskiedenis sedert 1652, en wat die moderne 
Suid-Afrikaanse lewe deurdring. Die Grondwet se projek van transformerende 
konstitusionalisme strek tot alle regs- en ekonomiese verhoudings, insluitend 
maatskappye, maar binnelandse korporatiewe regulering toon nog geen 
betekenisvolle transformatiewe verandering ten gunste van menseregte nie. Hierdie 
tesis ondersoek dus die implikasies van die Suid-Afrikaanse Handves van Regte vir 
ondernemings en ondernemingsreg deur die lens van transformerende 
konstitusionalisme. 
Die huidige literatuur met betrekking tot ondernemingsreg en menseregte volg 
gewoonlik ‘n atomistiese konseptuele benadering ten opsigte van die begrip van 
ondernemings, met die fokus op maatskappye as individuele entiteite wat oortredings 
kan begaan. Transformatiewe konstitusionalisme vereis egter ‘n kritiese en 
kontekstuele sistemiese begrip van ondernemings as deel van ‘n holistiese politieke 
ekonomiese stelsel. So ‘n benadering impliseer ondernemings, ondernemingsreg, die 
breër ekonomie en die staat in ‘n alternatiewe transformatiewe paradigma. 
Aangesien ondernemings en ondernemingsreg produkte van die wet is en dus self 
geheel en al onderhewig aan die Handves van Regte is, is die vraag eerder hoe die 
Handves van Regte van toepassing is waar dit betrekking het. Verskeie grondwetlike 
bepalings word relevant in die konteks van ondernemings en ondernemingsreg, 
naamlik artikels 7(2), 8, 39(2) en 239 van die Grondwet. Hierdie grondwetlike 
meganismes oorvleuel dikwels en die toepaslike regspraak is dikwels onduidelik. 
Internasionale sake- en menseregte-reg moet samehangend in die binnelandse 
sisteem geïntegreer word om transformatief te wees. Om hierdie probleme aan te 
spreek, stel hierdie tesis ‘n transformerende en sistemiese konseptuele benadering tot 
ondernemings met ‘n regte-sentriese leerstellige benadering voor. Dit lei tot ‘n 
gelyktydige multisentriese binding van die staat, maatskappye (en ander 
besigheidsrolspelers en -strukture) en die reg. Hierdie tesis gee ‘n uiteensetting van 
die moontlike kontoere van so ‘n ondernemingsregime wat internasionale menseregte-
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reg in ag neem. Sodanige hervorming vereis nie net ‘n verandering in die manier 
waarop die reg en ondernemings beskou word nie, maar ook ‘n fundamentele 






“Millions of human beings have laboured to create this civilisation on which we pride 
ourselves to-day. Other millions, scattered through the globe, labour to maintain it. …  
Science and industry, knowledge and application, discovery and practical realisation 
leading to new discoveries, cunning of brain and of hand, toil of mind and muscle — all work 
together. Each discovery, each advance, each increase in the sum of human riches, owes 
its being to the physical and mental travail of the past and the present. 
By what right then can any one whatever appropriate the least morsel of this immense whole 
and say — ‘This is mine, not yours?’” 
PA Kropotkin The Conquest of Bread (1892) 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1 1 Research problem 
1 1 1 Companies, corporate influence and human rights 
Modern life, both locally and globally, is permeated by the existence and operations 
of companies. It is difficult to imagine a part of the modern South African experience 
not deeply and constantly influenced by companies in their roles as employers, 
producers and financial institutions. This is not a wholly recent development, however. 
The modern history of South Africa is a history of political-economic conflict,1 and 
companies are not ahistoric. The present pervasiveness of companies is the 
intensification of the history of colonial capitalism, facilitated by State force and law.2 
This history began as early as the operations of the Dutch East India Company in the 
Cape, serving as both colonial government and corporation.3 It is tied to the imposition 
of serfdom, slavery and the slave trade, and to the commencement of the oppression 
of indigenous peoples.4 It continued with the British conquest of the Cape, in Britain’s 
attempt to establish and maintain economic dominance over France.5 The thread can 
be traced through British imperialist expansion, through Britain’s fight for gold and 
diamond control during the Anglo-Boer Wars, and through Cecil John Rhodes’ serving 
as Prime Minister of the Cape.6 Johannesburg’s role as Africa’s leading economic hub 
 
1 See generally H Wolpe “Capitalism and Cheap Labour-Power in South Africa: From 
Segregation to Apartheid” (1972) 1 Economy and Society 425; SE Merry “Law and 
Colonialism” (1991) 25 Law & Society Review 889; D Masondo “Capitalism and Racist Forms 
of Political Domination” (2007) 37 Africanus 66; S Terreblanche A History of Inequality in South 
Africa: 1652-2002 (2002); S Terreblanche Lost in Transformation (2012) 37-90; B Bunting The 
Rise of the South African Reich (1969). 
2 Terreblanche Inequality 153-156, 239-250; Terreblanche Transformation 37-58; Bunting 
Reich 369-400; Merry (1991) LSR; K Pistor The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth 
and Inequality (2019), especially 1-22. Colonialism and imperialism are systemically linked to 
capitalist expansion: G Lee “Rosa Luxemburg and the Impact of Imperialism” (1971) 81 The 
Economic Journal 847; N Faulkner A Radical History of the World (2018) 165-187, 268-274. 
3 Terreblanche Inequality 153-156. 
4 Terreblanche Inequality 156-163; Faulkner History 165-187. 
5 Terreblanche Inequality 179-183. 




– and indeed, much of its entire history as a city overall – is owed to its historic gold 
reserves and mining operations.7 
Corporate ideology intensified racist political ideology, and originated South Africa’s 
dark history of exploitative migrant labour and confiscation of indigenous land.8 
Capitalist interests were later a core cause of, and influence on, the policies of formal 
apartheid, which violently oppressed the majority of the population both politically and 
economically.9 Formal apartheid itself could not have been sustained without extensive 
corporate involvement and support, both legal and illegal.10 Nor could corporations 
have developed or profited without colonial and apartheid government policy serving 
them.11 Companies continued to hold sway over South African politics through the end 
of formal apartheid, and into the constitutional era.12 They were key to the introduction 
of neoliberal policies and financialisation,13 and to the recent cultivation of consumerist 
culture in the country.14 South Africa’s extreme poverty and inequality, and its issues 
 
7 P Harrison & T Zack “The Power of Mining: The Fall of Gold and Rise of Johannesburg” 
(2012) 30 Journal of Contemporary African Studies 551. 
8 Terreblanche Inequality 251-264. 
9 Terreblanche Inequality 264-342; Wolpe (1972) Economy and Society 425. 
10 Terreblanche Inequality 343-346; Terreblanche Transformation 37-58; H van Vuuren 
Apartheid Guns and Money: A Tale of Profit (2017) 489-511. 
11 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report vol 4 (1998) 187; Terreblanche 
Inequality 153-156, 239-250; Terreblanche Transformation 37-58; Bunting Reich 369-400; see 
generally Pistor Capital. 
12 Terreblanche Inequality 59-90. 
13 Neoliberal policies aim to engineer a so-called “free market” fundamentalist political 
economy, reducing the democratic and social role of the State while simultaneously expanding 
its role in creating profit for narrow private business interests. In South Africa, such policies 
have included privatisation, austerity and the drastic “liberalisation” of the economy: 
Terreblanche Inequality 51-65; Terreblanche Transformation 17-40; Masondo (2007) 
Africanus 67-72; S Ashman, B Fine & S Newman “The Crisis in South Africa: Neoliberalism, 
Financialization and Uneven and Combined Development” (2011) 47 Socialist Register 174 
182; Faulkner History 438-446, 471-482. 
14 Terreblanche Transformation 17-36; D Posel “Races to Consume: Revisiting South Africa’s 
History of Race, Consumption and the Struggle for Freedom” (2010) 33 Ethnic and Racial 




of unjust wealth and land distribution,15 cannot be considered without equally 
considering business’s historic role in the systems producing these social crises.16 
Business interests were central to the human rights violations of colonialism and formal 
apartheid, and to their enduring legacy. 
More recently, businesses and corporate structures have been at the centre of a 
great many other specific violations and scandals: the arms deal scandal;17 the bread 
price-fixing scandal;18 violent and fatal evictions by the “Red Ants” private security 
 
15 30,4 million South Africans – 55,5% of the population – were living in poverty in 2015: Stats 
SA Poverty Trends in South Africa (2017) 18-20. The wealthiest 10% of South Africans 
possess 90-95% of all South African wealth, while the highest-earning 10% receive 55-60% of 
all income. The poorest 50% of South Africans earn only 10% of all income, and have no 
measurable wealth: A Orthofer “Wealth Inequality – Striking New Insights from Tax Data” 
(2016) Econ 3x3 1 4-6. South Africa has the highest GINI coefficient in the world: World Bank 
Overcoming Poverty and Inequality in South Africa (2018) xv. See also K Wilkinson “Guide: 
Black Ownership on SA’s Stock Exchange – What We Know” (29-08-2017) Africa Check 
<https://africacheck.org/factsheets/guide-much-sas-stock-exchange-black-owned-know/> 
(accessed 25-09-2019); B Cousins “Land Reform in South Africa is Failing. Can it be Saved?” 
(2017) 92 Transformation 135. 
16 Terreblanche Transformation 101-115; Terreblanche Inequality 95-149, 371-415; JM Modiri 
“Law’s Poverty” (2015) 18 PER 224; S Sibanda “Not Purpose-Made! Transformative 
Constitutionalism, Post-Independence Constitutionalism and the Struggle to Eradicate 
Poverty” (2011) 22 Stell LR 482; T Madlingozi “Social Justice in a Time of Neo-Apartheid 
Constitutionalism: Critiquing the Anti-Black Economy of Recognition, Incorporation and 
Distribution” (2017) 123 Stell LR 123; JM Modiri “Towards a ‘(Post-)apartheid’ Critical Race 
Jurisprudence: ‘Divining Our Racial Themes’” (2012) 27 SAPL 231 237; Faulkner History 488-
491; Pistor Capital; S Moyn Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World (2018); P Joseph 
The New Human Rights Movement: Reinventing the Economy to End Oppression (2017). 
17 T Crawford-Browne “The Arms Deal Scandal” (2004) 31 Review of African Political Economy 
329. 
18 Competition Commission v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd 2010 JOL 25542 (CT); Competition 
Commission “Media Release: Competition Commission Welcomes Settlement Between 







company;19 the anti-poor pricing of mobile data and internet access;20 the Marikana 
massacre;21 the social grants scandal and crisis;22 mass deaths during the listeriosis 
outbreak;23 mass deaths during the Life Esidimeni tragedy;24 the record-breaking 
silicosis class action against the mining sector;25 abusive debt-collection practices 
exploiting the poor;26 Bell Pottinger’s “public relations” project of socio-political control 
in South Africa;27 data analytics and social media corporations’ political manipulation 
and privacy invasion worldwide;28 severe droughts related to climate change as the 
 
19 A Bennie “No One Held Accountable for Death of Man During Red Ants Raid” (13-09-2017) 
GroundUp <https://www.groundup.org.za/article/no-one-held-accountable-death-man-during-
red-ants-raid/> (accessed 25-09-2019); M Langa, T Matsena & S Xinwa “Land Occupations 
and Violence in Protea Glen, Soweto” in M Langa & D Hartford (eds) Urban Land and the 
Genesis of Violence (2018) 11. 
20 Competition Commission Data Services Market Inquiry: Provisional Findings and 
Recommendations (2019) 82; L Schelenz & K Schopp “Digitalization in Africa: Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives on Technology, Development and Justice” (2018) 9 International Journal of 
Digital Society 1413. 
21 G Marinovich Murder at Small Koppie: The Real Story of the Marikana Massacre (2016); D 
Magaziner & S Jacobs “Notes from Marikana, South Africa: The Platinum Miners’ Strike, the 
Massacre, and the Struggle for Equivalence” (2013) 83 International Labor and Working-Class 
History 137; E Cairncross & S Kisting “Platinum and Gold Mining in South Africa: The Context 
of the Marikana Massacre” (2016) 25 New Solutions 513. 
22 Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development (Freedom Under Law NPC Intervening) 
2017 3 SA 335 (CC). 
23 J Hunter-Adams, J Battersby & T Oni “Fault Lines in Food System Governance Exposed: 
Reflections from the Listeria Outbreak in South Africa” (2018) 2 Cities & Health 17. 
24 A Ornellas & LK Engelbrecht “The Life Esidimeni Crisis: Why a Neoliberal Agenda Leaves 
No Room for the Mentally Ill” (2017) 54 Social Work 296. 
25 Nkala v Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited 2016 5 SA 240 (GJ); Ex Parte Nkala 2019 
JOL 41956 (GJ). 
26 University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services 
2015 5 SA 221 (WCC); University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic v Minister of Justice and 
Correctional Services; Association of Debt Recovery Agents NPC v University of Stellenbosch 
Legal Aid Clinic; Mavava Trading 279 (Pty) Ltd v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic 
2016 6 SA 596 (CC). 
27 G Hart & M Nassimbeni “The Value of Information in South Africa’s New Democracy” 39 
Library Management 322 327-330. 
28 FJ Zuiderveen Borgesius, J Moller, S Kruikemeier, RO Fathaigh, K Irion, T Dobber, B Bodo 
& C de Vreese “Online Political Microtargeting: Promises and Threats for Democracy” (2018) 




result of corporate pollution;29 and the mismanagement of numerous South African 
state-owned entities.30 Of these, only the social grants scandal and the debt collection 
abuse case gave rise to substantive human rights law judgments in the South African 
courts.31 
Companies’ systemic influence is felt beyond these high-profile incidents, however. 
The South African media is wholly dominated by massive corporations, public and 
private.32 Chronic public-private corruption and collusion runs through formal apartheid 
to modern state capture, most famously involving former President Jacob Zuma.33 
Current President Cyril Ramaphosa was himself a highly prominent businessman, 
shareholder and director.34 He and his brother-in-law, Patrice Motsepe, are two of 
South Africa’s richest men, each having amassed several billion rand through their 
individual corporate interests and having benefited from pro-business neoliberal 
governmental policies.35 The profound and ubiquitous influence of companies on every 
facet of South African life cannot be overstated. This influence is economic, social, 
 
29 N Shepherd “Making Sense of ‘Day Zero’: Slow Catastrophes, Anthropocene Futures, and 
the Story of Cape Town’s Water Crisis” (2019) 11 Water 1744; Faulkner History 491-496. 71% 
of global carbon emissions since 1988 have been produced by only 100 companies, with more 
than half of emissions produced by just 25 companies: CDP The Carbon Majors Database: 
CDP Carbon Majors Report (2017) 8. 
30 Auditor-General of South Africa Consolidated General Report on National and Provincial 
Audit Outcomes (2018) 106-120. 
31 Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development (Freedom Under Law NPC Intervening) 
2017 3 SA 335 (CC); University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic v Minister of Justice and 
Correctional Services; Association of Debt Recovery Agents NPC v University of Stellenbosch 
Legal Aid Clinic; Mavava Trading 279 (Pty) Ltd v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic 
2016 6 SA 596 (CC). 
32 S Mpofu-Walsh Democracy and Delusion: 10 Myths in South African Politics (2017) 102-
113. 
33 “State capture” refers to the control and exploitation of the State and its institutions by private 
actors: Marinovich Marikana Massacre; PL Myburgh The Republic of Gupta: A Story of State 
Capture (2017); Van Vuuren Apartheid Guns and Money 489-511. As noted in this part and in 
chapter three part 3 2 2, such activity is common throughout, and intrinsic to, South Africa’s 
political economic history. However, “state capture” typically refers more specifically to cases 
where this control and exploitation is corrupt and illegal. 
34 GE Schneider “The Post-Apartheid Development Debacle in South Africa: How Mainstream 
Economics and the Vested Interests Preserved Apartheid Economic Structures” (2018) 52 





cultural, and political; it is both historic and ongoing; and it implicates all South Africans, 
from the poorest and weakest to the wealthiest and most powerful. 
Companies have also been central to recent developments internationally. The rise 
of massive multinational corporations, and the international economic policies that 
favour them, has raised critical questions about the nature of modern global 
democracy.36 Corporate financial abuse was central to the global economic crash of 
2008.37 Business interests and neoliberal policies have been identified as primary 
contributors to the ongoing rise of far-right nationalism and fascism globally.38 The two 
greatest existential threats to humanity and the planet more broadly – namely, 
extinction due to the present climate crisis and/or due to nuclear war39 – have corporate 
profiteering at their centres.40 
In response to these worsening problems of corporate human rights violations, the 
international community has recently started taking steps to intervene. On 26 June 
2014, the Human Rights Council appointed an intergovernmental working group to 
 
36 See generally J Stiglitz Globalization and its Discontents Revisited: Anti-Globalization in the 
Era of Trump (2017); P Phillips Giants: The Global Power Elite (2018); Faulkner 438-446, 471-
491. 
37 H Grove, L Patelli, LM Victoravich & P Xu “Corporate Governance and Performance in the 
Wake of the Financial Crisis: Evidence from US Commercial Banks” (2011) 19 Corporate 
Governance: An International Review 418; JE Stiglitz “Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis 
of 2008” (2010) 23 Seoul Journal of Economics 321; Faulkner History 471-488. 
38 R Saull “Capitalism, Crisis and the Far-Right in the Neoliberal Era” (2015) 18 Journal of 
International Relations and Development 25; N Davidson & R Saull “Neoliberalism and the 
Far-Right: A Contradictory Embrace” (2017) 43 Critical Sociology 707; Faulkner History 496-
499. 
39 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Science and Security Board A New Abnormal: It is Still 2 
Minutes to Midnight – 2019 Doomsday Clock Statement (2019); N Chomsky Who Rules The 
World? (2017) 128-134, 230-238. 
40 PAX Producing Mass Destruction: Private Companies and the Nuclear Weapon Industry 
(2019); G Kirk & M Okazawa-Rey “Neoliberalism, Militarism, and Armed Conflict” (2000) 27 
Social Justice 1; T Gabelnick & A Rich “Globalized Weaponry” (2000) 27 Social Justice 37; N 
Klein This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs the Climate (2014); K Lux “The Failure of the 




investigate and draft a binding treaty for business and human rights.41 The following 
day, the Council adopted a resolution42 supporting and calling for greater 
implementation of the non-binding United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights.43 In 2016 and 2018, the Human Rights Council adopted resolutions 
calling for improved accountability and access to remedy in business and human rights 
matters.44 In June 2017, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights45 adopted a General Comment on state obligations in the context of 
business activities.46 Most recently, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights noted the immense human rights threat posed by the worsening climate crisis.47 
The issue of corporate abuse of human rights, locally and globally, is thus both current 




41 United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution 26/9 Elaboration of an International 
Legally Binding Instrument on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises 
with Respect to Human Rights (26 June 2014) A/HRC/RES/26/9; Global Policy Forum The 
Struggle for a UN Treaty: Towards Global Regulation on Human Rights and Business (2016) 
24-29. The latest draft of 16 July 2019 can be found at: <https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ 
HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/OEIGWG_RevisedDraft_LBI.pdf> (accessed 25-09-
2019). 
42 United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution 26/22 Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises UN Doc A/HRC/RES/26/22. 
43 United Nations Human Rights Council Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework UN Doc 
A/HRC/17/31. These are considered in some depth in chapter four part 4 4. 
44 United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution 32/10 Business and Human Rights: 
Improving Accountability and Access to Remedy UN Doc A/HRC/32/10; United Nations Human 
Rights Council Resolution 38/13 Business and Human Rights: Improving Accountability and 
Access to Remedy UN Doc A/HRC/38/13. 
45 The Committee is established in terms of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (1966) United Nations Treaty Series 993 3. This Covenant is discussed in 
chapter four part 4 4. 
46 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No 
24: State Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in the Context of Business Activities UN Doc E/C 12/GC/24. 
47 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights “Opening Statement at the Global 
Update, 42nd Session of the Human Rights Council” (09-09-2019) United Nations Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/ 




1 1 2 Transformative constitutionalism as a response 
To address its numerous political and economic ills, past and present, South Africa 
has been undertaking a wide socio-legal project grounded in the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”). This has been commonly 
understood as transformative constitutionalism, a concept originally described by Karl 
Klare.48 Deeply aware of historical and present contexts,49 transformative 
constitutionalism founds South African society on “democratic values, social justice 
and fundamental human rights.”50 It can thus be described as an ongoing project of 
“large scale social change through nonviolent political processes grounded in law”.51 
At base, it is dedicated to constant evaluation and legal reform for the good of the 
people of South Africa, and especially for the victims of human rights abuses.52 
Prominent principles of the constitutional order, such as the rule of law,53 constitutional 
supremacy54 and justiciability,55 aim to give effect to these ambitions. These principles 
place human rights at the centre of the legal system, with the vindication of rights being 
a core aim of the transformative project.56 Rights underpin the State itself,57 and the 
State accordingly has a duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil them.58 Any law or 
legal concept in conflict with the Constitution or its values must thus actively be 
transformed until it can be considered constitutional, and consistent with human 
 
48 KE Klare “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 SAJHR 146; 
chapter 2 in S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication Under a Transformative 
Constitution (2010). 
49 Preamble to the Constitution. 
50 Preamble. 
51 Klare (1998) SAJHR 146 150. 
52 DM Davis & K Klare “Transformative Constitutionalism and the Common and Customary 
Law” (2010) 26 SAJHR 403. 
53 S 1(c) of the Constitution. 
54 S 2. 
55 See the “culture of justification” conceived in E Mureinik “A Bridge to Where? Introducing the 
Interim Bill of Rights” (1994) 10 SAJHR 31; I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 
2 ed (2013) 7. 
56 Ferreira v Levin NO; Vryenhoek v Powell NO 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) para 82; Currie & De 
Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 26-27; Mureinik (1994) SAJHR; S v Zuma 1995 2 SA 642 (CC) 
para 21; S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) paras 100-102, 155-156; Liebenberg Socio-
Economic Rights 199-203; T Roux “Democracy” in S Woolman, M Bishop & J Brickhill (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2006) 10-34 – 10-37. 
57 S 1(a) of the Constitution. 




rights.59 Transformative constitutionalism thus points to a fundamentally rights-centric 
approach to the law. Moreover, this transformative process requires a deep openness 
to international human rights law standards, integrating any such progressive 
developments into the domestic regime.60 In sum, meaningful legal transformation is 
essential to the constitutional project, and to its legitimacy.61 
Given the prominent issue of human rights violations by business, recent 
international law developments, and the critical importance of transformative 
constitutionalism, this thesis aims to focus on the effect of this transformative process 
on South African companies.62 Specifically, it aims to establish the implications of the 
Bill of Rights for companies and company law in South Africa – as informed by 
international human rights law – and to make proposals for transformative reform 
where necessary. This is essential for two reasons. First, as noted, the transformation 
of the law is constitutionally mandated: it is central to rectifying South Africa’s ills, and 
 
59 There is a great deal of literature on this aspect, and it is particularly relevant to the 
transformation of the private law governing companies. See, for instance, Liebenberg Socio-
Economic Rights 43-62; D Bilchitz “Do Corporations Have Positive Fundamental Rights 
Obligations?” (2010) Theoria 1; D Bhana “The Horizontal Application of The Bill of Rights: A 
Reconciliation of Sections 8 And 39 of the Constitution” (2013) 29 SAJHR 351; DM Chirwa “In 
Search of Philosophical Justifications and Suitable Models for the Horizontal Application of 
Human Rights” (2008) 8 AHRLJ 294; J Katzew “Crossing the Divide Between the Business of 
the Corporation and the Imperatives of Human Rights – The Impact of Section 7 of the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008” (2011) 128 SALJ 686; S Liebenberg “The Application of Socio-
Economic Rights to Private Law” (2008) TSAR 464; M Pieterse “Beyond the Welfare State: 
Globalisation of Neo-Liberal Culture and the Constitutional Protection of Social and Economic 
Rights in South Africa” (2003) 14 Stell LR 3; Davis & Klare (2010) SAJHR. 
60 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 35. See chapter four part 4 3. 
61 Importantly, authors have noted the materialist and philosophical limitations of the 
constitutional project itself: Terreblanche Inequality 95-149, 371-415; Terreblanche 
Transformation 59-77, 101-115; Ashman, Fine & Newman (2011) Socialist Register 182; 
Modiri (2015) PER; Sibanda (2011) Stell LR; Madlingozi (2017) Stell LR; Modiri (2012) SAPL 
246-259; Moyn Not Enough; M Albertus & V Menaldo Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of 
Democracy (2018) 2, 102-103, 278-279, 285. It is thus possible that transformative 
constitutionalism does not in fact contain the necessary tools to achieve meaningful social, 
economic and political transformation in South Africa. Critically, then, it may be impossible to 
operate “within the law” and achieve some notion of sufficient change. Nonetheless, as this 
study takes the Bill of Rights as its point of departure, it is presently assumed that the 
transformative constitutional project can achieve what it purports to be able to achieve. 
62 Companies in South Africa are incorporated in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. This 
study considers companies generally, as opposed to, for instance, only public companies, or 




to the legitimacy of the constitutional project as a whole. Second, effective legal 
remedies for victims of corporate abuse cannot be granted without rights being 
recognised and relevant duties imposed by law. The transformative implications of the 
Bill of Rights thus critically require study and concrete implementation. This need is 
made all the more urgent by the fact that company law has seen little to no meaningful 
transformation at all since the end of formal apartheid, as considered below. 
 
1 1 3 The absence of human rights reform in company law 
In 2004, the Department of Trade and Industry published a promising policy paper 
titled “Company Law for the 21st Century: Guidelines for Corporate Reform” (“the 
Guidelines”),63 intended to be a foundational document for the proposed Companies 
Bill.64 The Guidelines included an evaluation of the history of South African company 
law, and emphasised that it needed to be reformed to render it consistent with 
constitutional rights and values.65 The process would be mindful of the country’s 
historical, social and economic context,66 “recognising the broader social role of 
companies”.67 The Guidelines also predicted international developments being 
adapted for the South African constitutional context.68 More specifically, they motivated 
at length that when a company board makes decisions, it should be compelled to 
consider human rights stakeholder interests for their inherent value, rather than focus 
solely on the profit interests of shareholders.69 In short, the Guidelines made clear the 
inescapable need for company law to give effect to human rights. 
However, by the time the Companies Bill70 was before Parliament, it had entirely 
lost all meaningful reference to the Bill of Rights.71 Absent, too, was any recognition of 
 
63 South African Company Law for the 21st Century: Guidelines for Corporate Reform GN 1183 




67 Objective 4 in Guidelines 9. See also Guidelines 25. 
68 11. 
69 19-27. Stakeholder models are considered in chapter two part 2 5 2. 
70 The Companies Bill B61-2008.  
71 S 11(1)(c) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 referred to the South African Human Rights 
Commission, but only in the context of company names. The section prohibits names 
amounting to speech unprotected by the constitutional right to freedom of expression. The 




the inherent value of human rights considerations in the board of directors’ decisions, 
as called for in the Guidelines.72 The Companies Bill contained no substantive 
provisions concerning the company’s social purpose as envisioned by the 
Guidelines.73 By the time it was made law as the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (“the 
Companies Act” or “the Act”), only one relevant change had been made. This was a 
line inserted in the Act’s “Purposes” clause as the new section 7(a), holding that one 
of the purposes of the Act was to “promote compliance with the Bill of Rights as 
provided for in the Constitution, in the application of company law.”74 Three years later, 
the amendments75 to the Act added little to the substantive promotion of human 
rights.76 
Arguably, regulation 43(5)(a)(i)(aa) of the Companies Regulations 2011 (“the 
Regulations”)77 is of most significance in giving substance to human rights concerns. 
 
72 S 76 of the Act maintains shareholder primacy – directors must make decisions “in the best 
interests of the company”. The meaning of this phrase and duty is examined in chapter two 
part 2 5 2. 
73 S 7(b)(iii) lists a purpose of the Act as being to promote transparency and good corporate 
governance “given the significant role of enterprises with the social and economic life of the 
nation”. Reference is also made to social and ethics committees in s 72(4). Neither of these 
provisions amount to clear substantive protection or remedies. 
74 S 7(a) of the Companies Act. Given that the Memorandum to the Bill does not mention 
human rights at all in its goals or proposals, and that there is an absence of provisions directly 
relating to human rights in the Act, it is likely that this purpose was not factually borne in mind 
during the drafting process, and simply added as an afterthought. It may still be of indirect 
interpretive value, however, as considered in chapter five part 5 3. 
75 Companies Amendment Act 3 of 2011. 
76 The Memorandum to the Companies Amendment Bill B40B-2010 indicated that its priorities 
lay in fixing the numerous technical issues with the Companies Act. S 47 of the Companies 
Amendment Act merely added further provisions concerning social and ethics committee 
implementation (see following paragraph and accompanying notes). 




It requires that company social and ethics committees78 “monitor the company’s 
activities … with regard to matters relating to social and economic development, 
including the company’s standing in terms of the goals and purposes of … the United 
Nations Global Compact Principles.”79 The effect of this provision, however, appears 
very limited.80 More limiting still is the fact that such committees are only required for 
certain types of companies.81 
No remedies under the Act appear intended to apply specifically to human rights 
violations. This is not to say that the Act or Regulations, or indeed the common law of 
companies, cannot be interpreted to be consistent with the Constitution to develop 
remedies for corporate violations of human rights. Indeed, such interpretations must 
be preferred over interpretations leading to constitutional invalidity, where reasonably 
 
78 Social and ethics committees perform monitoring, board-advisory and shareholder-reporting 
duties on human rights-related matters such as the environment, labour and equality. They are 
established in terms of s 72(4) of the Act, and reg 43 of the Regulations. They must comprise 
at least three directors or prescribed officers of the company, amongst other conditions: reg 
43(3). HJ Kloppers “Driving Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Through the Companies 
Act: An Overview of the Role of the Social and Ethics Committee” (2013) 16 PER 166; M 
Gwanyanya “The South African Companies Act and the Realisation of Corporate Human 
Rights Responsibilities” (2015) 18 PER 3102 3113-3114; M Havenga “The Social and Ethics 
Committee in South African Company Law” (2015) 78 THRHR 285; IM Esser “Corporate Social 
Responsibility: A Company Law Perspective” (2011) 23 SAMLJ 317 325. See chapter 2 part 2 
5 2 2. 
79 The United Nations Global Compact (“UN Global Compact”) is a voluntary corporate 
governance initiative. It is centred on a set of ten principles, which provide guidance in the 
areas of human rights, labour, the environment and anti-corruption. It is not legally-binding, 
and the initiative performs no evaluation of goals being met. The sole requirement is that a 
company participating in the initiative submit progress reports for transparency; should it not 
comply, it may be expelled. United Nations Global Compact Guide to Corporate Sustainability: 
Shaping a Sustainable Future (2014) 11, 38. 
80 There are no external enforcement mechanisms for victims in terms of these provisions: the 
monitoring, advising and reporting on the matters is obligatory, not the compliance with the 
substance of the matters themselves. The committees merely remain obliged to submit reports 
to the shareholder body; thereafter shareholders are presumably expected to make active, 
altruistic decisions in favour of human rights, even if to the detriment of their own interests. An 
interesting implication is that a company need not strictly comply with the UN Global Compact, 
or even the reporting requirements the UN Global Compact itself contains, provided that this 
non-compliance is monitored, reported and advised upon by the committee. 




possible.82 However, this requires first studying and establishing the implications of the 
Bill of Rights for companies and company law. Further, where common law remedies 
exist parallel to the Act, they are generally poorly-suited to providing relief for violations 
of constitutional rights without undergoing substantial development.83 Such 
development must again follow an investigation of the Bill of Rights and its implications.  
Therefore, despite the purpose-declaration in section 7(a), it appears that the 
Companies Act does not clearly give substance to the human rights obligations of 
companies, and provides no specific human rights remedies where those obligations 
are breached. Of course, certain rights can be promoted outside of the Act, such as 
through labour or environmental legislation. In fact, the Guidelines expressly support 
specific legislation in certain cases.84 However, this does not address the general 
human rights obligations of companies, and leaves a great deal of uncertainty. It is 
currently unclear how obligations and remedies are to be regulated in the absence of 
specific legislation. External human rights victims seem unable to claim remedies that 
are traditionally “internal” to the company, such as against directors or shareholders. It 
is also unclear if the defences against director liability are narrow enough to avoid 
impunity for human rights violations, and unclear how the validity of board decisions or 
conduct should be affected where they unjustifiably infringe on human rights. 
Moreover, international developments in the field of business and human rights law 
have not been incorporated into the domestic regime. 
There thus appears to be a conceptual and implementation chasm between human 
rights obligations and corporate regulation.85 Managers, directors and shareholders 
not versed in human rights law would see its impact on corporate regulation as esoteric 
at best. At worst, it may seem irrelevant or inconvenient. In both cases, there is a 
profound disconnect between transformative constitutionalism and companies in 
South Africa. It is this disconnect that this study aims to address. There is not a great 
volume of literature interpreting the nature and scope of the human rights obligations 
 
82 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 2 SA 1 (CC) 
para 23. 
83 An example is s 77(2) of the Act, which allows the common law to run alongside the Act for 
directors’ liability remedies, but does not provide a remedy to external victims. The common 
law would thus likely need constitutional development, as occurred in the law of delict in 
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC). 
84 Guidelines 26. 




of companies in a specifically South African context.86 Some authors discuss human 
rights reform and the subsequent interpretation of existing company law provisions 
very generally.87 There is also extensive literature88 on the imposition of human rights 
obligations on non-state entities. However, little study has been devoted to the actual 
interaction and operation of human rights themselves vis-à-vis companies, and 
particularly not from the perspective of transformative constitutionalism. As will be 
seen, the literature and jurisprudence also centre primarily on the duties imposed on 
companies, instead of following a rights-centric approach focusing on victims.89 The 





86 Bilchitz appears to offer the most extensive contribution. See D Bilchitz “Corporate Law and 
the Constitution: Towards Binding Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations” (2008) 125 
SALJ 754; D Bilchitz “Corporations and the Limits of State-Based Models for Protecting 
Fundamental Rights in International Law” (2016) 23 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 
143. 
87 Esser (2011) SAMLJ 323; Katzew (2011) SALJ 686. 
88 See broadly S Woolman “Application” in S Woolman, M Bishop & J Brickhill (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2005); M Tushnet “The Issue of State Action / 
Horizontal Effect in Comparative Constitutional Law” (2003) 1 IJCL 79 79; S Woolman & D 
Davis “The Last Laugh: Du Plessis v De Klerk, Classical Liberalism, Creole Liberalism and the 
Application of Fundamental Rights Under the Interim and the Final Constitutions” (1996) 12 
SAJHR 361 399-400; DM Chirwa “The Horizontal Application of Constitutional Rights in a 
Comparative Perspective” (2006) 10 Law, Democracy and Development 21; Davis & Klare 
(2010) SAJHR; Bhana (2013) SAJHR 351; C Sprigman & M Osbourne “Du Plessis Is Not 
Dead: South Africa’s 1996 Constitution and the Application of the Bill of Rights to Private 
Disputes” (1999) 15 SAJHR 25; J van der Walt “Progressive Indirect Horizontal Application of 
the Bill of Rights: Towards a Co-Operative Relation Between Common-Law and Constitutional 
Jurisprudence” (2001) 17 SAJHR 341; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 317-376; N 
Friedman “The South African Common Law and the Constitution: Revisiting Horizontality” 
(2014) 30 SAJHR 63; S Woolman “The Amazing, Vanishing Bill of Rights” (2007) 124 SALJ 
762; AJ van der Walt “Normative Pluralism and Anarchy: Reflections on the 2007 Term” (2008) 
1 Constitutional Court Review 107; A Fagan “The Secondary Role of the Spirit, Purport and 
Objects of the Bill of Rights in the Common Law’s Development” (2010) 127 SALJ 611. 
The term “non-state entities” will be preferred to “private parties” throughout this thesis when 
referring to natural and juristic persons that are not functioning as organs of state. This is due 
both to the existing usage of “public/private companies” and to the potential obfuscation 
caused by arguments of “privateness”, as discussed in chapter three. 




1 2 Research aims and hypothesis 
The overarching aim of the present study is to consider the implications of a 
transformative approach to the Bill of Rights for companies and company law in South 
Africa. This may be divided into four smaller aims. First, to consider what is meant by 
“companies” and “company law” in the context of the Bill of Rights. Second, to examine 
and analyse how transformative constitutionalism and the Bill of Rights operate where 
companies are concerned. Third, to establish the value, content and implications of 
international human rights law in the interpretation and application of the Bill of Rights 
in the context of companies. And fourth, to consider the theoretical implications of the 
prior findings, and provide theoretical and practical recommendations for 
transformative judicial and legislative reform. 
The underlying hypothesis of this study is that Bill of Rights doctrine and corporate 
human rights regulation must both undergo substantive development if these are to be 
aligned with transformative constitutionalism. 
 
1 3 Methodology 
The study centres foremost on the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. It necessarily 
focuses in the first instance on the common law and legislation regulating companies, 
and especially the Companies Act 71 of 2008, to establish what is meant by 
“companies” in this context. However, the core of the study seeks to reach a 
transformative understanding of the Bill of Rights through extensive reference to case 
law and academic writing. This understanding is further informed by historical and 
political-economic literature, especially in the context of business operations. 
Transformative constitutionalism as thus conceived is then used to analyse the 
relevant human rights jurisprudence and corporate regulation. Case law on the 
transformative relevance of international human rights law is also considered. 
International human rights law in the field is used to inform the interpretation of the Bill 
of Rights, and thereby to inform regulatory proposals. In particular, two international 
law instruments will be studied: the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights,90 and the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
 
90 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) United Nations 




Rights.91 Academic literature, primarily in the form of books and journal articles, will be 
referred to throughout. 
Importantly, however, the study’s focus remains on the general human rights 
regulation of companies. Thus, detailed surveys of the regulation of specific rights 
(such as in labour or environmental law) are outside its scope. Further, the focus is on 
human rights violations committed by South African companies within South Africa’s 
territory. The important issue of extraterritorial application of the Bill of Rights is not 
considered here due to space limitations.92 Finally, while early steps are taken in this 
direction, a detailed systemic political-economic analysis of companies in South Africa 
and their collective impact on human rights also cannot be performed due to space 
limitations. 
 
1 4 Outline of chapters 
Chapter two sets the foundation for the entity and regime being studied – namely 
“companies” and “company law” in the context of the Bill of Rights. It refers to common 
law and legislation, and provides an overview of the legal nature and structuring of 
companies. This chapter next considers the relationship between companies and 
company law on the one hand, and the Bill of Rights on the other. It also analyses two 
conceptual approaches to business and human rights, namely an atomistic and a 
systemic approach. The characteristics of each of these are considered. Thereafter, 
following the predominant atomistic approach in the field, specific existing doctrines 
and mechanisms in company law are studied. 
Chapter three considers South Africa’s project of transformative constitutionalism 
as the core lens to interpreting the Bill of Rights. Following a transformative and 
systemic conceptual approach to companies, rather than the prevailing atomistic 
approach, the chapter places companies in their political-economic context. 
Thereafter, it examines the application of the Bill of Rights in the context of companies 
through reference to several relevant constitutional provisions and applicable 
 
91 United Nations Human Rights Council Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework UN Doc 
A/HRC/17/31. 
92 See in this regard Woolman “Application” in Constitutional Law 31-113 – 31-122; Mohamed 
v President of the Republic of South Africa 2001 3 SA 893 (CC); Kaunda v President of the 
Republic of South Africa 2005 4 SA 235 (CC); Minister of Home Affairs v Tsebe, Minister of 




jurisprudence. The application regime is then analysed, and early proposals for 
improvement noted. The relevance of the study for other business structures and 
actors is also considered. 
Chapter four considers the relevance of international human rights law where 
companies are concerned. With reference to case law, it first illustrates that 
transformative constitutionalism requires the deep consideration and integration of 
international law in the domestic Bill of Rights regime. Two specific international human 
rights law instruments are then considered for their relevance, namely the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,93 and the United Nations Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights.94 Their content and implications for the 
State and companies are then examined. 
Chapter five identifies salient theoretical implications and recommendations of the 
study, both in terms of Bill of Rights application doctrine and the conceptual approach 
to companies. It then provides some practical recommendations for judicial and 
legislative reform, and sketches the early contours of a more transformative business 
and human rights regime. In conclusion, the final chapter summarises the primary 
findings of the thesis, and presents some areas of further study and development in 
the field. 
 
1 5 Value of study 
This study aims to assist victims of human rights violations, who may better be able 
to vindicate their rights once the field has been better clarified and developed. It will be 
of value to the State – especially the judiciary and legislature – in its consideration of 
State duties and recommendations for practical reform. It will also be relevant to 
companies themselves, as it provides greater clarity regarding the implications of the 
Bill of Rights for their operations. Overall, the purpose of this study is to contribute to 
the greater transformative aims and aspirations of the Constitution, in a field and time 
where meaningful transformation is ever more necessary and urgent. 
 
93 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) United Nations 
Treaty Series 993 3. 
94 United Nations Human Rights Council Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 





Chapter 2: The conception of South African companies and company 
law in the context of the Bill of Rights 
 
2 1 Introduction 
This thesis considers the application of the Bill of Rights1 on companies and the field 
of company law. This chapter addresses the preliminary question of the scope of the 
inquiry, specifically considering the broad nature of company law and the companies 
whose operations may be affected by the Bill of Rights. Before these effects can be 
considered, it is necessary to determine the scope of what may be implicated by the 
Bill of Rights as far as companies are involved. In other words, it is necessary to 
establish what is meant by “companies” and “company law” in the context of human 
rights, and specifically the Constitution. This chapter aims to address this question. 
As a point of departure, this chapter examines the nature and structure of 
companies as defined in the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (“the Companies Act” or “the 
Act”). It then briefly considers the relationship between the Constitution, as supreme 
law, and company law. Finally, this chapter explores several company law 
mechanisms that are generally identified as having implications for human rights, with 
a specific focus on piercing the corporate veil and the duty of directors to act in the 
company’s best interests. 
 
2 2 Companies and company structures 
2 2 1 The legal formation, nature and structure of companies 
Companies can take several distinct forms with differing regulations, and they 
operate at the intersection of many areas of law, such as property, contract and 
administrative law. As the Bill of Rights operates across all of these areas, it would be 
incorrect to merely focus on, for instance, its effect on large public companies, or on 
the Act. This chapter thus takes, as a point of departure, the meaning of “companies” 
in the broad sense contemplated by the Act. This part provides a general summary of 
companies and their structure. 
 




The creation of a company is known as its “incorporation”,2 a process which must 
generally meet the requirements of section 13 of the Act.3 This section requires that a 
company’s incorporators complete and sign a Memorandum of Incorporation (“MOI”)4 
and file a Notice of Incorporation, after which the company may be registered.5 The 
MOI must be consistent with the Act, and may determine any internal provisions 
governing the company to the extent that the Act permits such provisions.6 The MOI is 
binding between the company and its shareholders; between shareholders 
themselves; and between the company and its directors.7 
The Act provides that, from the date and time of the incorporation of a company, 
such a company is a juristic person with all the legal powers and capacity of an 
individual, except to the extent that a juristic person is incapable of possessing such 
powers or capacities or where the company’s MOI states otherwise.8 This is referred 
to as “separate juristic personality”,9 and permits the company to be the holder of its 
own assets and liabilities,10 to conclude contracts,11 to commit and suffer delicts,12 and 
to sue and be sued in its own name.13 The juristic person then exists in “perpetual 
succession”,14 meaning that its continued and independent personhood is not affected 
by a change in the identity of its shareholders, directors or employees. 
 
2 See generally MF Cassim “Formation of Companies and the Company Constitution” in FHI 
Cassim (ed) Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2015) 105. 
3 Exceptions are determined by s 8(3) of the Act. For instance, for-profit companies may exist 
outside of the Act if they are formed pursuant to another law. 
4 Cassim “Formation” in Company Law 122-141. 
5 S 14 of the Act. 
6 S 15(1) and (2). 
7 S 15(6). As with directors, the MOI is further binding between the company and other officers 
prescribed by the Act, in the exercise of each of the respective functions of these persons. 
8 Ss 1 and 19(a)-(b) of the Act; R Cassim “The Legal Concept of a Company” in FHI Cassim 
(ed) Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2015) 28 29-31. 
9 PL Davies & S Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 9 ed 
(2012) 37-39; Cassim “The Legal Concept of a Company” in Company Law 31-35. 
10 Davies & Worthington Principles 42-43; Cassim “The Legal Concept of a Company” in 
Company Law 28 36-38, 39. 
11 Cassim “The Concept of a Company” in Company Law 39-40. 
12 McCrae v Absa Bank Limited 2009 JOL 24153 (GSJ). 
13 Davies & Worthington Principles 43. 
14 De Waal v African National Congress Youth League 2019 JOL 41076 (GJ) paras 30-37; 




As will be seen, the Act distinguishes between profit and non-profit companies. Non-
profit companies are generally regulated in the same way as profit companies, 
although the Act has provisions establishing some regulatory differences.15 Profit 
companies will thus be examined first, and thereafter the regulatory differences 
applicable to non-profit companies will be considered. 
 
2 2 2 Profit companies 
Profit companies are so named because they are considered to be run for the profit 
of their shareholders, who are considered investors.16 Natural and juristic persons may 
thus be able to acquire and hold shares in such companies. Shares are authorised and 
issued by the company,17 and are considered to be movable property.18 Shares may 
thus be sold and transferred to others.19 Holding shares may allow the shareholder to 
exercise particular rights with regard to the company.20 Most importantly, shareholders 
may vote21 to amend the MOI, and generally may appoint at least half of the directors 
on the company’s board.22 The “intention” of a company with regard to any of its acts 
is determined by deeming the intention of relevant board-authorised managers to be 
that of the company.23 As a result, shareholders generally ultimately control both the 
rules governing the company and the persons who control and manage it. Importantly, 
companies are able to hold shares in other companies. If a company’s shares in a 
second company amounts to majority voting control over that second company, the 
controlling company is known as the “parent” company, and the controlled company 
 
15 S 10 and sch 1 of the Act. 
16 See generally R Jooste & J Yeats “Shares, Securities and Transfer” in FHI Cassim (ed) 
Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2015) 212; R Cassim “Governance and Shareholders” in 
FHI Cassim (ed) Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2015) 353. 
17 Ss 35-48 of the Act. 
18 S 35(1). 
19 Ss 49-56; Smuts v Booyens, Markplaas (Edms) Bpk v Booyens 2001 3 All SA 536 (A). 
20 S 37 of the Act. See generally Cassim “Governance and Shareholders” in Company Law 
353. 
21 Ss 60-65 of the Act. 
22 S 66(4)(b). 
23 This is known as the directing minds doctrine: see generally Consolidated News Agencies v 
Mobile Telephone Networks 2010 3 SA 382 (SCA); s 332 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 
1977; R Cassim “Governance and the Board of Directors” in FHI Cassim (ed) Contemporary 




as the “subsidiary”.24 Companies are in this way able to form extended networks of 
control over each other. While a parent company may be able to control a subsidiary, 
both are independent juristic persons. The assets and liabilities of each are thus 
separate. 
The rationalisation for shareholder control stems from the traditional notion of shares 
as investment.25 By purchasing a share, a shareholder invests in a company and thus 
earns some degree of control in how the company is run, proportional to their 
investment. In principle, this would allow the investors to ensure that they receive their 
desired returns on their investments. Importantly, the company retains ownership of all 
profit it makes.26 Accordingly, returns to shareholders must be given as “distributions” 
that are generally authorised by the board after certain requirements are met,27 and 
may take several forms (such as dividends or property transfer).28 Shareholders, in 
turn, authorise the remuneration directors receive for their services to the company as 
directors.29 
Critically, a person cannot be held liable for any liabilities or obligations of the 
company by the sole reason of being an incorporator, shareholder or director of the 
company.30 In particular, shareholders can lose no more than the value of their 
investment should the company suffer loss. This is the principle of “limited liability”.31 
The company may also hold directors liable should the latter fail to act in the “best 
interests of the company”.32 This phrase will be considered in some depth below,33 but 
 
24 S 3 of the Act; R Jooste “Groups of Companies and Related Persons” in FHI Cassim (ed) 
Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2015) 194; see for instance Lubbe v Cape Plc (2000) UKHL 
41. 
25 See the discussion of the profit motive and the best interests of the company, part 2 5 2 
below. 
26 Cassim “The Legal Concept of a Company” in Company Law 38-39. 
27 S 46 of the Act. Most importantly, distributions cannot compromise the company’s continued 
operation, and thus must meet certain solvency and liquidity tests as assessed by the board. 
28 See generally R Jooste “Corporate Finance” in FHI Cassim (ed) Contemporary Company 
Law 2 ed (2015) 262 263-294. 
29 S 65(11)(h) of the Act. Shareholders would not have control, however, over directors’ pay 
as employees. 
30 S 19(2) of the Act; Davies & Worthington Principles 39-42; Cassim “The Legal Concept of a 
Company” in Company Law 35-36. 
31 See most prominently Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd (1896) UKHL 1. The exception to this 
is the personal liability company, discussed below. 
32 S 76(3)(b). 




for present purposes it can be noted that profit companies generally follow the principle 
of investors’ control for investors’ financial gain – that is, they are run for shareholder 
profit.34 Separate juristic personality and limited liability encourage such investment 
due to mitigation of risk – as shareholders are not liable for company debts, they cannot 
lose more than the value of their share in the company. Similarly, the company cannot 
be held liable for any debts incurred by shareholders in their personal capacity, and so 
shareholders need not evaluate each other’s solvency before investing. The assets 
and liabilities of the company and its shareholders, and of shareholders between 
themselves, are all fully partitioned from each other.35 
Importantly, shareholders are generally not considered to be under an obligation to 
exercise any standard of control over the company.36 Indeed, a prominent area of 
interest in political-economic company theory concerns the degree to which 
shareholders can (and do) control directors. It is possible, for instance, that directors 
act in their own self-interest, justifying their remuneration through the pursuit of short-
term goals, which are detrimental to the longer-term interest of the company and 
shareholders. This is generally referred to as the “agency problem”.37 Higher 
concentrations of shareholding may overcome this, by incentivising and facilitating 
increased shareholder control over, and engagement in, the company. A prominent 
instance of shareholders’ systemic inability to control directors is considered to have 
been a central cause of the financial crisis of 2007-2008.38 In such cases, external 
regulation may be necessary to ensure control over directors. Empirical research on 
 
34 See the definitions of “profit company” and “non-profit company” in the Act. 
35 H Hansmann & R Kraakman “Organizational Law as Asset Partitioning” (2000) 44 European 
Economic Review 807. This can be contrasted with a partnership or sole proprietorship, where 
there is far less partitioning (or indeed none) between personal assets/liabilities and those of 
the business operation. Personal creditors may thus be able to claim from business assets, 
and business creditors from personal assets. 
36 Living Hands (Pty) Ltd NO v Ditz 2013 2 SA 368 (GSJ). 
37 MS Mizruchi “Berle and Means Revisited: The Governance and Power of Large US 
Corporations” (2004) 33 Theory and Society 579; EF Fama “Agency Problems and the Theory 
of the Firm” (1980) 88 Journal of Political Economy 288; LV Ryan “Shareholders and the Atom 
of Property: Fission or Fusion?” (2000) 39 Business and Society 49. For a broader theoretical 
and historical examination, see P Ireland “Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder 
Ownership” (1999) 62 Modern LR 32. 
38 H Grove, L Patelli, LM Victoravich & P Xu “Corporate Governance and Performance in the 
Wake of the Financial Crisis: Evidence from US Commercial Banks” (2011) 19 Corporate 




shareholder concentration and control in South Africa is needed to establish the 
balance of control between shareholders and directors, and its effect on how 
companies are run. This can in turn have implications for how companies should be 
regulated, and is especially important in light of the recent growth of financial markets 
and large institutional investors.39 
Profit companies can be divided into four sub-categories, each with distinctive 
regulatory implications. These sub-categories are respectively state-owned, private, 
personal liability and public companies.40 A state-owned company is a public entity in 
terms of the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999, or is owned by a municipality,41 
with the State retaining majority ownership control over the company.42 It is subject to 
modified regulation,43 such as being able to receive governmental exemptions from 
certain regulations under the Act, provided that the alternative regulatory scheme still 
achieves the purposes of the Act.44 Such companies are often at the nexus of 
administrative and company law.45 A private company is a non-state-owned company 
whose MOI prohibits the offering of its securities to the public and restricts the transfer 
of these securities.46 A personal liability company is a private company whose MOI 
explicitly states that it is to operate under personal liability principles, rather than the 
usual principle of limited liability.47 Directors and past directors of such a company are 
jointly and severally liable with the company for any company debts contracted during 
 
39 S Ashman, B Fine & S Newman “The Crisis in South Africa: Neoliberalism, Financialization 
and Uneven and Combined Development” (2011) 47 Socialist Register 174. 
40 S 8(2) of the Act. 
41 As per the Act’s definitions. 
42 As per the definitions of the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999. 
43 S 9 of the Act. See generally South African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd v Mpofu (2009) 4 
All SA 169 (GSJ); Maroga v Eskom Holdings Ltd 2011 JDR 1586 (GSJ). 
44 S 9(3) of the Act. As discussed in the introductory chapter, s 7 of the Act lists the Act’s 
purposes, including the promotion of Bill of Rights compliance in the application of company 
law. 
45 See Gama v Transnet Limited 2010 JOL 24972 paras 30-46. 
46 S 8(2)(b) of the Act; Smuts v Booyens, Markplaas (Edms) Bpk en v Booyens 2001 3 All SA 
536 (A). The Companies Act defines “securities” as broader than merely shares. Rather, they 
comprise shares, debentures or other instruments, regardless of form or title, as issued or 
authorised by a profit company. 




their periods in office.48 Finally, any other profit company is considered a public 
company.49 
 
2 2 3 Non-profit companies 
As noted earlier, the Act applies to non-profit companies in largely the same way as 
it does to profit companies, although some regulatory differences exist.50 For instance, 
unlike profit companies, an association not for profit can have the benefits of juristic 
personality without being formally incorporated in terms of the Act.51 Most prominently, 
however, non-profit companies must have at least one stated object in their MOI, which 
must relate to cultural or social activities or communal or group interests, or otherwise 
be for public benefit.52 Such a company must use all its assets and income in pursuit 
of its stated objects, rather than for shareholder gain.53 Thus, a non-profit company 
does not have shareholders, but may have members54 who may have voting rights in 
controlling the company.55 As it is not run for the members’ financial gain, a non-profit 
company cannot transfer its income or assets to its incorporators, members or 
directors, with some narrow exceptions (such as bona fide remuneration for services 
rendered in pursuing the non-profit objects).56 On the winding up or dissolution of a 
non-profit company, members or directors (past and present) may only receive 
payment as company creditors.57 The remaining net value of the company is not 
distributed to members, but to other similar non-profit companies.58 In sum, then, a 
 
48 S 19(3); Fundtrust (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) v Van Deventer 1997 1 All SA 644 (A). 
49 S 8(d) of the Act. 
50 S 10 and sch 1 of the Act. See for instance Cuninghame v First Ready Development 249 
2010 5 SA 325 (SCA); Khan v Communicare 2012 JOL 29360. 
51 S 8(3) of the Act. However, the association’s constitution would have to explicitly state these 
benefits, such as perpetual succession and limited liability: Mitchells Plain Town Centre 
Merchants Association v McLeod 1996 4 SA 159 (SCA); La Lucia Sands Share Block Ltd v 
Flexi Holiday Club 2012 3 All SA 49 (SCA); Huey Extreme Club v McDonald VA Sport 
Helicopters 2005 1 SA 486 (C). 
52 S 1 of sch 1 of the Act. 
53 S 10(2)(a) of the Act. Subject to this, s 10(2)(b) notes that non-profit companies may carry 
on any business or trade or acquire and hold securities in profit companies. 
54 S 4 of sch 1 of the Act. 
55 S 10(3) and (4) of the Act. 
56 S 3 of sch 1 of the Act. 
57 S 1(4)(a) of sch 1. 




non-profit company only allows for members to benefit if such benefit is in line with the 
stated non-profit object. 
 
2 3 Companies as arising in the law and subject to the Constitution 
While the Companies Act is the most recent and extensive development of company 
law, companies are generally regulated by both the Act and the common law. Several 
observations can be made regarding this intersection. First, the common law continues 
to regulate companies where the Companies Act does not apply,59 and certain 
common law remedies are explicitly retained by the Act.60 Second, certain Companies 
Act remedies rely explicitly on common-law principles and their development.61 Third, 
common-law principles inform the interpretation of the Act’s provisions.62 Fourth, 
common-law principles may be tangentially related to company law.63 Finally, as 
specifically concerns human rights law and companies, the Bill of Rights itself uses the 
common law to fill any human rights lacunae in legislation. Section 8(3) of the 
Constitution holds that, where persons (including companies) are bound to fulfil a right 
in the Bill, a court must develop the common law to either give effect to that right or 
justifiably limit it (to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right). Thus, 
if the Act cannot provide an adequate remedy for a human rights violation, the common 
law must be developed to do so. 
As the following chapter will consider in greater depth,64 the Constitution is the 
foundation of all South African law, and all such law derives its force only from the 
 
59 AJ van der Walt “Normative Pluralism and Anarchy: Reflections on the 2007 Term” (2008) 1 
Constitutional Court Review 107. 
60 Such as s 20(8), concerning validity of company actions; s 95(6), retaining common law 
liability for public offerings; and s 161(2), retaining any remedy available to a securities-holder 
in terms of the common law subject to the Act. 
61 Such as s 77(2), concerning directors’ liability for breach of fiduciary duty or by delict for 
breach of the duty of care, skill and diligence; s 158(a), requiring a court to develop the 
common law as necessary to improve the realisation and enjoyment of rights established by 
the Act; and s 218(2), which holds that any person who contravenes a provision of the Act may 
be held liable for loss caused by that contravention. 
62 Such as s 76(3)(b), which requires directors to act “in the best interests of the company”. 
This is read as equivalent to the same duty at common law. See part 2 5 2 below. 
63 For instance, the common law of property may be implicated throughout business rescue 
proceedings in chapter 6 of the Act. 




Constitution.65 The Act and common law of companies are also subject to the Bill of 
Rights in particular.66 The Constitution, the Act and the common law applicable to 
companies thus form a single system of law.67 This system fully describes the 
capacities and duties of, and relations between, the company and all persons involved 
in its running. Accordingly, South African companies and their powers and functions 
originate in law, and ultimately derive their validity from the Constitution and Bill of 
Rights. This implies that all regulation and conduction of companies is equally subject 
to the Bill of Rights.68 This is not only the case for companies themselves. Any lawful 
economic relation – such as a contract of sale or property ownership – is underpinned 
by a relationship in law. Economic relations are thus, at their base, legal relations. 
Capitalism cannot exist without State law and force.69 As all legal relations are subject 
to the Constitution, the conclusion is that all economic relations are subject to the 
Constitution.70 
While the above is the simplest description of the legal principle underlying South 
African constitutional law, there are conflicting theoretical views in other jurisdictions. 
As will be seen later in this chapter, the question of the legal nature of a company is 
closely linked to the question of in whose interests it should be run. Theories which 
hold that the sole purpose of a company is to produce shareholder profit tend to align 
with the position that companies and company law should not (or even cannot) be 
regulated for purposes such as social good or human rights. It must be noted, however, 
that while these theories and debates on the nature of companies have historically 
been considered central to questions of company regulation, they are generally 
unnecessary in the modern South African legal system. The Constitution’s 
transformative approach requires a move beyond the legal formalism of company 
 
65 Ss 1(c) and 2 of the Constitution; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: 
In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 44. 
66 S 8(1) of the Constitution. 
67 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In re Ex Parte President of the 
Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 44. 
68 D Bilchitz “Corporate Law and the Constitution: Towards Binding Human Rights 
Responsibilities for Corporations” (2008) 125 SALJ 754 780-781. 
69 S Terreblanche Lost in Transformation (2012) 31-40; K Pistor The Code of Capital: How the 
Law Creates Wealth and Inequality (2019), especially 1-22. 




theories.71 All law is subject to the Bill of Rights, regardless of whether that law is 
considered public or private, and whether such a divide is relevant. Companies and 
company regulation are accordingly subject to human rights regulation. The pertinent 
question is rather how precisely the Bill of Rights interacts with companies and 
company law.72 To address this question properly, however, it is necessary to first 
examine specific company law mechanisms that have possible implications for human 
rights.  
 
2 4 Systemic and atomistic conceptions of companies 
South African scholars have broadly considered how companies and company law 
may be affected by the Bill of Rights.73 As noted previously,74 the Companies Act states 
that one of its purposes is to promote compliance with the Bill of Rights in the 
application of company law,75 but there has otherwise been little perceptible regulatory 
change in company law as regards human rights. In the absence of major 
developments by the judiciary or legislature, scholars have focused on using this stated 
purpose to consider the possible implications of human rights for existing company law 
 
71 AJ van der Walt “Tradition on Trial: A Critical Analysis of the Civil-Law Tradition in South 
African Property Law” (1994) 11 SAJHR 169 203-205; DM Davis & K Klare “Transformative 
Constitutionalism and the Common and Customary Law” (2010) 26 SAJHR 403 411; J van der 
Walt “Piracy, Property and Plurality: Re-Reading the Foundations of Modern Law” 
(2001) TSAR 52; Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 
2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 343; S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a 
Transformative Constitution (2010) 28-42. See chapter three. 
72 See chapter three. 
73 See Bilchitz (2008) SALJ 780-783; C Samaradiwakera-Wijesundara “Business and Human 
Rights: To What Extent Has the Constitution Transformed the Obligations of Business? 
Conference Paper: Twenty Years of South African Constitutionalism” (14-11-2014) New York 
Law School Law Review Papers 4-5, 24 <http://www.nylslawreview.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/16/2014/11/Samaradiwakera-Wijesundara.pdf> (accessed 25-09-
2019); M Gwanyanya “The South African Companies Act and the Realisation of Corporate 
Human Rights Responsibilities” (2015) 18 PER 3102; J Katzew “Crossing the Divide Between 
the Business of the Corporation and the Imperatives of Human Rights – The Impact of Section 
7 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008” (2011) 128 SALJ 686; L Smit “Binding Corporate Human 
Rights Obligations: A Few Observations from the South African Legal Framework” (2016) 1 
Business and Human Rights Journal 349. 
74 Chapter one part 1 1 3. 




mechanisms.76 They thus focus on how individual companies may be deterred from 
committing rights violations, or how human rights remedies can be ordered against 
them, within the existing framework of company law. This approach – which may be 
termed an “atomistic approach” – is predominant in the present domestic legal study 
of the field.77 The aim of this approach is to reform company law specifically, deterring 
individual companies from committing what are deemed unreasonable violations in 
their daily operation, and to provide remedies for victims. In sum, when evaluating 
whether or not a right has been infringed, this approach focuses on the conduct 
committed by individual companies, whether such conduct amounts to a violation, and 
what remedy the company must provide for that individual violation. Regulatory reform 
is intended to facilitate the appropriate deterrence and remedy. These authors have 
thus identified several existing company law mechanisms as being particularly relevant 
to Bill of Rights litigation, in particular the doctrine of “piercing the corporate veil”,78 and 
the directors’ duty to act in the “best interests of the company”.79 Further, there are 
some civil and criminal remedies under the Act that have been identified as potentially 
useful for human rights purposes.80  
As the literature centres on this approach and these doctrines and mechanisms, 
this chapter presents these as central to the understanding of “companies” and 
“company law” where human rights law is concerned. Accordingly, recommendations 
for reform will later be made in respect of these specific doctrines and mechanisms, 
building on the existing scholarship. However, it is important to note that alternative 
approaches to the conceptualisation of company law may lead to significantly different 
implications for reform. For instance, an alternative conceptual approach is to 
consider the systemic role of companies and company law in South Africa’s political-
 
76 Katzew (2011) SALJ 688-694; Gwanyanya (2015) PER 3108-3109; Smit (2016) BHRJ 354-
355; Samaradiwakera-Wijesundara “Business and Human Rights” NYLSLRP 2-5, 7-11, 15-18. 
77 The approach is similar for developments and discussions at the international level: see 
chapter four. 
78 Bilchitz (2008) SALJ 786-789; Samaradiwakera-Wijesundara “Business and Human Rights” 
NYLSLRP 15-18; Smit (2016) BHRJ 350-352; Katzew (2011) SALJ 700-704. 
79 Bilchitz (2008) SALJ 780-783; Samaradiwakera-Wijesundara “Business and Human Rights” 
NYLSLRP 7-11; Gwanyanya (2015) PER 3109-3111; Katzew (2011) SALJ 691-694, 704-709. 
80 Such as s 218(2) of the Act: Samaradiwakera-Wijesundara “Business and Human Rights” 
NYLSLRP 11; Cassim “The Legal Concept of a Company” in Company Law 65; MF Cassim 
“Enforcement and Regulatory Agencies” in FHI Cassim (ed) Contemporary Company Law 2 




economic context. There is support for such an approach in some legal academic 
literature,81 especially in the recent work of Pistor.82 Further support for systemic 
approaches to economic relations can be found in diverse fields, such as political 
theory and economy,83 history,84 philosophy,85 sociology,86 psychology,87 and anti-
racial and decolonial theory.88 The immense, varied and historied body of anti-
capitalist critique and literature strongly supports systemic analysis.89 Such a 
“systemic approach” would examine the political, social and economic functions and 
effects of the State, companies and company-related law generally. Thus – in contrast 
 
81 FS Cohen “Dialogue on Private Property” (1954) 9 Rutgers LR 357; MR Cohen “Property 
and Sovereignty” (1927) 13 Cornell LR 8; MR Cohen “The Basis of Contract” 46 Harv LR 553; 
JL Harrison “Class, Personality, Contract and Unconscionability” (1994) 35 William & Mary LR 
445; Ireland (1999) Modern LR 32 44-45; D Harvey A Companion to Marx’s Capital (2019), 
especially at 50-51, 139-140, 158. 
82 Pistor Capital (2019). 
83 Ashman, Fine & Newman (2011) Socialist Register; S Terreblanche A History of Inequality 
in South Africa: 1652-2002 (2002) 8-17, 56-65, 153-415; Terreblanche Transformation; H 
Wolpe “Capitalism and Cheap Labour-Power in South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid” 
(1972) 1 Economy and Society 425; RL Hale “Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-
Coercive State” (1923) 38 Political Science Quarterly 470. 
84 J Dewey “The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality” (1926) 35 Yale LJ 655; 
N Faulkner A Radical History of the World (2018) 165-187, 268-274, 438-446, 471-499. 
85 L Crocker “Marx’s Concept of Exploitation” (1972) 2 Social Theory and Practice 201; MR 
Cohen “Communal Ghosts and Other Perils in Social Philosophy” (1919) 16 Journal of 
Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 673. 
86 WP Archibald “Marx, Globalization and Alienation: Received and Underappreciated 
Wisdoms” (2009) 35 Critical Sociology 151; A Shantz, K Alfes & C Truss “Alienation from Work: 
Marxist Ideologies and Twenty-First-Century Practice” (2014) 25 International Journal of 
Human Resource Management 2529. 
87 I Crinson & C Yuill “What Can Alienation Theory Contribute to an Understanding of Social 
Inequalities in Health?” (2008) 38 International Journal of Health Services 455. 
88 T Madlingozi “Social Justice in a Time of Neo-Apartheid Constitutionalism: Critiquing the 
Anti-Black Economy of Recognition, Incorporation and Distribution” (2017) 123 Stell LR 123; 
S Makgetlaneng “How Capitalism and Racism Continue to Shape the Socio-Economic 
Structure of South Africa” (2016) 46 Africanus 1 6-7; D Masondo “Capitalism and Racist Forms 
of Political Domination” (2007) 37 Africanus 66 68-72; R Fine “The Antimonies of Neo-
Marxism” (1990) 11 Transformation 92 92-94; S Biko I Write What I Like (2005) 21-25, 27-32, 
48-50; JM Modiri “Towards a ‘(Post-)apartheid’ Critical Race Jurisprudence: ‘Divining Our 
Racial Themes’” (2012) 27 SAPL 231; SE Merry “Law and Colonialism” (1991) 25 Law & 
Society Review 889. 
89 See the sources listed above. Most historically prominent in this regard is Marxist literature; 




to the atomistic approach – the systemic approach views companies, the law affecting 
them, the wider economy and the State as a collective system. The entire economic 
system is thus viewed as underpinned by the legal system and State enforcement. 
The systemic approach examines whether this system, considered holistically, gives 
rise to rights violations. Company law is thus not considered in isolation, but rather 
seen as deeply linked to other legal fields – most notably property and contract law – 
and connected to questions of equality and political-economic democracy. Moreover, 
the functions and effects of companies are not reified as abstract economic or legal 
principles.90 Rather, the law is properly seen as a historic and sociological product of 
political-economic power relations, with these relations reciprocally supported and 
shaped by the law. The systemic approach thus studies companies in context, as a 
historical result of political-economic relations manifesting in law. 
Some practical examples illustrate the difference in these two approaches. First, the 
atomistic approach may consider whether specific companies violate the rights of their 
workers. The systemic approach may instead consider the combined effect of unequal 
wealth distribution and shareholder/director control for profit to assess the overall 
structural impact on all workers and unemployed people in the country. Second, the 
atomistic approach could consider whether a company’s operations unreasonably 
pollute its environs. The systemic approach may instead consider how the structure of 
the economy as a whole may drive companies to pollute wherever profitable lest they 
become uncompetitive and fail, and thus how there may be a deep tension between 
economic growth and environmental rights. The role of companies and company law 
in perpetuating structural inequality, the effect of wealth distribution on political and 
economic democracy, and the relations between political and economic power centres, 
could all only be considered if companies were viewed systemically.91 
The systemic approach thus potentially allows for a richer and more substantive 
understanding of companies and company-related law than the atomistic approach. By 
focusing on the conduct of companies individually, the atomistic approach inherently 
presumes the systemic capitalist background as acceptable or “normal”, and thus 
automatically sees the effects of this background as non-violations of human rights. By 
 
90 Cohen (1919) Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 673 682; Dewey 
(1926) Yale LJ 655; FS Cohen “Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach” 
(1935) 35 Colum LR 809 811. 
91 Terreblanche Inequality 8-17, 56-65, 153-415; Makgetlaneng (2016) Africanus 6-7; Masondo 




contrast, the systemic approach allows for a far deeper perception of rights violations, 
and potentially provides a more critical interrogation of South Africa’s political-
economic structuring as concerns human rights. Following a systemic approach may 
thus lead to a normative shift in what is perceived as a human rights violation, and thus 
in how human rights are conceived and fulfilled. Such an approach would also align 
more closely with the concept of transformative constitutionalism.92 
However, the present literature and jurisprudence on business and human rights 
law has not meaningfully engaged with the systemic approach. An exception is 
Samaradiwakera-Wijesundara, who calls for a paradigm shift in the conception of the 
structural role and function of the company in modern South African society.93 Thus, 
while important to note that the systemic approach exists as an alternative to the 
atomistic approach, it is not presently the conceptual approach in South African human 
rights law where companies are concerned. This thesis focuses on the present 
approach to companies and company law. An exploration of the full implications and 
possibilities of a systemic approach are beyond the scope of the current study. 
However, the systemic approach will nevertheless be partly considered in the context 
of transformative constitutionalism, and an argument developed that it is generally 
more consonant with transformative constitutionalism than the prevailing atomistic 
approach.94 
This chapter proceeds to set out a basic description of the doctrines and 
mechanisms presented in existing business and human rights law literature. This will 
more fully build a foundational understanding of the meaning of “companies” and 
“company law” where the Bill of Rights is concerned. The following chapters will then 
consider how precisely the Bill of Rights applies to companies and company law as 
thus conceived, and proposals for the reform of these doctrines and mechanisms will 
thereafter be considered.  
 
2 5 Significant company law mechanisms implicating human rights 
2 5 1 Piercing the corporate veil 
As noted earlier, companies are granted separate juristic personality in terms of the 
Act, and shareholders and directors generally cannot be liable for company debts by 
 
92 See chapter three part 3 2 2. 
93 Samaradiwakera-Wijesundara “Business and Human Rights” NYLSLRP 16-17. 




reason of those capacities alone.95 However, South African courts have recognised 
that they have the power in common law to ignore the company’s separate juristic 
personality to the extent necessary in a matter.96 As such, they are able to attribute 
liabilities directly to shareholders in certain circumstances, and thus “pierce the 
corporate veil”.97 As concerns human rights, the question is whether, and how, this 
section could serve to allow for the piercing of the veil (and shareholder liability) in 
cases of human rights abuses. 
There are no strict criteria for when courts will pierce the veil, and the courts have 
held that a flexible approach is necessary.98 However, courts have shown that they will 
pierce the veil where separate juristic personality is abused in a “fraudulent, dishonest 
or improper way” or where it is in the interests of justice.99 It is thus not a matter of 
holding shareholders liable for abuses by the company, but of holding shareholders 
liable for their own abuse of the company structure. The underlying reasoning appears 
to be that separate juristic personality is a benefit granted in law, and as such it can be 
revoked if unreasonably abused.100 This could equally apply to a group of companies 
functioning as an economic unit and abusing their separate personalities.101 
The Companies Act also provides a statutory form of piercing. Under the Act, if an 
interested person makes an application, or during any proceedings involving a 
company, a court can find the incorporation, use or acts of a company constitute an 
“unconscionable abuse of the juristic personality of the company as a separate 
entity”.102 In such a case, the court may pierce the veil as under the common law, and 
 
95 S 19(1) and (2) of the Act. 
96 Ex parte application of Gore NO 2013 3 SA 382 (WCC) para 4; see also Hulse-Reutter v 
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make any further order necessary to give effect to the piercing order. Statutory piercing 
has been considered separate and parallel to the common law remedy.103 However, 
the difference in wording – fraudulent, dishonest or improper abuse, as opposed to 
unconscionable abuse – makes it unclear whether it is stricter or more lenient a 
standard than that of the common law.104 At common law, it is not necessary that the 
abuse be “unconscionable”.105 However, the High Court has seen the statutory 
mechanism as being a lower standard with far broader remedial powers to give any 
further appropriate order.106 Statutory piercing may thus be a stronger mechanism than 
common law piercing. 
Overall, however, in both common and statutory law, the matter of piercing generally 
appears to be a matter of interpretation in the circumstances. Importantly, as limited 
liability reduces the risk of shareholders experiencing loss in business dealings, 
reintroducing shareholder liability by veil-piercing may deter companies from 
committing human rights violations. Further, it may be a means of ensuring an 
adequate remedy to victims of violations by, for instance, allowing compensation to be 
ordered against shareholders where the company is insolvent. 
 
2 5 2 The directors’ duty to act in the best interests of the company 
Two central issues in company law relate to the governance of companies. The first 
examines who controls or runs a company, and the second considers in whose interest 
the company should be run. Regarding control, and as noted earlier, shareholders are 
generally considered to control a company, while the board directs it, and managers 
and other employees carry out the board’s directions. There are indeed debates about 
the degree to which shareholders are able to exercise meaningful control over 
directors,107 but overall control is generally exercised by the joint group of shareholders 
and directors. 
 
103 Ex parte application of Gore NO 2013 3 SA 382 (WCC) para 34. 
104 FHI Cassim “Introduction to the New Companies Act: General Overview of the Act” in FHI 
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The more significant question concerns in whose interest companies should be run. 
Importantly, the company is able to hold directors liable should directors breach their 
duty to act in the “best interests of the company”.108 It is necessary to consider various 
interpretations of this duty as it stands, before considering the possible impact of the 
Constitution. As this duty is core to the structure and rationale of the company as an 
entity, it requires a simultaneous examination of theories of the company as an 
institution, and of models of corporate governance. 
 
2 5 2 1 Theories of the company and corporate governance models 
During the early development of company law, academics were critical of the 
personification of the company, and of its ability to have its own “interests” as a legal 
fiction.109 As already noted, a company cannot have a mind, and so its “intention” is 
decided in law by deeming the intentions of the directors and managers to be those of 
the company.110 Similarly, given that it is a legal fiction, a company does not have 
inherent “best interests”. Rather, the scope of the duty is wholly determined by how it 
is interpreted. This has important implications for human rights. Firstly, it can be asked 
if “the best interests of the company” can or should encompass the interests of human 
rights stakeholders – that is, people whose human rights are implicated by the 
company’s operations. Secondly, it can further be asked if this interpretation effectively 
promotes human rights, and if it could provide an effective human rights remedy if 
breached. Practically, this is an enquiry as to how deeply human rights (and rights-
holders’ interests) are incorporated into the governance of the company. This is 
important, as the fulfilment or non-violation of relevant rights may be wholly at odds 
with a company’s business goals, with rights accordingly being violated in pursuit of 
these goals. The interactions between company interests and human rights thus 
warrant close attention. 
 
108 This duty arose in common law: Davies & Worthington Principles 505-507. The Act for the 
first time refers to and codifies the same duty in s 76(3)(b): Cassim “Introduction to the New 
Companies Act” in Company Law 19; FHI Cassim “The Duties and the Liability of Directors” in 
FHI Cassim (ed) Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2015) 505 514-517. 
109 Dewey (1926) Yale LJ 655; Cohen (1919) JPPSM 682; Cohen (1935) Colum LR 809-814, 
820-821. 
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There are generally two distinct conceptions of the company and its motive, which 
are outlined in the famous 1930s debate between Berle and Dodd in the United 
States.111 Berle believed that companies served only to benefit their shareholders, as 
the company only had operating capital because of the shareholders.112 Directors were 
thus simply fiduciaries over the private property (or capital) of shareholders, by a series 
of contracts in private law. Any powers exercised by the company or its directors could 
only be exercised for the shareholders’ benefit, as an expression of the shareholders’ 
control over their property.113 In Berle’s view, companies owed no duty to society at 
large, or to any other stakeholders. Such a duty, if it existed, would be performed fully 
by the company’s paying tax. This approach is known as the “shareholder primacy” 
model, and relies on several capitalist economic theories.114 In particular, it relies on a 
specific conception of private control over private property, and of self-interested 
control in a market economy generally being perceived as leading to optimal social 
benefits.115 The shareholder primacy model thus sees the wider economy as producing 
social good if individual companies act only in their own interest, and follow the sole 
 
111 AA Berle “Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust” (1931) 44 Harv LR 1049; EM Dodd “For 
Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?” (1932) 45 Harv LR 1145 1145-1163; AA Sommer 
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Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry v Stilfontein Gold Mining Company Limited 2006 5 SA 
333 (W) para 16.9. 
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motive of pursuing profit.116 For Berle, the “best interests of the company” thus meant 
shareholder profit.117 
A prominent variant of this model is termed the “enlightened shareholder value” 
model.118 Here, the company may take the interests of other stakeholders into account, 
but only as far as these benefit the shareholders. That is, shareholder interests retain 
primacy, but it is understood that such primacy may benefit other stakeholders 
indirectly.119 Other stakeholders’ interests do not have value in and of themselves, but 
are merely a means to an end.120 Accordingly, there is little difference between 
enlightened shareholder value and shareholder primacy models, as both seek only to 
maximise shareholder profit. 
Shareholder primacy tends to align with two theories of the company, namely the 
contract (or inherence) and natural entity theories. The contract theory holds that 
company structures could theoretically arise merely from the private common law of 
contract and property.121 Separate personality and limited liability would thus be 
benefits arising from contractual arrangement between shareholders and creditors. 
Hessen even argues that such common law structures were in fact developing until 
legislatures actively outlawed them, and that legislatures thus improperly subjected all 
companies to control and regulation.122 The natural entity theory of the company 
similarly holds that companies are factual and consensual social relations which simply 
need recognition and enforcement by the law, but that the law should have no 
 
116 Importantly, a non-profit company acting in pursuit of its own social or public benefit interests 
may nonetheless infringe on human rights. Accordingly, while this part focuses on the historical 
and theoretical conception of the profit company, it still bears relevance for non-profit 
companies. 
117 The present discussion focuses on the principle of the directors’ duty to run the company 
for shareholder profit. However, as noted earlier, there is also the existing agency problem of 
directors running companies for their own short-term gain, rather than for longer-term 
shareholder profit: see part 2 2 above. 
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discretion as to whether to give this recognition and enforcement.123 These theories 
generally depict legislative regulation as illegitimate interference with shareholders’ 
private property and contractual relations. The State’s duty is perceived as limited to 
enforcing and protecting the shareholders’ decisions as to how their property is 
mobilised for profit. These theories thus rely on a rigid conceptual divide between 
public and private law, with public interest regulation being unable to interfere with 
private property and contract. 
An altogether different approach was advocated by Dodd, who believed that a 
company also necessarily had to serve the social good and benefit other stakeholders 
(including employees, creditors, consumers, society and the environment).124 Dodd 
held that the common law, charters and statutes governing corporations had always 
originated in state power. Therefore, at least in principle, company law was always 
premised on policy decisions taken by law-makers in the public interest, and their work 
was closely monitored by the State.125 All companies were thus public entities by their 
very nature, rather than being private entities for private benefit. As they served public 
functions and exercised public power,126 they should assume social responsibility akin 
to that of the State.127 Any perceived freedom of private property use in business was 
a result of the policy-based regulation of business, rather than such freedom being 
determinative of policy and regulation. The consequence is that even profit companies 
do not (and cannot) have a fully private profit motive, as they are equally public entities. 
Berle himself did in fact note earlier common-law authorities’ formulation that a 
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company cannot be incorporated without state authority,128 and later conceded that 
Dodd’s position was likely correct.129 
As public actors, directors would thus have to consider other stakeholders’ interests 
as independently valuable in and of themselves – they were not to be regarded as 
contingent on their indirect value to shareholders’ interests. This is known as the 
“stakeholder inclusive” or “pluralist” model.130 It closely aligns with the concession 
theory of the company, which holds that companies exist only as a special concession 
made by the legislature as a matter of public policy. The concession is a benefit granted 
to business actors – an exemption from the traditional rules of personal liability, 
allowing companies to exist as separate juristic persons with separate liability.131 As 
these are benefits granted by the legislature, they may equally be regulated, limited or 
withdrawn by the legislature for policy reasons.132 As noted above, in South Africa this 
concession would also be subject to the Bill of Rights.133 
 
2 5 2 2 The corporate governance model in South Africa 
South African company law has historically adhered to a shareholder primacy 
approach, following the legal tradition in common law jurisdictions.134 In other words, 
directors were required to act in the “best interests of the company”, interpreted as the 
shareholders’ interest in profit. As discussed,135 in the lead-up to the drafting of the 
new Companies Act, the Department of Trade and Industry published a policy 
document titled Company Law for the 21st Century: Guidelines for Corporate Reform 
(“the Guidelines”).136 The Guidelines provided a number of guiding recommendations 
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for corporate reform in the modern South Africa. It noted that, due to the isolation and 
sanctions imposed by the international community in response to the formal apartheid 
regime, South Africa’s corporate law had fallen behind international best practice and 
norms.137 As a result, the Guidelines committed to strongly imbuing South African 
company law with the values and principles of the Constitution and Bill of Rights,138 
mindful of constitutional obligations and the South African historical, social and 
economic context.139 
On this basis, the Guidelines firmly held to a vision of South African company law 
based on the pluralist model.140 They made repeated reference to non-shareholder 
concepts, such as “social renewal”,141 the company as a “social institution”,142 “social 
and economic [factors]”,143 and that a company’s “pursuit of economic objectives 
should be constrained by social imperatives”.144 Most significantly, the Guidelines 
expressly break with traditional shareholder primacy, and stress that other stakeholder 
interests have independent value.145 Despite these statements, some authors consider 
that the Guidelines in fact adhere to an enlightened shareholder model.146 Most 
prominently, Mongalo (who worked on the reform process within the Department of 
Trade and Industry) holds that the designers of the Guidelines did not intend the 
recognition of stakeholder interests to the detriment of shareholders.147 
In any event, the Companies Act maintains the common law definition of the “best 
interests of the company”, thereby implying an ongoing focus on shareholder value in 
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the absence of provisions to the contrary.148 Further, as the directors owe their duty 
solely to the company, only the company itself (under direction of the shareholders) 
possesses an action against directors for breach of this duty.149 Other stakeholders 
may claim for breach only indirectly, through a derivative action in terms of section 165 
of the Act. Under strict conditions, such an action allows any person to make a claim 
on behalf of the company against the directors for breach, but such a claim must still 
be in the best interests of the company.150 The focus thus remains on loss suffered by 
the company, rather than on the loss suffered independently by other stakeholders.151 
There have been arguments in support of a broader view of the company’s interests, 
apart from human rights considerations. In Teck Corp Ltd v Millar,152 for instance, it 
was held that acting in the interests of employees is acting in the interests of the 
company itself. Cassim firmly holds that South African courts should follow this 
approach, as failing to do so would mark a return to shareholder primacy.153 However, 
while consciously balancing employee and shareholder interests is a positive step, it 
is not clear how such balancing is to be done. Elsewhere, the Act states that listed and 
state-owned companies, and other significant companies, must generally appoint a 
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social and ethics committee.154 This committee must monitor the company’s activities, 
mindful of compliance with all applicable legislation and codes, and good corporate 
social responsibility generally. This does indirectly compel these companies to 
consider environmental and social stakeholders. However, the relative weakness of 
Committee, and its integration with the company, may lead to a formalistic “box-ticking” 
approach to social imperatives rather than substantively realigning the company’s 
governance priorities.155 Moreover, there is again no enforceable remedy for 
stakeholders outside of derivative actions.156 At best, the duties on the social and ethics 
committee may be enforced by means of a compliance notice under section 171 of the 
Act. Such a notice allows the Companies Commission or Panel to enforce compliance 
with the Act.157 However, this still does not ensure that other stakeholder interests have 
independent value in director decisions. 
Accordingly, outside of the suggested reforms proposed by human rights 
academics,158 modern South African company law appears to still adhere to a model 
of shareholder/director control for shareholder gain. 
It is necessary, however, to briefly consider the corporate governance impact of the 
King Report and Code on Corporate Governance, recently in its fourth incarnation 
(“King” or “the Code”).159 This prominent corporate governance instrument is voluntary, 
and does not give rise to legal obligations.160 Instead, it is enforced privately. 
Compliance with King is a requirement for listing on the JSE, and there is a belief that 
the market punishes any major company that does not comply with King, as such 
companies may be considered a poor and possibly unethical investment.161 However, 
it must again be borne in mind that investor interests do not necessarily align with those 
of other stakeholders. An unethical company may increase shareholder value by 
exploiting rights. In the absence of legal proceedings that affect profits, such a 
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company may still be an attractive investment. This is especially the case where 
investors do not (or cannot) meaningfully assess and respond a company’s ethical 
performance. The market enforcement of King may thus be limited. Beyond King’s 
intended private enforcement, however, the courts have occasionally used duties 
under King to inform the standards of conduct that applicable companies should meet, 
thereby crystallising the voluntary code into legal obligations.162 
King IV, like its predecessor, expressly follows what it terms a pluralistic stakeholder 
model, rather than one of shareholder primacy.163 It defines “stakeholders” as groups 
or individuals who can be reasonably expected to be “significantly affected” by a 
business’ activities, outputs or outcomes, or whose actions can be reasonably 
expected to “significantly affect” the business’ ability to create value over time.164 
Shareholders’ interests as capital providers are thus deprioritised, giving rise to 
“stakeholder inclusivity” – one of the central principles of King IV.165 Under such a 
model, shareholder interests do not have predetermined precedence. Rather, any 
material stakeholders’ interests have intrinsic value, and may even clash with those of 
shareholders.166 King further recommends “triple-bottom-line” reporting, promoting 
transparency with regard to its “triple context” of economic, social and environmental 
impacts.167 
However, King’s effect on the standard corporate governance model is likely very 
limited. The report claims to apply to all organisations, regardless of model or structure, 
but it is unlikely that King is known of or followed by smaller business structures, 
especially where there is no enforcement. The Code’s reliance on private enforcement 
by investors, who stand to lose if a model of stakeholder inclusivity is followed, further 
restricts the uptake of such a model. “Triple-bottom-line” reporting has also been 
shown to not result in stakeholder interests being meaningfully considered or 
upheld.168 The report itself stresses that the balancing of stakeholder interests must 
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remain in the longer-term “best interests of the organisation” as a separate legal 
entity.169 This revives the same interpretative difficulties as with the Act’s definition of 
“the best interests of the company”. Most importantly, the Code cannot override 
legislation,170 and so its model of “stakeholder inclusivity” remains restricted by the 
interpretation of the Act’s requirement that directors act in the “best interests of the 
company”.171 
In sum, South African company law in practice follows – in the absence of clear 
reform – the traditional common law principle of shareholders/directors controlling the 
company for shareholder profit. This manifests as the directors’ duty to act in “best 
interests of the company”. However, even outside of explicit human rights 
considerations, there is significant reason to judicially reinterpret this duty, although 
legislative amendments would be clearer and more desirable.172 Clarity in this regard 
is crucial, as the duty informs the core purpose, governance and direction of companies 
in South Africa. It may be that human rights infringements immediately cause loss to a 
company, and so human rights and shareholder interests fully overlap. It is more likely, 
however, that human rights are infringed in the pursuit of value for shareholders.173 
While the potential effect of the Bill of Rights on the directors’ duty to act in the “best 
interests of the company” will be considered later,174 it can be noted here that without 
explicit and clear regulation to the contrary, companies will likely continue to be run for 
profit at the expense of rights. 
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2 5 3 Civil and criminal mechanisms under the Companies Act 
Outside of piercing the corporate veil and the directors’ duty to act in the “best 
interests of the company”, the Act contains some provisions that are likely relevant to 
human rights considerations. Section 218(2) of the Act declares that a person who 
contravenes the Act, thereby causing another person loss or damage, may be held 
liable by that other person for that loss or damage.175 This is a general civil remedy for 
loss arising from the contravention of the Act, and may allow some relief for victims of 
human rights violations. Any contravention of the Act which causes a human rights 
violation would appear to be actionable. Further, the remedy appears to allow for strict 
liability, with proof of fault or negligence unnecessary.176 However, it is unclear whether 
any human rights violation would automatically contravene the Act, as there are no 
explicit provisions to this effect. This remedy also only imposes liability for loss or 
damage suffered. This implies that it only provides compensatory remedies, rather 
than broader constitutional remedies.177 
In terms of criminal sanctions, one of the explicit goals of the reform process was to 
drastically narrow the scope of criminal liability for companies and business actors.178 
As a result, criminal sanctions are now only imposed for the disclosure of certain forms 
of confidential information;179 committing fraud or misrepresentation in various ways;180 
and hindering the administration of the Act.181 In terms of relevance to potential human 
rights enforcement, the Act states that non-compliance with a compliance notice is an 
offence.182 Such notices are issued to any person who contravenes the Act, or who 
 
175 Cassim “The Legal Concept of a Company” in Company Law 65; Cassim “Enforcement and 
Regulatory Agencies” in Company Law 858. 
176 Cassim “Enforcement and Regulatory Agencies” in Company Law 832-833. 
177 For an extensive consideration, see M Bishop “Remedies” in S Woolman, M Bishop & J 
Brickhill (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2008). 
178 Guidelines 11; Cassim “Introduction to the New Companies Act” in Company Law 26; 
Cassim “Enforcement and Regulatory Agencies” in Company Law 853-857; Davis & Geach 
Companies 291-293. 
179 S 213 of the Act. 
180 S 214. 
181 S 215. 
182 S 214(3); Cassim “Enforcement and Regulatory Agencies” in Company Law 856. The 
Companies Commission, Panel and Tribunal are intended to be the primary means of 




benefited from or was implicated in such a contravention.183 As with the section 218 
civil remedy, above, the interpretative question is whether a company, in violating 
human rights, contravenes the Act. 
Accordingly, civil and criminal remedies that may be claimed by people outside the 
company – while limited in their scope and application – could possibly be used for 
human rights purposes if interpreted to this effect. However, it will still be for courts to 
first adopt such deliberate human rights interpretations of the relevant provisions, as 
their potential human rights application is not explicit. 
 
2 6 Conclusion 
This chapter laid the foundation for the kind of entity and regulatory regime that is 
subject to the Bill of Rights, namely “companies” and “company law”. It established the 
legal nature of the entity under examination, namely, the South African company as 
established in terms of the Act. Such companies may take several forms, and find 
themselves at the intersection of legislation and the common law. However, all 
companies, and the laws which constitute them, are entirely subject to the Bill of Rights. 
The primary question concerns how the Bill of Rights applies vis-à-vis companies. This 
issue constitutes the focus of the following chapter. 
Importantly, the current literature on business and human rights law takes what may 
be termed an “atomistic approach” to companies, focusing on the violations committed 
by companies individually. Such an approach is in contrast to a more “systemic 
approach”, viewing companies, the law affecting them, the wider economy and the 
State as a holistic system subject to the Constitution. The literature accordingly focuses 
on certain prominent existing company law doctrines and mechanisms that it identifies 
as having significant implications for holding companies accountable for human rights 
violations. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil may allow for human rights 
remedies against business actors that would otherwise have been shielded from 
liability by the doctrine of separate legal personality. The corporate governance model 
in South Africa presently continues to prioritise the interests of the shareholders in 
pursuing profit, but there is historical and present evidence that companies should be 
subordinate to public interest considerations, including human rights. Further, civil and 
 
183 S 171 of the Act; Cassim “Introduction to the New Companies Act” in Company Law 26; 





criminal remedies under the Act may potentially be used for human rights purposes if 
interpreted in such a way. However, a more comprehensive consideration of the 
potential reform of these aspects of company law can only follow a proper examination 
of the Bill of Rights’ application to companies and company law, as will take place in 




Chapter 3: Companies, transformative constitutionalism and the 
application of the Bill of Rights 
 
3 1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to establish how the Bill of Rights1 applies to South African 
companies and company law. It will be recalled that this study does not focus on any 
particular right, but rather considers the impact of the Bill of Rights generally. 
Accordingly, this chapter focuses on the general implications of the Bill of Rights for 
companies and company regulation, rather than on consequences concerning specific 
rights or regulatory mechanisms. Concrete implications for the regulatory scheme will 
be proposed in chapter five, following the doctrinal application study and consideration 
of international law. 
This chapter will begin by describing the purpose of the Bill of Rights in light of South 
Africa’s project of transformative constitutionalism. It will then proceed to consider the 
particular contextual relationship between transformative constitutionalism on the one 
hand, and companies and company law on the other. The focus will then shift to 
examining how the Bill of Rights applies where the State, non-state entities (such as 
companies) and relevant law are concerned. This will require a broad consideration of 
the application and interpretation provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”).2 
Specifically, four sets of provisions will be examined for their interactions with 
companies and company law: the State’s duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil 
rights as per section 7(2); the direct binding of the State, law and non-state entities as 
per section 8(1) and 8(2); the interpretation of legislation and development of the 
common law following constitutional values, as per section 39(2); and the treating of 
companies as organs of state as per section 239. A synthesis and analysis of the 
jurisprudence on these provisions will follow. The chapter will then conclude by 
extrapolating how the implications of the Bill of Rights may apply by extension to other 




1 Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”). 




3 2 Transformative constitutionalism and company law 
3 2 1 General features of transformative constitutionalism 
As will be seen in this part, the Constitution’s framework – and thus the guide for its 
interpretation and application – has been described as the project of transformative 
constitutionalism. It is thus first necessary to examine transformative constitutionalism 
itself before analysing how the Bill of Rights may be interpreted to apply to companies. 
Some general observations in this regard will first be made relating to the context of 
the constitutional project in South Africa, followed by a more nuanced examination of 
the particular context of companies and company law. 
As has been introduced,3 South Africa has been undertaking a large-scale legal and 
social project since the end of formal apartheid in 1994. This project, grounded in the 
Constitution, is commonly conceived as transformative constitutionalism.4 This 
ongoing constitutional process – whether considered a fundamental reform or unique 
revolution5 – is openly and deeply aware of the country’s present and historical 
contexts,6 founding its society on “democratic values, social justice and fundamental 
human rights.”7 It is thus a continuous project of “large scale social change through 
 
3 Chapter one part 1 1 2.  
4 KE Klare “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 SAJHR 146; DM 
Davis & K Klare “Transformative Constitutionalism and the Common and Customary Law” 
(2010) 26 SAJHR 403; E Van Huyssteen “The Constitutional Court and the Redistribution of 
Power in South Africa: Towards Transformative Constitutionalism” (2000) 59 African Studies 
245; P Langa “Transformative Constitutionalism” (2006) 17 Stell LR 351 351; D Moseneke 
“The Fourth Bram Fischer Memorial Lecture: Transformative Adjudication” (2002) 18 SAJHR 
308 313-314; J Brickhill & Y van Leeve “Transformative Constitutionalism: Guiding Light or 
Empty Slogan?” (2015) Acta Juridica 141 146-147; LWH Ackermann “The Legal Nature of the 
South African Constitutional Revolution” (2004) New Zealand LR 633; K Van Marle 
“Transformative Constitutionalism As/And Critique” (2009) 20 Stell LR 286; chapter 2 in S 
Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication Under a Transformative Constitution (2010); 
City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Afriforum 2016 6 SA 279 (CC) para 165; Print 
Media South Africa v Minister of Home Affairs 2012 6 SA 443 (CC) para 97; Hassam v Jacobs 
NO 2009 5 SA 572 (CC) para 28; AB v Minister of Social Development 2017 3 SA 570 (CC) 
para 126; Road Accident Fund v Mdeyide 2011 2 SA 26 (CC). 
5 Compare, for instance, Klare (1998) SAJHR 150 and Ackermann (2004) NZLR 643-646; I 
Currie & J De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 2 ed (2013) 2.  





nonviolent political processes grounded in law”.8 It gives rise to a single legal system9 
fundamentally dedicated to constant self-evaluation and self-reform for the good of all 
its people, and especially for the victims of human rights abuses.10 The Constitution 
declares the South African people and State as committed to this project.11 
Transformative constitutionalism thus forms the bedrock of modern South African 
society. 
Klare, in initially developing the paradigm of transformative constitutionalism, 
suggested that such a reading of the Constitution was merely a plausible one that he 
himself argued to be preferable over any alternative.12 Others, however, have seen 
transformative approach as being a necessary and inescapable part of the text.13 
Either way, the Constitutional Court has repeatedly affirmed transformative 
constitutionalism as being core to South African society and its legal regime.14 
Transformative constitutionalism thus provides a generally-accepted collective 
paradigm that guides the interpretation and implementation of the Constitution.  
There are some evident key features of the transformative project found in the text. 
The Constitution declares the State to be founded on the values of human dignity, the 
achievement of equality, and the advancement of human rights and freedoms.15 
Accordingly, these values should inform all interpretations of the Bill of Rights,16 and 
value-driven, substantive legal reasoning is preferred over formalism.17 Additionally, in 
following the Constitution’s dialogic openness to global human rights discourse,18 
 
8 Klare (1998) SAJHR 150. 
9 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In re Ex Parte President of the 
Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA (CC) 674 para 44. 
10 Davis & Klare (2010) SAJHR. 
11 Preamble and s 8 (Application of the Bill of Rights) of the Constitution. 
12 Klare (1998) SAJHR 152. 
13 T Roux “Transformative Constitutionalism and the Best Interpretation of the South African 
Constitution: Distinction Without a Difference?” (2009) 20 Stell LR 258; Moseneke (2002) 
SAJHR; Langa (2006) Stell LR 351; Brickhill & Van Leeve (2015) Acta Juridica. 
14 See, for instance, City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Afriforum 2016 6 SA 279 (CC) 
para 165; Print Media South Africa v Minister of Home Affairs 2012 6 SA 443 (CC) para 97; 
Hassam v Jacobs NO 2009 5 SA 572 (CC) para 28; AB v Minister of Social Development 2017 
3 SA 570 (CC) para 126; Road Accident Fund v Mdeyide 2011 2 SA 26 (CC). 
15 S 1(c) of the Constitution. 
16 S 39(1)(a). 





interpretations must also consider international law.19 Foundational principles of the 
constitutional order, such as the rule of law,20 constitutional supremacy21 and 
justiciability,22 aim to give effect to these guiding values. South Africa’s legislation, 
common law, legal culture and private legal relationships are thus all subordinate to 
the Constitution. These may not inhibit the goals of the Constitution. On the contrary, 
they should in fact be tools to achieve those goals, producing a single coherent system 
of law founded on human rights.23 
The legal transformation project can thus be broadly stated as follows: all law and 
legal concepts should be radically reconsidered and reworked in light of a 
transformative interpretation of the Bill of Rights. No legal relationship between any 
parties – public or private – can exist if it is unconstitutional, and the laws on which 
these rely must be actively brought into conformity with the Constitution.24 Phrased in 
terms of Etienne Mureinik’s concept of a shift from a “culture of authority” to a “culture 
of justification”,25 no law or exercise of state power falling within the Constitution’s wide 
 
19 S 39(1)(b) of the Constitution. Chapter four will focus on these international law 
considerations. 
20 S 1(c) of the Constitution. 
21 S 2 of the Constitution. 
22 See the “culture of justification” conceived in E Mureinik “A Bridge to Where? Introducing the 
Interim Bill of Rights” (1994) 10 SAJHR 31; Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 7. 
23 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In re Ex Parte President of the 
Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 44. See for instance s 8(3) of the 
Constitution, which portrays legislation and the common law as the primary means of 
regulating the human rights obligations of non-state entities such as companies. 
24 For a selection of academic literature pertaining to the application of the Bill of Rights to 
private law, see: Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 43-62; D Bilchitz “Do Corporations Have 
Positive Fundamental Rights Obligations?” (2010) Theoria 1; D Bhana “The Horizontal 
Application of The Bill of Rights: A Reconciliation of Sections 8 And 39 of the Constitution” 
(2013) 29 SAJHR 351; DM Chirwa “In Search of Philosophical Justifications and Suitable 
Models for the Horizontal Application of Human Rights” (2008) 8 AHRLJ 294; J Katzew 
“Crossing the Divide Between the Business of the Corporation and the Imperatives of Human 
Rights – The Impact of Section 7 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008” (2011) 128 SALJ 686; S 
Liebenberg “The Application of Socio-Economic Rights to Private Law” (2008) TSAR 464; M 
Pieterse “Beyond the Welfare State: Globalisation of Neo-Liberal Culture and the 
Constitutional Protection of Social and Economic Rights in South Africa” (2003) 14 Stell LR 3; 
Davis & Klare (2010) SAJHR. 




ambit of applicability has any prior justification.26 Any such law or power must be 
capable of justification in terms of the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights. 
The following part considers the implications of these general features of 
transformative constitutionalism in the specific context of companies and company law. 
 
3 2 2 The Bill of Rights, economic relations and company law 
As discussed, any economic relation that ultimately relies on some form of legal 
enforcement by the State is, in fact, a legal relation.27 Economic entities such as 
companies, and economic relations of contract or property, are at their base sourced 
in the law, which itself is wholly subject to the Constitution. Thus, in the context of 
companies specifically, the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (“the Companies Act” or “the 
Act”) and the common law – to the extent compatible with the Constitution and Bill of 
Rights – describe the nature, structure, capacities and duties of, and relations between, 
the company and all persons involved in its running. The dominant “atomistic” 
approach to companies and company law has also already been noted.28 However, 
transformative constitutionalism emphasises that the past is often deeply connected to 
ongoing abuses in the present, and that these cannot be undone without adopting a 
 
26 In terms of the Bill of Rights, this generally manifests in the two-stage approach of Bill of 
Rights litigation: Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 26-27. Procedural questions such 
as the correctness of forum aside, an applicant need only show that power has been exercised 
in contravention of their rights, with the rights themselves being interpreted as broadly as 
possible. Thereafter, it is for the respondent to show either that there was no such 
contravention, or that any contravention was justifiable in terms of s 36 of the Constitution. 
Ferreira v Levin NO; Vryenhoek v Powell NO 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) para 82; S v Zuma 1995 2 
SA 642 (CC) para 21; S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) paras 100-102. In the context of 
socio-economic rights, Liebenberg argues that the burden of justification should lie with the 
State as far as possible, to ensure that the marginalised are not placed at a further 
disadvantage: Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 199-203. On the relationship between 
justification and democracy, see T Roux “Democracy” in S Woolman, M Bishop & J Brickhill 
(eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2006) 10-34 – 10-37; S v Makwanyane 1995 
3 SA 391 (CC) paras 155-156; ss 2 and 36 of the Constitution. 
27 Chapter two parts 2 3 and 2 4. 




critical contextual approach to the origin and functioning of the law.29 Thus, the Bill of 
Rights and its effects on companies and company law cannot be considered in the 
abstract, but must rather be placed in historical context. It is thus necessary to consider 
the systemic dimensions of South Africa’s political economy for a transformative 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights to be reached. The real-world history and influence 
of companies has already been introduced,30 and a brief systemic consideration of 
companies in the context of transformative constitutionalism will be performed here. 
The systemic legal-economic aspect of apartheid oppression, its close ties to violent 
political repression under the regime, and its ongoing political-economic legacy today 
have been well documented.31 Colonialism and formal apartheid, while founded on 
“white”32 supremacy, relied on both racist and economically exploitative relations. 
These relations relied on legal enforcement and state power, and manifested in the 
 
29 Langa (2006) Stell LR 352-354. This observation was forcefully made in Daniels v Scribante 
2017 4 SA 341 (CC). The judgments of Madlanga J (writing for the majority; paras 1-2 and 13-
31) and Froneman J (concurring; paras 109-144, particularly para 110) make it clear that 
historical context is a crucial part of constitutional interpretation – the past is a critical factor in 
considering what amounts to an abuse of human rights. Cameron J (concurring) cautions that 
there are dangers in judges’ writing of history, but firmly concludes that judges should not use 
the “indeterminacies of history and the inevitable incompleteness and partiality of its telling” to 
limit justice mechanisms (paras 145-155). See also P de Vos “A Bridge Too Far? History as 
Context in the Interpretation of the South African Constitution” (2001) 17 SAJHR 1. 
30 See chapter one part 1 1 1. 
31 See most generally H Wolpe “Capitalism and Cheap Labour-Power in South Africa: From 
Segregation to Apartheid” (1972) 1 Economy and Society 425; D Masondo “Capitalism and 
Racist Forms of Political Domination” (2007) 37 Africanus 66 68-72; S Terreblanche A History 
of Inequality in South Africa: 1652-2002 (2002); B Bunting The Rise of the South African Reich 
(1969); JM Modiri “Law’s Poverty” (2015) 18 PER 224. 
32 Race and racial categories are historical and unscientific social constructs that arbitrarily 
group humans together for the purpose of discrimination: see generally A Smedley & BD 
Smedley “Race as Biology is Fiction, Racism as a Social Problem is Real: Anthropological and 
Historical Perspectives on the Social Construction of Race” (2005) American Psychologist 16; 
R Fine “The Antimonies of Neo-Marxism” (1990) 11 Transformation 92 92-94; Bunting Reich 
159-160, 189. Any reference to race or racial categories in this study is made with this in mind, 




political and socio-economic oppression of the majority of South Africans.33 In other 
words, this systemic oppression was a result of the undemocratic imposition of the law 
by State force. Far-reaching state power and policy could thus serve specific minority 
private business interests, and came at the expense of the public interest and the 
private interests of the majority. Importantly, this system was produced by both the 
judiciary and legislature, and relied on both common law and statute. For instance, 
contract law validated forced labour contracts as “consensual”, and delict, property and 
succession laws ensured that wealth accrued and remained in minority circles.34 
Company law could not operate without this broader economic framework of 
property rights and contract, and was itself constructed to allow those with property to 
benefit at the expense of those without.35 The law gave shareholders wide control over 
economic decisions, exercised through directors only they appointed, with State force 
upholding the private decisions of how the shareholders chose to use their 
increasingly-concentrated property.36 Control over capital was thus shielded from any 
direct political or economic control by workers, communities or “black” people 
generally. Economic regulation such as company law accordingly became a means of 
privatising democratic control. Limited liability and the State’s strong support for the 
 
33 SE Merry “Law and Colonialism” (1991) 25 Law & Society Review 889; Moseneke (2002) 
SAJHR 315. Makgetlaneng demonstrates that oppressive “white” supremacist policies in 
South African history have tended to align with economic interests, leading to an enduring 
connection between racial and class oppression: S Makgetlaneng “How Capitalism and 
Racism Continue to Shape the Socio-Economic Structure of South Africa” (2016) 46 Africanus 
1. In fact, if Afrikaner nationalism was largely a reaction to the oppression of Afrikaners by the 
British, it was ultimately a result of British economic imperialism: Bunting Reich 9-12; FA van 
Jaarsveld The Afrikaner’s Interpretation of South African History (1964) 1-21. 
34 See very generally AJ van der Walt “Tradition on Trial: A Critical Analysis of the Civil-Law 
Tradition in South African Property Law” (1994) 11 SAJHR 169 181-187; Davis & Klare (2010) 
SAJHR 443-445; J Van der Walt “Progressive Indirect Horizontal Application of the Bill of 
Rights: Towards a Co-Operative Relation Between Common-Law and Constitutional 
Jurisprudence” (2001) 17 SAJHR 341 361-362; J van der Walt “Piracy, Property and Plurality: 
Re-Reading the Foundations of Modern Law” (2001) TSAR 52. 
35 DL Ratner “Corporations and the Constitution” (1980) 15 University of San Francisco LR 11; 
K Pistor The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality (2019). 
36 The development of company law in the late 19th and early 20th century in the United States 
led to similar observations, even when quite apart from the specific oppressive context of South 
African formal apartheid: FS Cohen “Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach” 
(1935) 35 Colum LR 809; FS Cohen “Dialogue on Private Property” (1954) 9 Rutgers LR 357; 
MR Cohen “Property and Sovereignty” (1927) 13 Cornell LR 8; Brandeis J’s dissent in Louis K 




business sector further reduced risks for capital investment. Throughout, a wealthy 
“white” minority was able to enforce, influence and develop the common law in their 
favour, as the judicial system was significantly more accessible to them than to poor 
people and “black” people generally.37 Businesses thus benefited significantly from the 
State force and law of colonialism and formal apartheid.38 
Transformative constitutionalism aims to address this complex political-economic 
legacy of colonialism and formal apartheid. The present Constitution rejects the old 
formalist division between socio-economic and political rights, and considers these 
rights to be interrelated and indivisible.39 In other words, given the interconnectedness 
of power relations, people whose socio-economic rights remain unrealised cannot 
meaningfully be said to be politically free.40 Democracy, human dignity, equality and 
freedom are thus intended to penetrate every facet of South African society, not only 
the sphere of parliamentary politics.41  
Accordingly, as formal apartheid was both a racial and economic system, the 
constitutional transition requires more than rectifying racial discrimination. It also 
requires economic restructuring, including the restructuring of company regulation. In 
short, the democratic transition will be incomplete if the economic system is left 
unchanged. Even if non-racialism were the sole purpose of the transition, non-racialism 
itself remains inherently incompatible with structural patterns of economic exploitation, 
 
37 See Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report vol 4 (1998) 93-108; J 
Dugard “The Judicial Process, Positivism and Civil Liberty” (1971) 88 SALJ 181; C Albertyn & 
DM Davis “Legal Realism, Transformation and the Legacy of Dugard” (2010) 26 SAJHR 188. 
38 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report vol 4 (1998) 187; Terreblanche 
Inequality 153-156, 239-250; S Terreblanche Lost in Transformation (2012) 37-58; Bunting 
Reich 369-400; see generally Pistor Capital. 
39 “Indivisibility” refers to the inability to separate the enjoyment of rights from one another: the 
enjoyment of one right inherently depends on the enjoyment of all other rights. See 
Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 83; Sidumo 
v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2008 2 SA 24 (CC) para 153. 
40 D Bilchitz “Are Socio-Economic Rights a Form of Political Rights?” (2015) 31 SAJHR 86; 
Moseneke (2002) SAJHR 318; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 9, 51-54. 




both past and present.42 Race is a social construct which must be (and was in fact) 
unnaturally created and imposed by force. Once imposed, it “rationalises” the 
continuation of such force.43 In South Africa, this was achieved through the 
mechanisms of colonialism and formal apartheid. This was partly done by aligning 
“blackness” with poverty and childlike lack of agency, while “whiteness” was equated 
with wealth and the right to rule.44 Thus, racism was used to justify exploitative 
economic policy, while economic policy simultaneously reproduced racial constructs.45 
Accordingly, any maintaining of formal apartheid patterns of economic exploitation in 
the present not only amounts to economic oppression, but is also inherently racist, in 
that it forcefully perpetuates the construct of “blackness”. Similar relations can be 
 
42 Studies of inequality make plain that the “black” majority remains overwhelmingly poor today; 
the ongoing general correlation between poverty and “blackness” is well-documented: Stats 
SA Poverty Trends in South Africa (2017) 18-20; A Orthofer “Wealth Inequality – Striking New 
Insights from Tax Data” (2016) Econ 3x3 1 4-6. Estimates of direct broad-based “black” 
ownership on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (“JSE”) range from 0.6% to 10%, with the 
JSE itself stating it to be at 3%; indirect “black” investment is at 13%, and “white” investment 
at 22%: K Wilkinson “Guide: Black Ownership on SA’s Stock Exchange – What We Know” (29-
08-2017) Africa Check <https://africacheck.org/factsheets/guide-much-sas-stock-exchange-
black-owned-know/> (accessed 25-09-2019). Collectively, these statistics indicate that JSE 
ownership is very highly concentrated, and far from being meaningfully under the control of the 
poor “black” majority. 
43 See generally Smedley & Smedley (2005) AmPsych; Fine (1990) Transformation 92-94; 
Bunting Reich 159-160, 189. 
44 The confluence of race and class patterns today is thus not merely a vestige of formal 
apartheid: race in South Africa has always been sociologically tied to class. Even Afrikaner 
nationalism has its roots in the racial subjugation of Afrikaner people by the British: K Norman 
Into the Laager (2016) 61-71; Van Jaarsveld Afrikaner’s Interpretation 1-32; C van der 
Westhuizen Sitting Pretty: White Afrikaans Women in Postapartheid South Africa (2017) 36-
41; Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 116-132; Terreblanche Inequality 264-275. 
45 For a recent case illustrating the link between class and race, see Social Justice Coalition v 
Minister of Police 2019 (4) SA 82 (WCC), especially paras 53 and 90. The Equality Court held 
in this case that the allocation of police human resources in the Western Cape discriminated 




observed between the economic system and the construct of gender,46 and even more 
critically between the economic system and the intersection of racial and gender-based 
oppression.47 
The legacy of this legal-economic structuring extends to the present day, and is 
arguably a primary cause of contemporary socio-economic problems. For instance, 
Terreblanche observed that democratic political control has not sufficiently been 
extended over the laws governing the economy.48 He described four modern structural 
“poverty traps” produced by the system:49 high unemployment with low economic 
 
46 See s 1(c) of the Constitution, which founds its values of non-racialism and non-sexism on 
equal grounds; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 27. Men are consistently less likely to 
suffer poverty than women: Stats SA Poverty Trends in South Africa (2017) 56-57. While no 
broad statistics exist for South Africa, it is likely that genderqueer people suffer from higher 
rates of poverty as well, based on trends for abuse they suffer: Triangle Project Levels of 
Empowerment Among LGBT People in the Western Cape (2006) 34-41; OUT LGBT Well-
Being The Crimes Against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) People in South 
Africa (2016).  
47 See generally K Crenshaw “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and 
Violence Against Women of Color” (1991) 43 Stan LR 1241; J Conaghan “Intersectionality and 
the Feminist Project in Law” in E Grabham, D Cooper, J Krishnadas & D Herman (eds) 
Intersectionality and Beyond: Law, Power and the Politics of Location (2008) 21-48; Van der 
Westhuizen Sitting Pretty (2017). 
48 Terreblanche Transformation 101-115; Terreblanche Inequality 95-149. Madlingozi’s 
describes the present dispensation as being neo-apartheid, with little meaningful structural 
change from formal apartheid: T Madlingozi “Social Justice in a Time of Neo-Apartheid 
Constitutionalism: Critiquing the Anti-Black Economy of Recognition, Incorporation and 
Distribution” (2017) 123 Stell LR 123. Modiri declares that “the fact of Apartheid refuses to 
fade”: JM Modiri “Towards a ‘(Post-)apartheid’ Critical Race jurisprudence: ‘Divining our racial 
themes’” (2012) 27 SAPL 231 237. 
49 30,4 million South Africans – 55,5% of the population – were living in poverty in 2015: Stats 




growth;50 deep institutionalised inequality of wealth,51 power, and opportunities, 
coupled with racial prejudices; chronic community poverty due to disrupted social 
structures amongst the oppressed; and the vicious cycle produced between poverty 
and crime/violence/ill health.52 These traps make it structurally impossible for poor 
“black” people, and poor people generally, to escape their circumstances without 
owning meaningful capital.53 Critically, it is by State force and law that this system is 
maintained.54 
Concentrated capital structures such as companies, on the other hand, continue to 
benefit from the legacy of this undemocratic economic structuring, and this 
undemocratic structuring itself continues into the present.55 Human rights violations by 
companies can thus often be viewed as the systemic result of a history of anti-
democratic and narrowly concentrated shareholder/director control. The awareness 
and subsequent transformation of these patterns of wide private control should 
accordingly constitute a core concern of the Bill of Rights. Practically, for instance, a 
transformative approach to company regulation in the mining sector would note the 
sector’s economic and political role in the creation of the migrant labour system and 
the development of racist land distribution and planning, as well as the sector’s 
exploitation of “black” workers and communities under formal apartheid.56 Specific 
human rights violations related to mining today are then properly seen as systemic 
vestiges of undemocratic ordering, with examples including the environmental and 
 
50 Terreblanche wrote this in 2002, but unemployment reached 27.7% in 2017 – the highest 
on record since 2003: Stats SA “Quarterly Labour Force Survey – QLFS Q1:2017” (01-06-
2017) Statistics South Africa <http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=9960> (accessed 25-09-2019). 
51 The wealthiest 10% of South Africans possess 90-95% of all South African wealth, while the 
highest-earning 10% receive 55-60% of all income. The poorest 50% of South Africans earn 
only 10% of all income, and have no measurable wealth: A Orthofer “Wealth Inequality – 
Striking New Insights from Tax Data” (2016) Econ 3x3 1 4-6. South Africa has the highest GINI 
coefficient in the world: World Bank Overcoming Poverty and Inequality in South Africa (2018) 
xv. See also Stats SA Poverty Trends in South Africa (2017) 18-20; K Wilkinson “Guide: Black 
Ownership on SA’s Stock Exchange – What We Know” (29-08-2017) Africa Check 
<https://africacheck.org/factsheets/guide-much-sas-stock-exchange-black-owned-know/> 
(accessed 25-09-2019); B Cousins “Land Reform in South Africa is Failing. Can it be Saved?” 
(2017) 92 Transformation 135. 
52 Terreblanche Inequality 25-49. 
53 Terreblanche Transformation 101-115. 
54 Modiri (2015) PER; Pistor Capital. 
55 See generally Terreblanche Transformation (2012). 




health damage by mining operations in Mpumalanga;57 Lonmin’s ongoing failure to 
provide its workers with adequate housing in Marikana, despite their legal commitment 
and obligation to provide such housing;58 and the number of yearly industry deaths – 
at 73 in 2016, spiking to 90 in 2017, and only dropping to 81 in 2018.59 South Africa’s 
“history is omnipresent when one applies the Constitution”60 to the evaluation and 
transformation of these abuses. 
These critical and historical insights must also inform analyses of company theory 
itself. As noted in the previous chapter, there are debates concerning legal theories of 
the company, such as concession theory and contract theory. These theories have 
prominent implications for whether (and to what degree) the State can regulate 
companies on principle. For instance, contract theory stresses that companies should 
be permitted full private autonomy, and that the State’s role is merely to support this 
autonomy. Concession theory, on the other hand, observes that companies have 
always been subject to public control via the law, per legal principle, and that 
arguments of “privateness” are accordingly unsupported and undemocratic. As has 
been noted in this part, such arguments of “privateness” were core to systemic 
economic oppression in South Africa’s history. Judges historically hid economic policy 
decisions by separating private and public law, following a formalist approach 
attributed to classical liberalism and its reception in South African law.61 This gave rise 
to the shareholder primacy model that continues to form the basis of South African 
company law.62 Shareholder primacy and contract theory emphasised the maximal 
freedom of a specific few in the “private sphere”, at the expense of the freedom (public 
and private both) of the rest of the population. The resulting unequal systemic power 
relations were thus left unquestioned and shielded from democratic review.63 
 
57 Centre for Environmental Rights Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and the Violation of 
Environmental Rights in Mpumalanga (2016), especially 74. 
58 Amnesty International Smoke and Mirrors: Lonmin’s Failure to Address Housing Conditions 
at Marikana, South Africa (2016) 7-10. The report openly links the systemic current abuse to 
mining practices during formal apartheid. 
59 A Seccombe “Number of Mining Deaths and Injuries Falls in 2018” (01-03-2019) Business 
Day <https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/companies/mining/2019-03-01-number-of-mining-
deaths-and-injuries-falls-in-2018/> (accessed 25-09-2019). 
60 Cameron J in Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 148. 
61 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 59-63. 
62 See chapter two part 2 5 2. 
63 Van der Walt (1994) SAJHR 180-181. See also the majority decision of Du Plessis v De 




Moreover, wealthy private business interests have often had immense control over the 
State itself, such as when the Dutch East India Company and later Cecil John Rhodes 
governed the Cape.64 Uncritical company conceptions that favour preserving business 
interests above legal transformation are thus the sociological products of South Africa’s 
capitalist-colonialist history, and of the rise of neoliberal market fundamentalist 
ideology.65 
A critical historical understanding of company theory implies that the “privateness” 
arguments that facilitated economic oppression in the past cannot serve to oppose 
transformative public regulation. Further, it can be recalled that a minority of interests 
in the “private sphere” have historically controlled so-called “public” power for their 
advancement. Regulation of this power thus does not simply amount to regulation of 
the “private” sphere, as the sphere has historically been “private” in name only. Rather, 
regulation amounts to restoring the public’s control over state power. Accordingly, 
while the current corporate governance model adheres to a shareholder primacy model 
that follows contract theory and the prioritisation of private profit, the concession theory 
discussed in the previous chapter aligns somewhat more with transformative 
constitutionalism and the historical reality of South African companies.  
The current doctrinal position in South Africa appears to move beyond the formalist 
debate between contract and concession theory, however – at least in principle if not 
yet in application.66 As a matter of principle, all law is subject to the Constitution and 
the Bill of Rights.67 Thus, all company regulation and all actions taken by companies 
are equally subject to the Bill of Rights. Transformative constitutionalism accordingly 
 
64 Terreblanche Inequality 51-65; Terreblanche Transformation 39-77. See also Brandeis J’s 
dissent in Louis K Liggett Co v Lee (1933) 288 US 517 564-581. The use of public power and 
policy for narrow private gain has continued into the present; see most prominently G 
Marinovich Murder at Small Koppie: The Real Story of the Marikana Massacre (2016); PL 
Myburgh The Republic of Gupta: A Story of State Capture (2017); H van Vuuren Apartheid 
Guns and Money: A Tale of Profit (2017) 489-511. 
65 Terreblanche Transformation (2012) 17-36; Terreblanche Inequality 239-250; Merry (1991) 
LSR; Masondo (2007) Africanus 68-72; S Ashman, B Fine & S Newman “The Crisis in South 
Africa: Neoliberalism, Financialization and Uneven and Combined Development” (2011) 47 
Socialist Register 174 182; N Faulkner A Radical History of the World (2018) 438-446. 
66 Van der Walt (1994) SAJHR 203-205; Davis & Klare (2010) SAJHR 411; Van der Walt 
(2001) TSAR 52; Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 
2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 343; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 28-42. 
67 Ss 2 and 8(1) of the Constitution; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: 




aligns with the claim that private relations are always subject to democratic public 
control in law.68 This public control is foundationally that of the Constitution, and 
secondarily that of statute and common law. Accordingly, the legislature and courts 
are always able, in principle, to regulate companies as they see fit. Indeed, they are 
obliged to limit the benefits of the company structure where the law of companies, or 
any area of law concerning companies, infringes on the rights of natural persons.69 
This transformative constitutional approach has practical implications for how 
companies themselves are conceived, which in turn has consequences for how the 
regulation of companies is approached. For instance, following a critical and historical 
interpretation, a juristic person is simply any entity other than a natural person that the 
law deems as a legal subject, and to which it chooses to attach certain rights and 
duties.70 In other words, juristic personhood arises from the law; it does not occur 
naturally. It thus cannot be claimed that personhood must automatically be legally 
protected, as personhood itself is rather the result of legal protection. The question of 
whether such protection and personhood should arise at all necessarily relies on public 
policy considerations other than the mere existence of that protection. Most 
fundamentally, this means that the legal recognition of a company is (and must be) 
subject to public control via the law, as it is only by the law that such recognition can 
arise.71 Arguments of “privateness” which depict the personhood of a company as 
naturally occurring, or as automatically requiring protection in the law, are thus an 
inversion of the legal reality. This transformative constitutional reading ensures that 
company law is the result of democratic control – which in South Africa is grounded in 
the Bill of Rights – rather than allowing existing economic power relations to determine 
the contours of the law. 
In sum, transformative constitutionalism views the fundamental restructuring of 
economic relations of wealth and control – such as company regulation – as being 
 
68 Davis & Klare (2010) SAJHR 435-449; Cohen (1935) Colum LR 809; Cohen (1954) Rutgers 
LR 357; Cohen (1927) Cornell LR 8; MR Cohen “The Basis of Contract” (1933) 46 Harv LR 
553; S Woolman “Application” in S Woolman, M Bishop & J Brickhill (eds) Constitutional Law 
of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2005) 31-32 – 31-33. 
69 Ratner (1980) USFLR 20-21. 
70 H Kruger & A Skelton (eds) The Law of Persons in South Africa (2012) 13, 17-18; MR Cohen 
“Communal Ghosts and Other Perils in Social Philosophy” (1919) 16 Journal of Philosophy, 
Psychology and Scientific Methods 673 678-684; Cohen (1935) Colum LR 812-813. 




crucial to meaningful non-racial democracy and political freedom.72 The influence of 
the Bill of Rights on company, property and contract law can thus be seen as part of a 
broad systematic response to systemic economic-racial oppression.73 The notion that 
considerations of human interests must be the primary guide in regulating companies 
is also not wholly novel to historical conceptions of company theory. On the contrary, 
it finds support in concession theory’s notion of public control over the law. In essence, 
companies and any laws concerning companies are subject to the Bill of Rights. 
Transformative constitutionalism thus takes an openly systemic approach to South 
Africa’s legal landscape. However, as noted,74 the present literature on business and 
human rights law appears to align more with an “atomistic” approach, focusing 
primarily on companies as individuals rather than as part of a wider political-economic 
system that can or should be altered. As will be seen, human rights law doctrine 
concerning non-state entities as a whole also prefers an atomistic approach to some 
degree.75 In failing to scrutinise and critique South Africa’s fundamental political-
economic structure, the atomistic approach thus risks inadvertently entrenching 
 
72 Biko emphasised that the destruction of “whiteness” and “blackness”, and the achievement 
of non-racialism, would require that all structural oppressive relations between all people be 
undone; that all people have equal democratic agency; and that “black” people accordingly 
regain their confiscated human dignity: S Biko I Write What I Like (2005) 21-25, 27-32, 48-50. 
See generally Modiri (2012) SAPL. 
73 Brickhill & Van Leeve (2015) Acta Juridica 148-151. This view was shared by the broader 
anti-Apartheid movement. During the address at Cape Town after his release, Nelson Mandela 
stated firmly that: 
“There must be an end to white monopoly on political power, and a fundamental restructuring 
of our political and economic systems to ensure that the inequalities of apartheid are addressed 
and our society thoroughly democratised.” 
NR Mandela “Remarks by Nelson Mandela in Cape Town on 11 February 1990 After His 
Release From Victor Verster” (11-02-1990) The Nelson Mandela Foundation 
<https://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv03445/04lv04015/05lv04154/0
6lv04191.htm> (accessed 25-09-2019). The struggle movement generally believed that 
undoing overtly racist laws but maintaining the economic status quo would be tantamount to 
maintaining minority domination: Makgetlaneng (2016) Africanus 1 6-7. On the African National 
Congress’ shift away from its historic policies of economic restructuring, see Terreblanche 
Inequality 84-149; Ashman, Fine & Newman (2011) Socialist Register.  
74 See chapter 2 part 2 4. 




colonial capitalist and neoliberal ideology.76 The alignment of aspects of the global 
human rights project with neoliberalism in particular has been criticised.77 So too has 
been the failure to scrutinise the core role of the State and law in socio-economic and 
political oppression.78 Conceptually, then, a shift towards a critical and systemic 
approach to companies is needed if the Bill of Rights is to achieve its full transformative 
potential. 
Accordingly, while it is clear that companies and company law are subject to the Bill 
of Rights in principle, the pertinent question rather concerns how precisely the Bill of 
Rights interacts with companies and company law. In other words, it is possible that 
the present doctrinal approach to companies does not fully align with transformative 
constitutionalism’s systemic conception of companies. It is thus necessary to consider 
jurisprudence on the interactions between the Bill of Rights and companies, and the 
mechanisms by which the Constitution is able to transform company law. Thereafter, 
an analysis of the jurisprudence will follow, as guided by transformative 
constitutionalism and its insights. As will become apparent, while the principle is that 
companies and company law are subject to the Bill of Rights, the current application 
of the Bill of Rights is far more complex and unclear. 
 
3 3 The application of the Bill of Rights to company law 
This section will broadly summarise the ways in which the Bill of Rights interacts 
with companies and company law. This predominantly concerns the topic of 
“horizontality”, wherein human rights obligations are imposed on persons (including 
companies) in various ways, rather than resting solely on the State. There is an 
immense body of literature on this issue, and many contrasting interpretations and 
 
76 Merry (1991) LSR; A Rafudeen “A South African Reflection on the Nature of Human Rights” 
(2016) 16 AHRLJ 225. Hyper-individualism and the erasure of systemic factors is especially 
core to neoliberal market fundamentalist ideology: Terreblanche Inequality 239-250; 
Terreblanche Transformation 17-36; Masondo (2007) Africanus 68-72; Ashman, Fine & 
Newman (2011) Socialist Register 182; Faulkner History 164-187, 268-274, 438-446. 
77 See, for instance, S Moyn Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World (2018) 212-220; 
P Joseph The New Human Rights Movement: Reinventing the Economy to End Oppression 
(2017). 




analyses.79 This section will focus on describing and then analysing existing legal 
doctrine pertaining to the application of the Bill of Rights to companies. 
The application of the Bill of Rights to companies takes place via four broad 
mechanisms, corresponding to sections 7(2), 8, 39(2) and 239 of the Constitution.80 
As will be seen, these often overlap, and there is little doctrinal clarity on the 
intersection between them. These approaches should thus not be seen as mutually 
exclusive, but rather as co-existing in complex relations with each other. 
 
3 3 1 Section 7(2): The State’s duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil 
Section 7(2) of the Constitution places a duty on the State to respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. This provision supports the substantive 
rights in the Bill of Rights, and means that, for instance, courts must ensure that effect 
is given to the substantive rights.81 However, the provision is also justiciable on its own, 
 
79 As a broad sample, see: Woolman “Application” in Constitutional Law; M Tushnet “The Issue 
of State Action / Horizontal Effect in Comparative Constitutional Law” (2003) 1 IJCL 79 79; S 
Woolman & D Davis “The Last Laugh: Du Plessis v De Klerk, Classical Liberalism, Creole 
Liberalism and the Application of Fundamental Rights Under the Interim and the Final 
Constitutions” (1996) 12 SAJHR 361 399-400; DM Chirwa “The Horizontal Application of 
Constitutional Rights in a Comparative Perspective” (2006) 10 Law, Democracy and 
Development 21; Davis & Klare (2010) SAJHR; Bhana (2013) SAJHR; C Sprigman & M 
Osbourne “Du Plessis Is Not Dead: South Africa’s 1996 Constitution and the Application of the 
Bill of Rights to Private Disputes” (1999) 15 SAJHR 25; Van der Walt (2001) SAJHR 341; 
Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 317-376; N Friedman “The South African Common Law 
and the Constitution: Revisiting Horizontality” (2014) 30 SAJHR 63; S Woolman “The Amazing, 
Vanishing Bill of Rights” (2007) 124 SALJ 762; AJ van der Walt “Normative Pluralism and 
Anarchy: Reflections on the 2007 Term” (2008) 1 Constitutional Court Review 107; A Fagan 
‘The Secondary Role of the Spirit, Purport and Objects of the Bill of Rights in the Common 
Law’s Development’ (2010) 127 SALJ 611. 
80 Authors use the terms “direct/indirect application”, “direct/indirect remedies” and 
“horizontal/vertical application” when referring to these approaches, but their definitions of 
each can vary or contradict each other considerably. To avoid confusion, these terms will not 
be used here; reference will rather be made to the underlying principles themselves. 




without necessary reference to a specific implicated right.82 Importantly for the context 
of human rights infringements committed by companies, section 7(2) requires the State 
to protect against infringements by non-state entities.83 Critically, regardless of the 
identity of the duty-bearer of a right – whether they be State or non-state – section 7(2) 
indicates that the State must always enforce that duty, and vindicate the right. The 
State is always under a duty to protect rights, even where the substantive rights 
obligation falls on a company. 
An important case in this regard is Glenister v President of the Republic of South 
Africa84 (“Glenister”). In this case, the Constitutional Court considered whether the Bill 
of Rights placed an obligation on the State to create and maintain an independent anti-
corruption unit. In the event, the majority judgment did find such an obligation.85 The 
Court held that, while there is no express duty to establish an independent unit, the 
constitutional scheme as a whole, when coupled with international law inputs, implies 
a State duty to deal effectively with corruption.86 The Court reasoned that corruption 
actively “undermines” democracy87 and “disenables” the State from meeting its duty to 
respect, protect, promote and fulfil human rights as per section 7(2) of the 
Constitution.88 As a result, for the Bill of Rights and the section 7(2) duty to be 
 
82 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) paras 189-201; L 
Du Plessis “Interpretation” in S Woolman, M Bishop & J Brickhill (eds) Constitutional Law of 
South Africa 2 ed (OS 2008) 32-121 – 32-125; S Liebenberg “The Interpretation of Socio-
Economic Rights” in S Woolman, M Bishop & J Brickhill (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2 ed (OS 2003) 33-6. The implications of s 7(2) for international law are considered more 
fully in chapter 4; the present focus is how the Bill interacts with the law and non-state entities 
generally. Importantly, however, s 7(2) requires the State to respect, protect, promote and fulfil 
the rights in the Bill whether they arise through s 8(1) or s 8(2): Liebenberg “The Interpretation 
of Socio-Economic Rights” in Constitutional Law 33-57 – 33-59; Liebenberg Socio-Economic 
Rights 82-87, 332-335. 
83 Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South 
Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 6 SA 40 (SCA) para 27; AJ van Der Walt “The 
State’s Duty to Protect Property Owners v The State’s Duty to Provide Housing: Thoughts on 
the Modderklip Case” (2005) 21 SAJHR 144. 
84 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC); J Tuovinen “The 
Role of International Law in Constitutional Adjudication: Glenister v President of the Republic 
of South Africa” (2013) 130 SALJ 66. 
85 Paras 160-251. 
86 Paras 175-176. 
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meaningfully effective and not nugatory, the section must necessarily be read to 
require the implementation of effective anti-corruption measures. 
It is possible in certain cases for companies to directly undermine the State’s section 
7(2) duty in a manner similar to corruption as considered in Glenister. An example 
would be where companies are organs of state in terms of section 239 of the 
Constitution. The classification of companies as organs of state will be considered 
more fully below, but for present purposes it can be noted that any company which can 
be considered an organ of state would naturally accrue State duties where relevant. 
Infringement of the Bill of Rights by the company (as an organ of state) would thus be 
regarded as a direct violation of its own State duty to respect, protect, promote and 
fulfil human rights. Thus, similar to Glenister, the company’s infringement would 
directly undermine the section 7(2) duty, and would have to be guarded against. 
Another example would be where violations by companies (even as non-state entities) 
interfere with the State’s ability to meet its duty, such as where companies themselves 
participate in corruption.89 The companies’ infringements in these cases would thus 
also directly undermine section 7(2), and the State would have to take action to remedy 
and protect against this. Following Glenister, then, section 7(2) must be understood as 
requiring safeguards against these particular forms of company infringements, which 
directly interfere with the State’s duty and capacity to respect, protect, promote and 
fulfil rights. 
However, outside of these examples, it should be noted that human rights 
infringements by companies do not automatically “undermine” or “disenable” the 
State’s section 7(2) duty in precisely the same way as corruption does. In other words, 
companies may conceivably infringe on substantive rights without directly interfering 
 
89 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No 
24: State Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in the Context of Business Activities UN Doc E/C 12/GC/24 paras 18 and 20; United 
Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Statement on the Obligations of 
States Parties Regarding the Corporate Sector and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights UN 
Doc E/C12/2011/1 paras 2-3. Improper collusion between the State and non-state entities can 
be found both before and after the end of formal apartheid: see Myburgh Republic of Gupta; 
Van Vuuren Apartheid Guns and Money. See chapter 2 part 2 5 2 for further detail on the 




with the State’s own capacity to respect, protect, promote and fulfil rights.90 For 
instance, a company acting as a non-state entity and polluting a community may violate 
rights, but this does not itself interfere with the State’s ability to respect or protect rights 
as in the case of corruption. Nonetheless, while company infringements do not 
generally directly undermine the State’s ability to meet its section 7(2) duty, the State 
still has a section 7(2) duty to protect against such infringements and provide remedies 
for them. In other words, while the State’s duty and capacity is not directly interfered 
with by the company’s violation, the company’s violation still triggers the State’s duty. 
For company infringements generally, then, the Glenister view of section 7(2) as being 
a necessary gateway to the rest of the Bill of Rights has greater implications for 
business and human rights matters than the concept of direct “undermining” or 
“disenabling” does. 
The majority of the Court in Glenister held on this point that a failure to adequately 
deal with corruption lays the foundation for the infringement of any number of rights.91 
More directly, it held that any potential infringement of any right, and even the potential 
infringement of rights as a whole in the abstract, immediately triggers section 7(2).92 
Section 7(2) thus presents a clear justiciable duty that is separate to, but underpins, 
the application provisions of section 8 and the substantive rights provisions of the Bill 
of Rights.93 The Court held that the State must take “reasonable and effective” steps 
to fulfil this duty, which in some cases may require positive steps to “provide 
appropriate protection to everyone through laws and structures designed to afford such 
protection”.94 As the State as a whole is bound, these steps may be taken by the 
 
90 This is following the “atomistic” conception of companies as presented in chapter 2 part 2 4. 
A systemic reading may conceive of capitalist economic relations as inherently hamstringing 
human rights fulfilment. See for instance D Harvey A Companion to Marx’s Capital (2019), 
especially at 50-51, 139-140, 158. 
91 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) para 198. 
92 Para 200.  
93 See paras 177, 189, 190, 194, 200-201. See also Du Plessis “Interpretation” in Constitutional 
Law 32-121 – 32-125; Liebenberg “The Interpretation of Socio-Economic Rights” in 
Constitutional Law 33-6; Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 
2006 6 SA 416 (CC) para 17. 
94 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) para 189, citing 
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 
2001 4 SA 938 (CC) para 44. This latter quote originally referred to a s 8(1) duty, based on the 
Bill of Rights binding all law and all branches and organs of state. The Glenister Court expands 




judiciary95 as well as the legislature. Where it is most appropriate for the legislature to 
take these steps, the Court will not be prescriptive of what steps should be taken, 
provided they are reasonable.96 
In sum, then, section 7(2) runs parallel to and underpins the substantive provisions 
of the Bill of Rights. Any substantive rights must be given effect to via section 7(2), but 
the provision also provides an independently justiciable duty on the State to give effect 
to the Bill of Rights as a whole, without reference needing to be made to a specific 
right.  
 
3 3 2 Section 8(1) and (2): A perceived dichotomy between approaches centred on 
the State versus non-state entities 
The literature on section 8 application doctrine is complex and conflicting, and so 
the present exposition and analysis will begin with a preliminary overview of the 
section’s text before considering its interpretation as given by the courts. 
Section 8(1) of the Constitution provides that the Bill of Rights applies to all law, and 
binds organs of state as well as the three primary branches of government. It thus 
ostensibly gives rise to two implications. First, laws can be directly tested against the 
Bill of Rights for constitutionality, and any unconstitutional laws must be deemed 
invalid.97 Second, the State – a branch of it, or an organ of state – can be under an 
obligation itself in terms of the Bill of Rights, and may not infringe it by act or omission. 
Thus, it would be unconstitutional for a legislature to promulgate laws that unjustifiably 
infringe on human rights, or for a court to interpret legislation or develop the common 
law in a manner that unjustifiably infringes on fundamental rights. It would equally be 
unconstitutional to fail to promulgate or reform laws to give effect to rights. Thus, when 
coupled with the State’s duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill 
of Rights – as part of section 7(2), considered above – the State may be obliged, for 
instance, to regulate companies and provide remedies for victims. As a result, section 
8(1) may implicate companies, but only secondarily – either as a result of the State’s 
own human rights obligations, or as a result of the law being reformed to accord with 
the Bill of Rights.  
 
 
95 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 20. 
96 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) paras 190-191. 




Section 8(2) of the Constitution states: 
 
“A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, 
it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed 
by the right.” 
 
This provision provides a basis on which to directly bind non-state entities, such as 
companies, to applicable provisions in the Bill of Rights. Section 8(3) describes the 
effect of a finding that a right in the Bill of Rights binds a non-state entity. It provides 
that, to the extent that the right cannot be vindicated through existing legislation, a 
court must apply or develop the common law to do so.98 Alternatively, a court may 
develop common law rules to limit the right in accordance with the Constitution’s 
section 36 limitations clause.99 In other words, while section 8(2) may bind a company 
directly, section 8(3) requires courts to use the law – whether existing legislation or 
through common law development – to give effect to the binding effect established in 
section 8(2). 
However, in the case of Khumalo v Holomisa100 (“Khumalo”) the Constitutional Court 
(“the Court”) gave an important gloss to section 8(1) and 8(2) of the Constitution. 
O’Regan J held for a unanimous Court that each of these provisions must be 
interpreted mindful of the other’s existence, and that each must accordingly be given 
its own independent meaning, distinct from the other.101 The applicants had argued, 
on a plain reading of the provisions, that section 8(1) binds all law and the judiciary to 
the Bill of Rights, and thus could theoretically be used to invalidate any common law 
regulating non-state entities. However, O’Regan J held that if this interpretation were 
accorded to section 8(1), then section 8(2) and its attached section 8(3) would have 
no apparent purpose.102 She went on to hold that an interpretation that negated a 
provision of the Constitution was not tenable. Accordingly, the Court held that, as far 
the common law regulates relations between non-state entities, it is section 8(2) and 
8(3) that applies, and not section 8(1).  
Further, the Court dealt with the meaning of section 8(2)’s statement that a non-
state entity may be bound “to the extent that it is applicable, taking into account the 
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nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right.” O’Regan J 
interpreted this to mean that, given the “intensity” of the right and its “potential invasion” 
by non-state entities, there is a human rights obligation on those entities in terms of 
section 8(2).103 Ultimately, then, this enquiry centres on the interpretation and content 
of the right itself, rather than on an interpretation of section 8(2).104 In other words, the 
imposition of an obligation on a non-state entity will ultimately turn on how its correlative 
substantive right is interpreted. 
Later, in Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School & Others v Essay 
NO105 (“Juma Musjid”), the Court relied on Khumalo to impose a human rights 
obligation on a non-state entity. The case concerned the common law rei vindicatio 
eviction of a public school from a non-state entity’s property. The non-state entity had 
met the requirements of the rei vindicatio – that is, they proved their ownership and 
that the school had been in possession of the property at the time of proceedings.106 
In terms of the common law, the onus was thus on the school to justify their continued 
occupation. The Court first held that, following section 8(2) of the Constitution, the non-
state entity could not impair the learners’ right to basic education.107 However, the 
Court held that the application for eviction had still been reasonable in terms of the 
common law rei vindicatio test.108 The Court did not make reference to section 8(3) or 
section 36 of the Constitution, and so this was not a case of using the common law to 
justifiably limit the right. The Court’s reasoning is thus not clear. It appears to not bind 
the non-state entity to the right, in contradiction to its earlier rights analysis. 
Alternatively, it appears to elevate the common law above the Bill of Rights. 
Thereafter, the Court emphasised that, despite the reasonableness of the eviction, 
the non-state entity’s common law property rights could not trump the right to basic 
education and children’s rights. The Court thus appeared to return to its earlier position, 
holding that the rei vindicatio should be developed to respect these rights – implying 
some degree of invalidity of the law.109 However, the Court then did not develop the 
common law in any way, and makes no further mention of the rei vindicatio. Finally, 
 
103 Para 33. Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 331; Friedman (2014) SAJHR. 
104 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 38 (majority) and 156 (minority). 
105 Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School & Others v Essay NO 2011 8 BCLR 
761 (CC). 
106 Para 15, and footnote 14. 
107 Paras 54-60. 
108 Paras 61-66. 




the Court ordered that, even given the confirmed priority of the learners’ rights over the 
non-state entity’s property rights, it would be “just and equitable” in the circumstances 
to order eviction in terms of the Court’s wide remedial powers.110 The judgment thus 
vacillates between binding the non-state entity to the Bill of Rights and vindicating the 
entity’s common law rights, and ultimately settles on the latter. In other words, it is not 
clear to what extent non-state entities can be bound where they have opposing 
“private” common law rights. However, Juma Musjid has since generally been received 
to at least mean that non-state entities can be obliged to not interfere with the 
enjoyment of rights, depending on the interpretation of the right in question.111 
Importantly in the context of companies, the Court holds that the distinction between 
public and private law has historically “sheltered private power used for public 
purposes”,112 and it is this that section 8(2) seeks to address. 
More recently, the case of Daniels v Scribante113 (“Daniels”) has emphasised that 
positive human rights obligations may also be imposed on companies directly via 
section 8(2). This case concerned the potential positive obligation on a private natural 
person landowner in terms of the right to security of tenure. Madlanga J for the majority 
noted that the Court has never denied the possibility of positive human rights 
obligations being imposed on non-state entities, and in fact saw some potential 
precedent of such obligations.114 He held that whether an obligation can be seen as 
“positive” is a factor when considering whether or not to impose it, but that this positive 
nature is “not dispositive”.115 The positive nature is primarily relevant when considering 
the potential financial burden on a non-state entity, whose resources are limited as 
compared to the public purse.116 Indeed, the Court formulated a broader test than the 
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113 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC). 
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the possibility of positive human rights obligations on non-state entities. 
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mere question of positive duty for determining whether a non-state entity is directly 
bound by a a right in the Bill of Rights in terms of section 8(2). Thus Madlanga J held: 
 
“Whether private persons will be bound depends on a number of factors. What is paramount 
includes: what is the nature of the right; what is the history behind the right; what does the 
right seek to achieve; how best can that be achieved; what is the “potential of invasion of 
that right by persons other than the State or organs of state”; and, would letting private 
persons off the net not negate the essential content of the right? If, on weighing up all the 
relevant factors, we are led to the conclusion that private persons are not only bound but 
must in fact bear a positive obligation, we should not shy away from imposing it; section 
8(2) does envisage that.”117 
 
The Court held that there was, in this case, a positive duty on a natural person 
towards the rights claimant, via section 8(2). On the facts, this required the owner of a 
dwelling to allow an occupier to make improvements to that dwelling. The positive duty 
would arise indirectly, as under the relevant human rights legislation118 the owner may 
later be ordered by a court, upon the eviction of the occupier, to provide compensation 
to the occupier for any improvements made.119 That is, the occupier’s human right to 
effect improvements would result in a later positive duty to compensate her. However, 
this result was used to inform the interpretation of human rights legislation,120 despite 
the positive duty being examined through binding a non-state entity directly via section 
8(2). In other words, despite the reliance on section 8(2) and its implications for binding 
non-state actors, the outcome was in terms of statute and statutory interpretation – and 
thus should have implicated sections 8(1) and 39(2). This is an important observation. 
Normally, the legislature would be able to promulgate legislation that impose burdens 
on non-state entities as part of its legislative powers. Such an approach was taken 
earlier in the Daniels case,121 but the explicit reference to section 8(2) here implies that 
 
117 Para 39 (footnotes omitted). 
118 S 13 of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997. 
119 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 37. 
120 The Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 is directly called for in the right to 
security of tenure in s 25(6) of the Constitution. Parliament was thus under a duty to give effect 
to this right by enacting this Act: Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 12-13. 
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respondent’s objection that the imposition of a positive duty precludes such an interpretation. 
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the legislature may only have such legislative powers where the non-state entity is 
bound in terms of section 8(2). Moreover, even where the legislature is itself under a 
human rights duty to promulgate legislation – as was the case here – it seemingly can 
only impose duties on non-state entities (and meet its own duty) where the non-state 
entity can also be bound. In other words, the Court introduced the question of severity 
of duty on non-state entities into the statutory interpretation process. In doing so, it 
provided a form of defence to non-state entities, allowing such entities to allege that a 
legislative burden on them to give effect to rights is too strenuous (even without 
claiming a competing constitutional right). This potentially narrows the State’s ability to 
promulgate legislation that gives effect to rights, and reduces the scope of its own duty. 
Ideally, Daniels should not be read as providing such a “defence” to non-state 
entities, but it did open the door to considerations of “privateness” and severity of duty 
in the process of legislative interpretation. As a result, while Daniels found the 
legislative burden to not be too strenuous, the opposite was found in Baron v Claytile 
(Pty) Limited122 (“Baron”), which followed and relied on Daniels. Like Daniels, Baron 
made express mention of directly binding a non-state entity (specifically, a company) 
with a positive obligation to house occupants on its property, but (as in Daniels) used 
this duty to interpret and apply legislation.123 Despite referring to Daniels and its 
approval of positive duties on non-state entities,124 the Baron Court ultimately ordered 
an eviction. In interpreting whether the legislation required that the company should 
continue to house the occupants, the Court stressed the importance of the company’s 
common law right to property and how the occupation had unfairly limited that right.125 
Importantly, this was not a question of the company’s competing constitutional right to 
property, and the balancing and limitation of such a right against the occupants’ rights. 
The section 25 constitutional right to property was not mentioned, and no such 
balancing was done. In other words, this was not a matter of the non-state entity’s 
human rights being balanced against or shaping the occupants’ human rights. Rather, 
the Court used the non-state entity’s duty to shape the content of the occupants’ right, 
by way of statutory interpretation. The confluence of sections 8(1), 8(2) and 39(2) thus 
allowed for common law rights to dominate the interpretation of legislation intended to 
give effect to human rights.  
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The judgments in Daniels and Baron thus implicate the law itself, interpretation of 
statute, non-state entities, and the judiciary and legislature all at once. However, there 
is little clarity as to how these are all implicated, as only the interpretation of statute via 
section 39(2)126 and the potential binding of a non-state entity via section 8(2) are 
referred to explicitly. It is thus not fully clear what role section 8(2) is to play in cases 
such as these where legislation is involved – an important factor where companies and 
company regulation is concerned.  
A final case to consider in relation to section 8 is University of Stellenbosch Legal 
Aid Clinic v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services127 (“Legal Aid Clinic”). The 
case concerned a number of micro-lenders exploiting their vulnerable and 
impoverished debtors by forging or improperly obtaining their consent to judgment 
when the debtors defaulted.128 The lenders would also often “forum-shop” for courts 
far from where the debtors could defend themselves. Emoluments attachment orders 
were then inevitably given by the clerk of the court, and thus without any judicial 
oversight, against the debtors’ salaries. As a result, the debtors were left wholly unable 
to support themselves or their families. The Western Cape Division of the High Court 
saw this as a case specifically concerning companies, namely micro-lenders and debt-
collectors, and the human rights abuses committed by them. The court noted that one 
of the debt collection companies had 150 000 active cases, and that the value of the 
debts it collected were over R1,5 billion. Concerning the individual experience of those 
exploited, an illustrative debtor was a farm worker earning R2 420 per month, with 
emoluments deductions of R1 194. As the sole breadwinner for his family, comprising 
himself, his wife, five children and a grandchild, he was thus left with a net pay of R1 
263. The impact of the infringements by the companies was thus both wide and severe, 
with very many cases and serious consequences in each. 
To decide the matter, the court had to consider the interpretation of the Magistrates’ 
Courts Act 32 of 1944. In particular, it had to assess whether the provision allowing 
debtors to consent to judgment against them without judicial oversight was 
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constitutionally valid. The court referred extensively to foreign jurisdictions and 
international human rights instruments, especially those concerning business and non-
state entities.129 Importantly, the court emphasised that the State is under a duty to 
protect against human rights abuses by third parties, and eliminate legal barriers to 
remedies.130 The court thus concerned itself primarily with the State’s duty to protect 
against the infringement of rights by companies. The court specifically noted the rights 
infringed, namely rights to shelter, health, food, education, housing, family life, human 
dignity, and access to courts.131 The High Court ultimately found the provision of the 
Magistrates’ Court Act 32 of 1944 to be constitutionally invalid insofar as it allowed 
written consent to judgment, and as a remedy severed that portion of the provision. 
The case proceeded to the Constitutional Court for confirmation of the invalidity and 
remedy.132 The Constitutional Court did not refer to section 7(2) or 8, instead focusing 
solely on statutory interpretation and the assessment of the statute’s validity.133 It 
nonetheless reached a similar conclusion on the invalidity of the statute to the High 
Court, although differing in remedy. The Constitutional Court held that the statute was 
invalid to the extent that it did not provide for judicial oversight, and ordered that such 
provisions be read in.134 
Legal Aid Clinic does not refer explicitly to sections 7(2) or 8 of the Constitution.135 
Nonetheless, the case presents a number of interesting approaches to the application 
of the Bill of Rights where companies are involved. Firstly, the assessment and 
declaration of invalidity implies a reliance on section 8(1) and the binding effect of the 
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Bill of Rights on all law.136 Secondly, the emphasis on the court’s duty to protect seems 
to imply a reliance on section 7(2), as well as imply a reference to section 8(1)’s binding 
of the State. Thirdly, the case emphasises the infringement of rights by non-state 
entities, referring in particular to abuses by companies, and thus hints at companies 
themselves being under an obligation to respect rights in terms of section 8(2). Like 
Daniels, then, Legal Aid Clinic implicates the State, law, and companies 
simultaneously, although it places a greater emphasis on the State’s duty to protect.137 
The promising implications of this approach will be considered in a later analysis. 
 
3 3 3 Section 39(2): Avoiding the direct binding effect of section 8 
Section 39(2) of the Constitution requires every court to promote the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights when interpreting any legislation, and when developing 
the common and customary law. There are numerous interpretations of this provision, 
both by academics and the courts.138 Importantly, the section does not provide for the 
imposition of Bill of Rights obligations on non-state entities, as per section 8(2). Rather, 
it requires the interpretation of legislation or the development of the common law to 
promote the normative value system of the Bill of Rights.139 It thus does not directly 
give rise to enforceable human rights obligations for state or non-state entities, nor 
does it provide for the direct testing of the law against the Bill of Rights, but it may 
nonetheless lead to the indirect human rights regulation of companies.140 In other 
words, the non-state entity may come under a secondary obligation in terms of the law 
being interpreted or developed, rather than (for instance) directly under a substantive 
Bill of Rights obligation via section 8(2). 
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The distinction between direct binding via section 8 and the indirect human rights 
regulation via section 39(2) is important, as it gives rise to material differences in the 
effects of the Bill of Rights. The most prominent of these is that the rights in the Bill are 
enforceable and are given substantive meaning by the Constitutional Court, thereby 
distinguishing them from the broader value-based analyses for which section 39(2) is 
often used.141 As section 39(2) merely requires the promotion of the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights – and not the advancement of discrete substantive rights – 
the use of section 39(2) allows for substantive rights analyses to be avoided. Indeed, 
prior to Daniels, authors had observed that the confusion regarding the application of 
section 8 to non-state entities has resulted in courts tending to avoid that section 
altogether, and instead using section 39(2).142 As a result, legislation can be 
interpreted or the common law developed without reference being made to the 
substantive provisions of the Bill of Rights. This approach has been criticised as 
defeating the purposes of the Bill of Rights, and as rendering section 8(2) nugatory.143 
In particular, as the substantive rights form the core of the Bill of Rights, an 
interpretation of section 39(2) that avoids those rights has been argued as 
untenable.144 Certain authors have nonetheless asserted that section 39(2) may well 
have the same effect as substantive rights, especially if substantive rights are used to 
reciprocally inform the meaning of constitutional values.145 Rather than resolve the 
doctrinal tension between sections 8 and 39(2), the High Court has in one case 
assumed that the outcome will be the same regardless of which route is followed.146 
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Authors have also argued that there are benefits to preferring section 39(2), such as 
allowing courts to engage with applicable legislation and developing a constitutionally 
consistent interpretation of the legislation in question, thereby displaying more respect 
for the legislature.147 
Where non-state entities such as companies are concerned, however, section 39(2) 
is sometimes used by courts alongside the other sections considered in this chapter. 
For instance, Daniels referred to section 39(2), and explicitly linked it to substantive 
rights and duties analysis.148 The same occurred in Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd,149 
where the interpretation of a statute (namely the Prescription Act 68 of 1969) was 
expressly linked to substantive rights in evaluating the victim’s contract with a 
company. Nonetheless, the potential for avoidance of substantive rights is 
compounded where companies are involved, as – in addition to section 8(1) and 8(2) 
– companies are at the nexus of both legislation and common law. Company matters 
may thus trigger section 39(2) on either or both of those fronts, and allow for avoidance 
of substantive rights. Accordingly, as with the other constitutional provisions 
considered in this chapter, this is a developing area, and some clarity is needed in the 
interaction between section 39(2) and substantive rights application, especially where 
companies are concerned. 
 
3 3 4 Section 239: Companies as organs of state 
Section 239 of the Constitution allows for a company to qualify as an organ of state 
if it exercises a public power or performs a public function in terms of any legislation.150 
Critically, companies qualifying as organs of state are subject to the obligations 
applicable to the State in terms of sections 7(2) and 8(1). Thus, insofar as it constitutes 
an organ of State in terms of section 239, the company ceases to be treated as a non-
state entity. As concerns the application of the Bill of Rights, there is a clear distinction 
between a company acting as part of state machinery and its acting as a non-state 
entity. This difference is implied by the inverse of section 8(2): where a company is an 
organ of state, it is bound regardless of the nature of the right and its correlative duty. 
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The considerations of whether to impose an obligation on a non-state entity, as 
considered by the Khumalo and Daniels cases, above, are irrelevant. Rather, the 
enquiry would centre on whether the company qualifies as an organ of state. Where 
the company is found to be an organ of state, even state-specific Bill of Rights 
provisions, such as those requiring progressive realisation of rights within available 
resources,151 would bind the company.152 
The difference produced by being an organ of state should not be overstated, 
however. It should be remembered that, to fulfil its own obligations, the State itself may 
require companies to progressively fulfil rights. For instance, in keeping with its 
obligations to promote rights in terms of sections 7(2) and 8(1), the State may legislate 
that certain companies take steps to provide housing for its employees. Alternatively, 
companies may be under such obligations even as non-state entities. As discussed 
earlier, the Daniels case implies that even positive obligations may be imposed on 
companies as non-state entities, and these non-state obligations may take a similar 
form to the progressive realisation obligations of the State. 
In cases where companies are treated as non-state entities, section 8(3) would 
prompt section 36, and thereby function as a check: where a company has a smaller 
scope and fewer resources, and such burdens may lead to undue hardship for the 
company, it may be justifiable to limit the rights that demand specific human rights 
regulation. This consideration of scope and impact is very similar to the requirement of 
public function, as required when treating companies as organs of state in terms of 
section 239. 
In other words, the same conclusion may conceivably be reached whether one binds 
the State, the company as a non-state entity, or the company as an organ of state 
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itself. The different approaches simply shift questions of company scope and impact 
to different parts of the evaluation. 
That the line between “influential non-state entity company” and “organ of state 
company” is blurred is evidenced by the case of Allpay Consolidated Investment 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social Security 
Agency (No 2).153 The judgment seemingly hovers between imposing obligations on 
the company concerned as an organ of state and as a non-state entity.154 The company 
under consideration is treated explicitly as an organ of state at some points, with direct 
reference to section 8(1) of the Constitution.155 However, at other points, it is treated 
as a non-state entity, with explicit reference made to Juma Musjid and section 8(2) of 
the Constitution, and to the company as a “private party” rather than as a public organ 
of state.156 The confusion is clearest when the Court holds that “[where] an entity has 
performed a constitutional function [as an organ of state] for a significant period already 
… considerations of obstructing private autonomy by imposing the duties of the state 
to protect constitutional rights on private parties, do not feature prominently, if at all.”157 
The Court reintroduces questions of private autonomy and attempts to justify imposing 
state duties on a “private party”. However, it had already confirmed that the private 
party was acting as an organ of state, and so questions of “privateness” were irrelevant. 
Nonetheless, the judgment ultimately rested on the organ of state characterisation. 
The confusion between the company’s characterisation as non-state entity and organ 
of state was later repeated in the related case of Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social 
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3 3 5 Analysis of the various Bill of Rights application approaches to companies and 
human rights 
The jurisprudence and literature on sections 7(2), 8, 39(2) and 239 of the 
Constitution are immensely varied and often contradictory. It is thus necessary to 
perform some degree of synthesis analysis across these sections to understand how 
the Bill of Rights affects companies. 
The dichotomy between section 8(1) and 8(2) is the primary source of difficulty with 
the Bill of Rights’ application doctrine, and of debate on the subject.159 Firstly, it is 
necessary to start with Khumalo, as the central case on section 8(2).160 Khumalo 
implies that the “public” common law – where the dispute concerns a vertical 
relationship between a non-state entity and the State – can and should be tested 
against the Bill of Rights via section 8(1). However, the “private” common law, involving 
common law rules regulating the “horizontal” relationship between non-state entities, 
must follow section 8(2) and (3). In other words, the nature of the parties determines 
the nature of the evaluation. This is an outcome at odds with the doctrine of objective 
unconstitutionality, which holds that constitutionality should not turn on which parties 
are before the Court.161 Further, as far as the common law is concerned, the conclusion 
from Khumalo is that section 8(1) and section 8(2) are mutually exclusive: they do not 
apply at the same time. There is thus an apparent dichotomy between binding the State 
(or testing the law), and binding non-state entities. Moreover, Khumalo clearly implies 
that if it is possible to bind a non-state entity through section 8(2), this must be preferred 
to taking the section 8(1) routes of directly testing the common law against the Bill of 
Rights, or of obliging the legislature or judiciary to reform the law. The implication of 
this is that the scope of section 8(1) is determined by the scope of section 8(2): where 
section 8(2) can potentially be seen as applicable, section 8(1) does not apply. In other 
words, if a section 8(2) enquiry could conceivably be performed, it must be. This is the 
case even if the section 8(2) enquiry ultimately concludes that the non-state entity 
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should not be bound. Section 8(1) will still not apply: where a non-state entity is 
implicated, the matter “[does] not involve the state or an organ of state”.162 
Khumalo dealt with the common law specifically, and so it is not immediately clear 
whether the dichotomy between section 8(1) and 8(2) extends to legislation. Some 
case law indicates that legislation can always be directly tested for validity via section 
8(1) in all cases, whether the legal relationships concerned are between a non-state 
entity and the State (“public”) or between non-state entities themselves (“private”).163 
The implication is thus that, where legislation is considered, the law is directly subject 
to the Bill of Rights and the State’s obligations under the Bill are determinative. There 
is thus no question of directly binding a non-state entity via section 8(2). In Daniels and 
Baron, however, the Court invoked section 8(2) where legislation affecting 
relationships between non-state entities was concerned, rather than rely on section 
8(1).164 In these cases, the Court considered the binding of non-state entities via 
section 8(2) expressly, and subsequently used the conclusions drawn to establish the 
meaning of the statute. In other words, these cases imply that legislation regulating 
“horizontal” relationships implicates the direct binding of non-state entities via section 
8(2). Again, the Court does not consider the question of the binding of the State and/or 
law via section 8(1). 
As concerns company law, difficulties arise in the close links between public and 
private law, in the relevance of both statute and common law to company regulation, 
and in the significant role of the State in enforcing the legal relations that constitute the 
economy. These difficulties have already been discussed to some degree, but bear 
elaboration in this particular context. Practically, the three central problems for 
company law arising from the Khumalo dichotomy are the following. First, it is uncertain 
whether company law reform should rely on State obligations and the direct testing of 
the law via section 8(1), or on the obligations of companies themselves via section 
8(2). Company law relies on clear public regulation and enforcement by all branches 
of state, has wide public economic implications, involves “private” non-state entities, 
and arises from common law and statute. It is not clear where company law fits into 
the hard categories Khumalo creates from “public” common law, “private” common law, 
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and legislation. It is also in any case not evident why the common law should be 
handled differently to legislation, when section 8(1) binds “all law” and both the 
legislature and judiciary equally.165 It is further difficult to see why, whenever 
companies are implicated, the State’s role in enforcing the legal regime supporting 
companies and company activities should not be scrutinised and tested against the Bill 
of Rights via section 8(1). The same applies for why the law (and regulatory scheme) 
itself should not be scrutinised and tested via section 8(1).166 
Second, the difficulty with the section 8 dichotomy has, as noted previously, given 
rise to a greater reliance on section 39(2) to avoid questions of the direct application 
of the Bill of Rights to non-state entities.167 Instead of binding the State or relevant law 
directly to substantive rights via section 8(1), or binding non-state entities directly to 
substantive rights via section 8(2), courts simply interpret legislation or develop the 
common law following the normative system of the Bill of Rights. The relationship 
between section 39(2) and sections 8(1) or 8(2) is thus uncertain. This uncertainty is 
again compounded by the simultaneous relevance of both the common law and statute 
to companies, as section 39(2) applies to both the interpretation of legislation and the 
development of common law. As mentioned above, this is coupled with the uncertainty 
of how sections 8(1) and 8(2) may have differing application depending on whether 
common law or statute is implicated. It is thus unclear which of the aforementioned 
approaches to applying the Bill of Rights to companies should be used when, and why. 
It can be noted, however, that the preference for section 39(2) reduces the scope of 
both parts of section 8, as those parts cease to apply where section 39(2) is used. This 
may have serious implications for the extent to which substantive rights considerations 
feature in matters involving companies. Where section 39(2) is preferred, and where it 
only prompts a consideration of broader constitutional values, the use of substantive 
rights might be avoided as well. Such an approach would make it impossible to use 
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substantive rights to test the law or bind the State or non-state entities. This is a 
significant loss, as it neglects the substantive content given to rights by courts in 
jurisprudence, and reduces the potential of this content to inform and transform the 
law. It also potentially excludes the content given to rights by international instruments, 
as considered in the following chapter. 
Third, the State has a duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the Bill of Rights in 
terms of section 7(2) of the Constitution. As with section 39(2), the interaction between 
section 7(2) and the section 8 dichotomy is not firmly established. Khumalo can be 
read to imply that, where companies are concerned, obligations under the Bill of Rights 
only arise by assessing whether a company should be directly bound via section 8(2). 
As noted above, any assessments of the law and State obligations under section 8(1) 
are seemingly precluded. If paired with section 7(2), Khumalo means that the State 
only has a duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil rights where a company is found 
to be bound by a right in the Bill of Rights in terms of section 8(2). In other words, the 
State’s duties under section 7(2) are contingent on the existence of a binding obligation 
on the company in terms of section 8(2). The scope of the State’s obligations (and thus 
of the substantive rights themselves) accordingly turns on whether the company is 
bound, and to what degree. The sphere of application of the Bill of Rights is thus 
noticeably diminished, as it must always first be shown that the non-state entity in 
question can be bound. This paradigm may give rise to some undesirable 
consequences. As discussed, it is contrary to transformative constitutionalism to shield 
the law and state action from scrutiny, and especially so to cloak the law and state 
action in a garb of “privateness”.168 Further, as companies are still primarily viewed as 
“private” entities, there may be a conceptual reluctance to interfere too heavily with 
them or impose duties on them. A human rights enquiry then turns primarily on what 
would seem reasonable to expect from companies in their pursuit of “private” self-gain, 
instead of focusing on the implications of the rights themselves. This approach subjects 
human rights to private economic interests, such as profit, and amounts to a conceptual 
privatisation of human rights obligations.169 The public role of the State and the law is 
reduced to solely ensuring that the company fulfils the obligations deemed appropriate 
for it as a private entity. This is a subversion of constitutional supremacy; of the origin 
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of companies in law subject to the Bill of Rights; of the substantive reasoning and 
reform envisioned by transformative constitutionalism; and arguably of the spirit and 
content of sections 7(2) and 8(1) themselves.  
Practically, following Khumalo, where a company is involved and the common law 
of companies is implicated, it should thus solely be asked whether the company should 
be bound via section 8(2) – section 8(1) does not apply. The common law of companies 
cannot on this approach be directly tested for validity against the Bill of Rights, and no 
branches or organs of state are bound. If there is an obligation on the State to regulate 
the company or provide a remedy, it arises only if it is found that the company itself 
should be bound, with the State’s obligation arising indirectly from its section 7(2) duty 
to protect, respect, promote and fulfil rights. The State and law are thus not directly 
bound, and the enquiry turns entirely on whether the company should be bound. 
Following Khumalo, then, the Bill of Rights only applies to all law and binds state 
institutions insofar as the matter does not concern the possible binding of a non-state 
entity (at least as far as the common law is concerned). Paradoxically, the Bill of Rights 
thus only binds the law and state institutions sometimes: where a non-state entity is 
implicated, the matter “[does] not involve the state or an organ of state”.170 
Juma Musjid follows Khumalo, in that the common law was not scrutinised or 
developed once the non-state entity was found to be bound, whereafter that entity’s 
property rights were prioritised. Daniels appeared to similarly confuse section 8(2) with 
the interpretation of a statute, and arguably narrowed the legislature’s ability to regulate 
non-state entities by implying that such regulation can only occur where the non-state 
entity is found to be bound under a section 8(2) duty themselves. Baron followed the 
approach in Daniels, and accordingly could prioritise the company’s common law 
property rights when interpreting the content of the occupants’ human rights. That is, 
Baron shaped the human rights of the victims according to the perceived severity of 
the burden on the non-state entity. This is evidently a reversal of a more transformative 
approach, where legislation is interpreted to give effect to rights foremost, and the 
common law of property is made subordinate to that rights-centric legislation. In sum, 
Daniels inadvertently led to an approach that centres on the duties and ordinary rights 
of the non-state entity, rather than on the human rights of the victims – as evidenced 
by the outcome in Baron. Moreover, as noted earlier, these cases thus take Khumalo 
even further. It appears that section 8(2) is generally to be preferred in any matter 
 




between non-state entities, such as where a company allegedly violates the human 
rights of another non-state entity, whether statute or common law is implicated. As with 
Khumalo, the explicit analysis of the validity of a law, or of binding the State, is 
precluded, and it becomes seemingly necessary to prove that any statutory burden on 
a company can first be established through section 8(2). In all these cases, there is 
also little indication of how and where section 8(3) is to be used to give effect to (or 
limit) the substantive rights in question.171  
However, Daniels also holds important progressive implications for the imposition 
of positive duties on companies. Specifically, section 8(2) allows for positive duties to 
be imposed on companies after consideration of the factors listed above. Here, 
transformative constitutionalism and the historical context of companies and their wider 
sphere of economic and political influence and control must be borne in mind. A 
systemic (rather than atomistic) approach to understanding the origin and nature of 
wealth and economic relations may be insightful here. Companies also tend to have 
far greater resources than individuals, and so considerations of resource limitations 
are somewhat diminished as concerns positive obligations. 
As concerns companies as organs of state, there is also some degree of confusion 
as to whether they lose their nature as non-state entities once they qualify as part of 
the State. Specifically, there is insufficient clarity on the overlap between directly 
binding a company as an organ of state, and directly binding them as a non-state entity. 
This is because the Bill of Rights provisions binding companies as organs of state can 
apply at the same time as provisions binding companies as non-state entities, and with 
regard to the same facts. Clarity is also needed on the implications of companies 
qualifying as organs of state, and the extent to which they are under state duties as a 
result – for instance, to what degree they attract the State duty to respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil in terms of section 7(2), and the subsequent impact on their pursuit 
of private profit. 
In sum, there is extensive confusion in numerous areas where the Bill of Rights and 
companies are concerned. First, concerning when precisely the law is to be (or can 
be) scrutinised and invalidated. Second, concerning when the State is to attract duties, 
and whether in terms of section 7(2), 8(1), or both. Third, concerning whether the 
State’s duties preclude companies’ duties, and vice-versa. Fourth, concerning when 
and why companies are to be bound directly in terms of 8(2). Fifth, concerning whether 
 




section 8(2) obligations trump companies’ common law rights (such as property). Sixth, 
concerning whether the State can regulate companies even where section 8(2) duties 
on the company are not clearly established. Seventh, concerning when companies are 
to be seen as organs of state, to what extent, and with what implications. Eighth, 
concerning when legislation is to be interpreted or the common law developed through 
section 39(2) rather than by imposing direct obligations. Finally, concerning whether 
there is a difference in any of these approaches in how statute and common law are 
handled, considering how companies exist at the intersection of the two. 
There are several consequences stemming from this lack of clarity and consistency. 
First, it is difficult for victims to reliably seek relief given the confusion in the field. 
Second, if each of these constitutional provisions are applied separately, lacunae are 
likely to arise. For instance, if section 8(1) and 8(2) are to be applied exclusive of each 
other, and a company is found not to be bound under section 8(2), the State and law 
escape section 8(1) scrutiny. Similarly, even if the company is bound and a claim 
succeeds against it, wider systemic failures in the regulatory regime could escape 
scrutiny if section 8(1) is ignored. Third, the present state of application doctrine 
exhibits a reluctance to scrutinise the systemic role of the State and law in facilitating 
corporate power and profit.172 This aligns it with an atomistic conception of companies. 
It thus risks ideologically favouring and preserving corporate interests over victims’ 
rights, and it thereby risks being insufficiently transformative.173 
There are nonetheless some promising developments in recent case law. Legal Aid 
Clinic – in not referring to section 7(2) or section 8 – implies a plurality of obligations. 
It is implied that companies, the State and the law are all bound at the same time, and 
can all infringe rights. These rights were infringed simultaneously by the companies, 
by the legislative and judicial regime that facilitated their infringement, and by the State 
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(of which the court was a part) as long as it did not meet its duty to protect against 
violations.  
Similarly, Glenister appears to move beyond the dichotomised and formalist 
approach to non-state entities and violations. Even before considering whether the 
State or a non-state entity is bound by the Bill of Rights, the mere possibility of a right 
being infringed is enough to trigger the State’s section 7(2) duty.174 Without necessarily 
having to specify a particular right, and thus without having to specify the duty-bearer, 
the State is required take reasonable measures to prevent and remedy infringements 
of rights generally.175 This extends to infringements committed by companies. 
Reasoning by analogy, this aspect of Glenister implies that company regulation as a 
whole must be rendered systemically consistent with the Bill of Rights, and that a case-
by-case approach to specific reported violations of specific rights would be insufficient. 
This places the focus on rights and rights-holders, even where it can only be said that 
the Bill of Rights as a whole would be systemically infringed if the State failed its section 
7(2) duty. That is, it is not strictly necessary to refer to particular substantive rights or 
rights-holders. It is rather necessary only to show that retaining the present regulatory 
scheme would negatively affect rights more generally. The core of this approach is 
thus the State’s duty to systemically protect and supply an effective remedy for all 
potential rights-holders and violations. This lends itself well to a systemic (rather than 
atomistic) approach to companies and human rights. The role of the State and law is 
stressed, and steps taken by the State would have to amount to a sufficiently 
reasonable and effective systemic intervention. Similarly, as both the judiciary and 
legislature are implicated, the focus is shifted to deciding what the most effective 
means to meet the duty would be, whether by a range of judicial remedies, legislative 
reform, or both. The chosen remedy may then happen to implicate the State, its law, 
and companies all at once. This moves towards substantive reasoning rather than 
formalism, and places the protection of rights at the foundation of the analysis.176  
Thus, these two cases point to a potential rights-centric approach to companies and 
human rights, rather than a complex and formalistic duty-bearer-centric approach. The 
question of rights infringement is answered first, while more formalist questions of 
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whether the duty in the case should be considered to be imposed on non-state entities 
(in terms of section 8(2)) or the State and its law (in terms of section 8(1)) are 
deprioritised. Emphasis is also put on the State’s constant, underlying and independent 
duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil rights in terms of section 7(2). Simply put, 
all parties and the law implicated in the infringement are bound by the right. The 
specific duties on these bound parties and the implications for the law are merely the 
result of a policy decision, that being the effective remedy for the infringement. In Legal 
Aid Clinic, for instance, the remedy chosen fulfilled the State (including the court’s) 
duty to protect, enforced companies’ duty to not infringe rights, and harmonised the 
legislative-judicial regulatory regime with the Bill of Rights. 
A remedy that follows a rights-centric analysis is thus multicentric in nature where 
duty-bearers are concerned, in that it simultaneously implicates the State, the law and 
any non-state entities. It also applies regardless of whether a company is itself 
considered an organ of state or a non-state entity, as it centres on the right and not the 
duty-bearer. The nature of any ensuing obligations as “positive” or “negative” is also 
irrelevant, with the focus being on the effectiveness of the remedy rather than the 
classification of the burden. Whether (and how) legislation or common law are affected 
is a result of the remedy, rather than a formalist determinant of how the analysis 
proceeds. If a right is to be limited, it can only be done through the law and a rights 
limitation analysis, as required by section 36 of the Constitution. This allows for the 
broadest and most generous interpretation of the right, followed by a strict analysis of 
justifiable limitations. It thus accords with the two-step approach to human rights that 
is a prominent feature of transformative jurisprudence and the culture of justification.177  
This approach further aligns with section 8(3), which requires that courts use the 
ordinary law to vindicate rights where a non-state entity is bound – whether by using 
legislation or by applying or developing the common law.178 Similarly, section 8(3) 
holds that courts may use the common law to limit rights, provided such limitation is in 
accordance with section 36. Both the rights vindication and rights limitation 
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mechanisms of section 8(3) therefore point toward the simultaneous binding of the law 
and non-state entities. 
Overall, then, this rights-centric approach provides a harmonious interpretation and 
implementation of the various constitutional provisions discussed, giving them all 
meaningful and effective content centred on rights fulfilment. It also inherently 
facilitates deep systemic legal reform following the supremacy of the Constitution and 
Bill of Rights, and does not allow ordinary economic-legal conceptions or structures to 
predominate the analysis. In addressing systemic concerns holistically, it also 
maintains the transformative notion of a single system of law founded on human 
rights.179 It would thus strongly benefit from a fuller study and conception of the 
systemic approach to conceptualising companies. 
The rights-centric approach – while still in need of development – aligns well with 
transformative constitutionalism’s focus on the substance of the Bill of Rights and the 
meaningful transformation of the law. Substantive rights become determining factors, 
rather than former perceived divisions between the public and private spheres, positive 
and negative obligations, or the economy and law. In this vein, placing the focus on 
the Constitution foremost, Pretorius AJ for a unanimous Court aptly observed in Baron: 
 
“But often adherence to a strict classification of horizontal or vertical application of the Bill 
of Rights obfuscates the true issue: whether, within the relevant constitutional and statutory 
context, a greater “give” is required from certain parties. Any ‘give’ must be in line with the 
Constitution. This Court has long recognised that complex constitutional matters cannot be 
approached in a binary, all-or-nothing fashion, but the result is often found on a continuum 
that reflects the variations in the respective weight of the relevant considerations.”180 
 
To conclude this analysis, there is thus a need for far greater doctrinal clarity on how 
the Bill of Rights applies where companies and company law are concerned. However, 
there is the possibility of a move past difficult and contradictory doctrine towards a 
multicentric approach focused on substantive rights and effective remedies for 
violations. Moreover, this approach can be extended beyond companies, to other 
business structures and actors, as considered in the following part. 
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3 4 The Bill of Rights and other business structures/actors 
This study focuses specifically on the implications of human rights for companies. 
Companies are able to secure greater investment due to their separate juristic 
personality granting limited liability for investors. They are thus able to operate on a 
large scale, with a far greater potential impact on human rights. Accordingly, the 
particular structure of the company merits special study. However, many of this study’s 
findings may be applicable to other forms of business as well, which, in the South 
African context, include close corporations, business trusts, partnerships and sole 
proprietorships. Further, there are many business actors involved in the running of the 
company. These will be considered very briefly, along with their potential relevance to 
the study. 
Close corporations are regulated by the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984. 
Importantly, instead of shareholders and directors as in a company, close corporations 
can have up to ten natural persons as members, and these both control and direct the 
close corporation.181 Like companies, corporations are separate juristic persons to their 
members, and their members receive the benefits of limited liability.182 This results in 
a business form better suited to smaller undertakings between members in close 
interaction. The Act makes provision for the continued operation of any close 
corporations that existed when the Act came into effect (although no new close 
corporations can be formed).183 
Business trusts, partnerships and sole proprietorships do not create a separate 
juristic person with separate liability (unlike companies and close corporations). 
Business trusts are established in terms of common law.184 Being trusts, they 
distinguish between trust beneficiaries and trustees – a similar distinction as that 
between shareholders and directors for companies. Trustees must manage trust 
assets and liabilities to the financial benefit of the beneficiaries, or they may be liable 
for trust mismanagement.185 The trustees formally own the trust’s assets and liabilities 
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in their own name, although these cannot be mingled with the trustees’ personal assets 
and liabilities.186 Similar to trusts, formal business partnerships are concluded and 
regulated through the common law.187 Each partner to the partnership contract must 
financially contribute to the partnership, and the partners must agree to jointly run the 
business for their joint financial gain.188 Finally, a business may be run as a sole 
proprietorship, where the proprietor owns assets and conducts business in their own 
name, and is thus solely personally liable for any business losses. 
As noted in this chapter,189 the Bill of Rights’ application provisions state that it 
applies to “all law”190 and that it binds “natural and juristic persons”, if applicable.191 
The Bill of Rights thus does not distinguish its application based on the form of the 
particular business structure. The same act performed by different business structures 
or business actors could equally violate rights and attract obligations. Large companies 
may be more likely to have a severe impact on human rights due to their larger scale 
and operational capacity. However, it must be noted that, if the same infringements 
were performed by a partnership or sole proprietor, the partners or proprietor would 
likely be legally bound in the same way. Thus, the form of a business structure does 
not, by itself, attract or diminish human rights duties under the Bill of Rights. In other 
words, a business operation cannot be structured in such a way that it avoids human 
rights duties that would otherwise be imposed on it by the Bill of Rights. As concerns 
human rights, then, the difference between a company and a partnership, for example, 
would primarily lie in tailoring human rights regulation to suit the specific business 
structure. In other words, a company and partnership would not be bound differently 
by the Bill of Rights, but the implications of the Bill of Rights for each would differ. While 
the principles of separate juristic personality for companies could be regulated to 
protect human rights, for instance, there are no such principles to regulate for 
partnerships. 
The Bill of Rights’ application provisions, cited above, also imply that natural and 
juristic persons may be simultaneously bound in respect of a violation. Importantly, 
despite the principle of separate juristic personality, South African companies are a 
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legal fiction and thus can only act by attributing some human conduct to them.192 It is 
thus likely that – where a company is bound by the Bill of Rights – persons involved 
with the company are also effectively bound, according to the scope of their respective 
duties and/or powers. In other words, if a human act attributable to the company 
amounts to a rights violation, that human act itself is likely a violation as well, and both 
company and human are effectively bound by the right. The practical benefit of such a 
multicentric approach is that it allows effective remedies to be found and ordered 
against any relevant parties. This further provides incentives for each to comply with 
their own human rights duties within the particular business structure, even if the 
structure itself is a separate juristic person. Where applicable, rights would thus likely 
bind directors, managers and employees, but may also effectively bind anyone whose 
business interactions with the company cause or facilitate violations. For instance, 
shareholder resolutions could not infringe on human rights, and this would effectively 
mean both the company and the shareholders are bound by the Bill of Rights. It could 
also be argued that the shareholders themselves are in any case bound to not act to 
infringe rights, and that a shareholder resolution is an act by the shareholders. This 
multicentric binding could possibly also extend to external contractors who contribute 
to rights violations committed by the company. Again, this approach facilitates a 
systemic (rather than atomistic) and transformative intervention where companies are 
concerned, centring on rights and effective remedies foremost. Formalist questions of 
legal personality and duty-bearers are deprioritised in favour of rights vindication. 
In essence, the particular structure or juristic personality of a company does not 
necessarily determine who is bound by a right where business structures are 
concerned. Instead, the transformative rights-centric analysis and multicentric remedy 
approach implies moving beyond the formalist conception of business actors. It implies 
instead a multicentric assessment of human rights obligations that can involve any 
persons, natural or juristic, to the extent that they are involved in business operations 
affecting rights. Indeed, all of the numerous business structures and actors considered 
in this section may be implicated by the Bill of Rights in principle. Thus, while this study 
focuses primarily on the implications of the Bill of Rights for companies and company 
law, it must be noted that these implications likely extend in some way to other 
business structures and actors, and to the laws concerning them.  
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3 5 Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the application of the Bill of Rights to matters 
concerning companies and company law. This assessment relied on a study of the 
roots of the Bill of Rights in transformative constitutionalism generally, followed by a 
contextual and systemic consideration of transformative constitutionalism’s insights for 
companies and company law. These have been used to inform and guide the analysis 
that followed. 
There are several constitutional provisions which have been used where companies 
and non-state entities are concerned. Firstly, section 7(2) places a duty on the State 
to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the substantive rights in the Bill of Rights, and is 
also independently justiciable. Secondly, section 8 allows for the State, law and non-
state entities to variously be bound by the Bill of Rights. Thirdly, section 39(2) requires 
courts, when interpreting legislation or developing the common law, to do so within the 
normative framework of the Bill of Rights. Fourthly, companies can qualify as organs 
of state in terms of section 239 of the Constitution. The interactions and intersections 
between the various understandings of these are often not clear or contradictory in 
jurisprudence. However, there are some promising developments in recent cases, 
indicating an early move towards a more transformative and rights-centric approach 
with multicentric duties and remedies. 
Finally, this chapter has considered the potential extension of these implications to 
non-company business structures and actors. While presently unclear, it appears that 
a move past a formalist approach to business structures – again focusing on rights and 
an effective remedy – may be preferable here. If that is the case, the implications for 
how the Bill of Rights affects companies would extend to all actors involved in 
companies – such as directors, employees, shareholders and external contractors – 
as well as to other types of business structures. 
This chapter has considered the implications of a transformative approach to the 
application of the Bill of Rights to companies. The following chapter will consider the 
implications of international human rights law for the application of the Bill of Rights to 




Chapter 4: The constitutional implications of international law 
concerning business and human rights 
 
4 1 Introduction 
The previous chapter considered the theoretical approach of the transformative 
application of the Bill of Rights to the State and non-state entities. This chapter focuses 
on a specific aspect of this application – the effect of international law on the 
interpretation of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, and specifically 
on that of domestic Bill of Rights obligations. The analysis commences by comparing 
and linking the approaches to business and human rights at the international and 
domestic levels. It then considers how international law contributes to interpretations 
of the Bill of Rights, referring to transformative constitutionalism and case law. Finally, 
it examines two specific and relevant instruments – the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the “ICESCR”),1 and the United Nations Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights (the “UNGPs”)2 – and considers their 
implications for the domestic regime on business and human rights. 
 
4 2 State obligations and company obligations: Distinguishing the domestic 
and international law discussions 
As discussed in the previous chapter, constitutional jurisprudence on the application 
of the Bill of Rights creates a dichotomy between the Bill of Rights binding the State 
and its binding of companies as non-state entities. The academic literature also tends 
to focus on the question of the duty-bearer of accountability for human rights violations: 
the State, companies, or possibly both. As a result, the vindication of rights is 
determined primarily by the duty-bearer enquiry, rather than the other way around. This 
is in contrast with a potential rights-centric approach, as considered previously.3 
 
1 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) United Nations Treaty 
Series 993 3. 
2 United Nations Human Rights Council Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework UN Doc 
A/HRC/17/31. 




A similar focus and debate on the question of duty-bearer extends into international 
law.4 Historically, human rights obligations were owed by States to their citizens 
domestically, and later were also owed by States to each other in terms of international 
law.5 How states treated those in their jurisdiction thus became a matter of international 
concern. Imposing human rights obligations directly on companies is a relatively newer 
and more contentious phenomenon, however, in terms of both domestic constitutional 
law provisions and international law.6 As recent developments in international law and 
the burgeoning body of literature indicate,7 the current focus of the discussion concerns 
whether primary international human rights obligations should be imposed on States, 
companies, or both. This has raised questions of whether companies can and should 
bear human rights duties in international law, with both the legal principle and policy 
effectiveness of companies’ owing such duties being debated.8 Further academic and 
policy discussions revolve around which institutions can and should bear the duty to 
regulate transnational companies and enforce companies’ own duties, and the degree 
to which a State can and should interfere with the “private” business operations of its 
 
4 M Ssenyonjo Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law 2 ed (2016) 169, 177-
187. 
5 A Clapham Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (2006) 25; D Bilchitz “Corporations 
and the Limits of State-Based Models for Protecting Fundamental Rights in International Law” 
(2016) 23 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 143 146-149. 
6 Clapham Non-State Actors (2006) 25-84, 195-270; Ssenyonjo Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 169, 177-187. 
7 See chapter one part 1 1 1. These developments most prominently including the UNGPs and 
ICESCR, as considered in this chapter, and the ongoing work of the task team to establish a 
business and human rights treaty: D Bilchitz “The Necessity for a Business and Human Rights 
Treaty” (2016) 1 Business and Human Rights Journal 203; L McConnell “Assessing the 
Feasibility of a Business and Human Rights Treaty” (2017) 66 International & Comparative 
Law Quarterly 143; O De Schutter “Towards a New Treaty on Business and Human Rights” 
(2016) 1 Business and Human Rights Journal 41; Global Policy Forum The Struggle for a UN 
Treaty: Towards Global Regulation on Human Rights and Business (2016). 
8 J Nolan & L Taylor “Corporate Responsibility for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Rights 
in Search of a Remedy?” (2009) 87 Journal of Business Ethics 433 433-434; D Bilchitz 
“Corporate Law and the Constitution: Towards Binding Human Rights Responsibilities for 
Corporations” (2008) 125 SALJ 754 760-761; Bilchitz (2016) BHRJ 205-219; D Bilchitz “The 
Ruggie Framework: An Adequate Rubric for Corporate Human Rights Obligations?” (2010) 7 
SUR 198-229; S Ratner “Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility” 
(2001) 111 Yale LJ 443 461-465, 475-477; RC Blitt “Beyond Ruggie’s Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: Charting an Embracive Approach to Corporate Human Rights 




subjects in order to fulfil its own international obligations as a (public) State.9 In 
practice, the primary approach at international law has generally been “state-centric”, 
in that it has primarily retained States as the primary bearers of formal human rights 
obligations. Companies are only being indirectly “bound” through domestic regulation 
introduced by the State in the meeting of its own human rights obligations.10 
The question of who can and should be a duty-bearer thus appears similar at both 
the international and domestic constitutional levels. However, the “state-centric” 
approach as used at international law must be distinguished from its domestic 
meaning. As considered in the previous chapter, the State or companies (or possibly 
both) may be under domestic human rights duties, but it is ultimately always the 
obligation of the State to enforce those duties.11 In domestic law terminology, and as 
considered previously, this may be discussed variously as a state-centric “vertical” 
approach (in terms of which the State is always the final enforcer of the law and duties), 
a “horizontal” approach (focusing on the imposition of direct obligations on companies, 
enforced by the State), or a mixed approach (in terms of which both companies and 
the State are under direct obligations, with the State enforcing all obligations via the 
law – which may itself also be tested against substantive rights). While the terminology 
varies with the conceptualisation of who bears the duty, it remains for the State to 
enforce that duty in domestic law. Thus, from an international law perspective, the 
domestic enforcement of the Bill of Rights by the State is always an inherently state-
centric approach.12 The Bill of Rights obligations on companies only exist in terms of 
the State’s domestic law, and can ultimately only be legally enforced by the State. In 
other words, while outwardly similar in that they both consider State and direct 
 
9 See generally Clapham Non-State Actors (2006) 25-58, 195-270. For a discussion on the 
“private” versus “public” dichotomy, see chapter three. 
10 As will be seen in part 4 4, below, this has been the approach of the ICESCR and UNGPs. 
It has also been the approach of the proposed binding treaty on business and human rights: 
Bilchitz (2016) BHRJ 203-227; McConnell (2017) ICLQ 143-180; De Schutter (2016) BHRJ 41-
67; Global Policy Forum The Struggle for a UN Treaty (2016); United Nations Human Rights 
Council Resolution 26/9 Elaboration of an International Legally Binding Instrument on 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights Un 
Doc A/HRC/RES/26/9. 
11 See s 7(2) of the Constitution; chapter three part 3 3 1.  
12 This is not to deny the crucial role of such non-State actors in promoting human rights, such 
as in pressuring companies or the State to act differently. These actors may even cause 
changes or enforcement of legal obligations, such as by the legal development of legislation 




company obligations, the discussion of state-centrism in international law is distinct 
from the discussion of verticality/horizontality in domestic law as considered in the 
previous chapter.13 
Importantly, this study focuses on the legally-enforceable domestic human rights 
regulation of companies in terms of the South African Constitution. This chapter thus 
specifically views the international discussion on business and human rights through 
the inherent state-centrism of domestic law, rather than considering whether such 
state-centrism is the most effective policy at international law. As such, while the 
debate surrounding state-centrism at international law is central to that field and rapidly 
developing, it is less relevant from a domestic constitutional law lens. In other words, 
the present focus is solely on the implications of international law for the interpretation 
of the Bill of Rights. 
The following part will show how such openness and sensitivity to international law 
is core to transformative constitutionalism. This will then lay the foundation for the 
consideration of the ICESCR and UNGPs and their implications for our domestic rights 
regime. 
 
4 3 The relationship between the South African Constitution and international 
law 
4 3 1 Transformative constitutionalism and international law 
Transformative constitutionalism has already been considered in the context of the 
application of the Bill of Rights to non-state entities.14 However, it also forms the 
foundation of the South African human rights regime’s openness towards international 
law. Accordingly, as the background of the case law analysis that follows, 
transformative constitutionalism is considered in this context as well. 
 
13 Bilchitz has, however, used similar arguments in both the discussion at international law and 
on domestic horizontality to advocate for obligations being imposed directly on companies: 
Bilchitz (2016) IJGLS 143-170. 




South Africa’s legal tradition, descended from liberal legalism, has historically been 
relatively formalist in nature.15 Under formal apartheid especially, courts would use 
abstract mechanical reasoning, and fundamental assumptions would be neither 
expressed nor challenged.16 Following the principle of parliamentary supremacy, the 
judiciary would defer almost entirely to the legislature, without much question.17 
Indeed, a deliberate strategy of political and legal isolationism from international 
human rights developments was central to the maintenance of formal apartheid.18 
Overall, then, South Africa’s legal culture traditionally exhibited an avoidance of 
substantive reasoning and a tendency to “close itself off” to contesting insights and 
opinions, both locally and abroad.  
In Mureinik’s famous turn of phrase, transformative constitutionalism deliberately 
aims to move away from this “culture of authority” to a “culture of justification”.19 Johan 
van der Walt argues that constitutional review is thus a means of democratic “re-
plurification”, as it destabilises power relations and re-introduces a wide plurality of 
parties, each with meaningful power of engagement and contestation.20 Liebenberg 
has more recently echoed this approach in advocating a conception of adjudication as 
a form of dialogic politics.21 In this paradigm, courts become a forum (but are far from 
 
15 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 43-51. KE Klare “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 
SAJHR 146; J Dugard “The Judicial Process, Positivism and Civil Liberty” (1971) 88 SALJ 181; 
C Albertyn & DM Davis “Legal Realism, Transformation and the Legacy of Dugard” (2010) 26 
SAJHR 188. 
16 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 47. 
17 On the political factors that exacerbated this, see B Bunting The Rise of the South African 
Reich (1969) 140, 155-157. 
18 On the roots of “laager” isolationism in South Africa’s Afrikaner nationalist apartheid history, 
see FA van Jaarsveld The Afrikaner’s Interpretation of South African History (1964) 21-25. 
19 E Mureinik “A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights” (1994) 10 SAJHR 31. 
20 Johan van der Walt argues for the reconceiving of wealth as improper distribution instead of 
legitimate appropriation, which is particularly relevant to economic transformation and 
company law: J van der Walt “Piracy, Property and Plurality: Re-Reading the Foundations of 
Modern Law” (2001) TSAR 52. André van der Walt similarly argued that property should no 
longer be a trump over all other rights, but that it should be a meeting-point for collective 
engagement and participation in society: AJ van der Walt “Tradition on Trial: A Critical Analysis 
of the Civil-Law Tradition in South African Property Law” (1994) 11 SAJHR 169 203-205. This 
is particularly relevant in light of companies and their relative wealth as compared to potential 
rights victims. See also Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha 
Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 343. 




being the only forum) where marginalised groups are empowered to engage 
deliberatively with authority.22 The political and economic historical context of South 
Africa as considered in the previous chapter is of relevance here – as companies in 
the pre-constitutional era received extensive state support in law and policy, they 
formed part of a system of powerful and democratically-unaccountable political-
economic structures. Open and dialogic conceptions of human rights are thus 
especially relevant to the democratic transformation and contestation of this system.23 
Formalist, isolationist or “top-down” approaches to the interpretation and content of 
human rights as they affect companies would be inconsistent with the nature of 
transformative constitutionalism.24 Indeed, the transformative approach is rather one 
of embracing openness and critique “from below”.25 
This appreciation is seen most clearly in section 39 of the Constitution and its 
implications for the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. First, section 39(1)(a) holds that 
a court interpreting the Bill of Rights “must promote the values that underlie an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.” This indicates 
that, as part of the democratisation of the legal system after formal apartheid, courts 
must embrace substantive value-based reasoning and an open plurality of inputs and 
ideas.26 
Second, and importantly for the present chapter, this dialogic openness extends to 
norms beyond domestic borders:27 when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court “must 
consider international law”, and “may consider foreign law”, as required by section 
 
22 S Liebenberg “Needs, Rights and Transformation: Adjudicating Social Rights” (2006) 17 Stell 
LR 5 7-8, 12-21; S Rosa “Transformative Constitutionalism in a Democratic Developmental 
State” (2011) 22 Stell LR 542; DM Davis “Transformation and the Democratic Case for Judicial 
Review: The South African Experience” (2007) 5 Loyola University Chicago International LR 
45 50-55. 
23 Terreblanche Lost in Transformation (2012) 101-115. This is not only relevant to colonial 
and formal apartheid systemic issues, but extends as well to contemporary issues of 
companies and state capture: see broadly PL Myburgh The Republic of Gupta: A Story of State 
Capture (2017); H van Vuuren Apartheid Guns and Money: A Tale of Profit (2017). 
24 Van der Walt (1994) SAJHR 203-205; DM Davis & K Klare “Transformative Constitutionalism 
and the Common and Customary Law” (2010) 26 SAJHR 403 411. 
25 K Van Marle “Transformative Constitutionalism As/And Critique” (2009) 20 Stell LR 286; 
Davis & Klare (2010) SAJHR 435-449. 
26 S 39(1) of the Constitution. The Constitution’s values are always supremely determinative, 
not narrow categorical reasoning: Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2008 2 SA 24 
(CC) para 149-158. 




39(1)(b) and (c) of the Constitution respectively.28 Interpretations of the Bill of Rights 
are thus influenced both by international norms29 and foreign jurisdictions where 
appropriate.30 This openness to the international community’s normative input is crucial 
to self-reflective and substantive domestic human rights interpretations.31 Such a 
cooperative dialogue between domestic and international law is also in direct response 
to the isolationism of formal apartheid. It acknowledges the role international human 
rights law played in the anti-Apartheid struggle, and the deep influence it had on the 
Constitution’s drafting.32 It embraces South Africa’s place in the modern closely-
interconnected international community,33 and further allows South Africa itself to 
contribute to the development of international human rights law.34 As shown in the 
previous section, the dialogue between domestic and international human rights law is 
particularly important in the present era of economic globalisation, where the potential 
violations of human rights by powerful and unaccountable transnational companies are 
especially in focus.35 
Transformative constitutionalism thus supports the position that international law 
must play a role in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights as it concerns companies. The 
 
28 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 2 ed (2013) 146-147; H Strydom & K 
Hopkins “International Law” in S Woolman, M Bishop & J Brickhill (eds) Constitutional Law of 
South Africa 2 ed (OS 2005) 30-11 – 30-14; L Du Plessis “Interpretation” in S Woolman, M 
Bishop & J Brickhill (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2008) 32-173 – 32-191. 
29 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 101-118. 
30 118-120. 
31 117-118. 
32 K Maclean Constitutional Deference, Courts and Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 
(2009) 1-21. 
33 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 102. 
34 101-102, 117-118. Most recently, the landmark case of Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 
(CC), considered in chapter three part 3 3, has been cited internationally in the context of 
human rights and business regulation. The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights cited the case as an example of positive human rights duties imposed on 
a non-state entity in domestic law: United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights General Comment No 24: State Obligations under the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Context of Business Activities UN Doc E/C 
12/GC/24 para 6. 
35 See generally K Pistor The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality 
(2019); J Stiglitz Globalization and Its Discontents Revisited: Anti-Globalization in the Era of 
Trump (2017); P Phillips Giants: The Global Power Elite (2018); chapter one part 1 1 1, and 




mechanisms by which international law informs rights interpretation will now be 
considered, with reference to applicable case law. 
 
4 3 2 How international law affects Bill of Rights interpretations 
4 3 2 1 Overview of the relationships between international law and the Bill of Rights 
International law can interact with domestic law in several distinct ways, depending 
on the nature of the instrument36 and the purpose of the interaction. The Constitutional 
Court has observed interactions between domestic and international law via four 
constitutional provisions in particular.37 First, a court interpreting a provision of the Bill 
of Rights “must consider international law”.38 Second, international agreements are 
governed by section 231.39 This provision holds that the negotiating and signing of all 
such agreements is the responsibility of the national executive;40 that both houses of 
Parliament must ratify such an agreement for it to “bind the Republic”;41 that technical, 
administrative or executive treaties “bind the Republic” even without parliamentary 
ratification;42 and that international agreements only become domestic law in the 
Republic when enacted into law by national legislation, unless they are self-
executing.43 An important distinction must thus be made between treaties “binding the 
Republic” on the international level and treaties being enacted as part of domestic law. 
Signed treaties must first be ratified by Parliament to “bind the Republic” (unless of a 
technical, administrative or executive nature). Ratified treaties (unless self-executing) 
must then necessarily be enacted by national legislation to be considered domestic 
law. Third, customary international law “is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent 
with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.”44 Fourth, when interpreting any 
 
36 On the various sources of international law and their relevance to domestic litigation, see M 
du Plessis & S Scott “The World’s Law and South African Domestic Courts: The Role of 
International Law in Public Interest Litigation” in J Brickhill (ed) Public Interest Litigation in 
South Africa (2018) 48 50-59. 
37Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) para 179; see also 
Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 102-105. 
38 S 39(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
39 Du Plessis & Scott “The Role of International Law” in Public Interest Litigation 59-70. 
40 S 231(1) of the Constitution. 
41 S 231(2). 
42 S 231(3). 
43 S 231(4). 




legislation, a court “must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is 
consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent 
with international law.”45 
Following the above, the provisions and jurisprudence governing how international 
instruments interact with domestic law rely on three distinctions, which must be borne 
in mind as the case law is considered. First, customary international law is 
automatically law in the Republic unless inconsistent with the Constitution or 
legislation, while international agreements must be signed and ratified to bind the 
Republic, and must generally be enacted to form domestic law. Second, the 
interpretative use of international law46 is different to its use as substantive law 
domestically. Third, as regards interpretative use, legislative interpretations must be 
“reasonably consistent” with international law, while interpretations of the Bill of Rights 
must be reached after international law is “considered”.  
It should be noted that international human rights law may affect companies and 
company law without specific reference to the Bill of Rights regime. Section 233 for 
instance, requires that all legislation must be interpreted as far as possible to be 
reasonably consistent with international law. The Companies Act 71 of 2008 (“the 
Companies Act” or “the Act”) would thus have to be reasonably consistent with 
international law, including international business and human rights law, without 
reference needing to be made to the domestic Bill of Rights regime. Similarly, any 
international human rights instruments that are enacted domestically constitute 
legislation – again without reference to the Bill of Rights – and the Companies Act 
would have to be interpreted to form a coherent part of this legislative scheme. 
International human rights law can even prompt a development of the common law.47 
In all these cases, international human rights law would affect domestic law without 
necessarily arising from a direct interpretation and application of the Bill of Rights. 
However, it is likely that in a case where international human rights law is concerned, 
the Bill of Rights regime would be applicable as well. As this study specifically 
considers the legal implications of the Bill of Rights for companies and company law, 
the use of international law in interpreting the Bill of Rights will thus be the primary 
focus. Nonetheless, many of the applicable principles will apply as well to the 
 
45 S 233 of the Constitution. 
46 Du Plessis & Scott “The Role of International Law” in Public Interest Litigation 73-79. 




interpretation of the Companies Act, or the development of the common law 
concerning companies, in line with international human rights law. 
There are four cases particularly relevant to the use of international law in the 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights, namely S v Makwanyane;48 Government of the 
Republic of South Africa v Grootboom;49 Glenister v President of the Republic of South 
Africa;50 and University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic v Minister of Justice and 
Correctional Services.51 These will be considered in turn. 
 
4 3 2 2 S v Makwanyane52 (“Makwanyane”) 
This early Constitutional Court case concerned the constitutionality of the death 
penalty in South Africa. This necessarily turned on the interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights. In order to properly achieve such an interpretation, several justices made 
reference to international law.53 In the event, the death penalty was ruled 
unconstitutional. 
The case was decided under the Interim Constitution, with the relevant interpretive 
provision being section 35(1). Its formulation held that a court “shall, where applicable, 
have regard to public international law applicable to the protection of the rights 
entrenched in this Chapter.” The Final Constitution’s section 39(1)(b), requiring that a 
court interpreting the Bill of Rights “must consider international law”, is clearly less 
qualified than its Interim Constitution equivalent. The case’s position thus remains 
relevant. 
Importantly, Sachs J noted that the Constitution reflects an adherence by the South 
African State to principles which are internationally accepted,54 and Mokgoro J 
observed that this is deeply linked to the transformative pursuit of an open and 
democratic society founded on freedom and equality.55 Chaskalson P cited a wide 
variety of international sources that could be considered, including international 
 
48 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC). 
49 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC). 
50 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC). 
51 University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services 
2015 5 SA 221 (WCC). 
52 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC). 
53 See paras 34-36, 63-69, 97, 109, 198, 265, 204, 308, 362, 373. 
54 Para 362. 




agreements and customary international law.56 Critically, even under the Interim 
Constitution, it was held that “public international law” included both binding and non-
binding law.57 Limiting the dialogic contribution to strictly binding law would evidently 
be an unduly narrow and untransformative approach.58 As concerns this study, this is 
an especially important point, as developing fields – such as business and human 
rights law – might not yet have any binding instrument or customary law developed 
that caters directly to the field. The crucial implication of Makwanyane is thus simply 
that, regardless of the status of the ICESCR or UNGPs, these must be considered in 
a proper transformative interpretation of the Bill of Rights. 
 
4 3 2 3 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom59 (“Grootboom”) 
Grootboom was another early Constitutional Court case, and laid down important 
principles regarding the use of international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights. 
The respondents were people rendered homeless by eviction from private land in the 
Western Cape, and the case concerned the State’s duty and programme to provide 
housing for them. The amici curiae submitted that the right to access to adequate 
housing in section 26 of the Constitution had to be interpreted in line with international 
law, and specifically with the ICESCR.60 In particular, the amici attempted to persuade 
the Court that the provision should contain a minimum core obligation that the State 
must meet, as endorsed by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (“the CESCR”) in its General Comment No 3.61 The case has two 
important implications for the present chapter. Firstly, the Court held that socio-
economic rights are justiciable, and “cannot be said to exist on paper only”.62 This 
justiciability was directly linked to section 7(2) of the Constitution and the State’s duty 
to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the Bill of Rights. A duty thus falls on the courts 
to ensure that these rights are protected and fulfilled.63 Accordingly, where companies 
 
56 Para 35; Ssenyonjo Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 270. 
57 Para 35. 
58 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 103, 106-107. 
59 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC). 
60 Paras 26-33; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 146-155; Ssenyonjo Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 271. 
61 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No 
3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (Art 2 par 1) UN Doc E /1991/23. 
62 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 20. 




infringe on socio-economic rights, or company regulation facilitates such infringement, 
the State – including the courts – is under a constitutional duty to intervene. 
Secondly, the court held that any relevant international law can be an interpretative 
guide, although the weight attached to this interpretative input will vary.64 Where the 
law is binding on South Africa, it may be “directly applicable”.65 At the time of this 
judgment, South Africa had signed but not ratified the ICESCR. It was thus not binding 
law on the Republic.66 Importantly, however, the non-binding nature of the ICESCR 
was not at all considered in the Court’s reasoning. This implies that, while international 
law may be “directly applicable” to interpretation and thus easily directly incorporated, 
non-binding law still remains relevant to interpretation. The Court further expressly 
cited and approved Chaskalson P’s statement in Makwanyane that both binding and 
non-binding law must be considered when interpreting the Bill of Rights.67  
In the event, the Court in Grootboom declined to include minimum core obligations 
in the interpretation of section 26, as the Court believed that such a standard could not 
be effectively assessed or enforced in a judicial setting.68 This decision has been 
criticised.69 However, the Court nonetheless wholly incorporated the CESCR’s 
interpretation of “progressive realisation” into the interpretation of the same phrase in 
section 26(2) of the Constitution.70 The Court held that the term’s context in the 
Constitution and at international law were in harmony, and that the Constitution clearly 
derived its use of it from international law. 
Three implications can be drawn from Grootboom. First, Grootboom holds that 
socio-economic rights are justiciable and that the State must take measures in terms 
of section 7(2), to respect, protect, promote and fulfil these rights. Second, as with 
 
64 Para 26. 
65 Para 26. 
66 See Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) footnote 
23. 
67 Para 26; S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) paras 34-35.  
68 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) paras 26-33; 
Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 107-108, 146-155; D Bilchitz “Giving Socio-Economic 
Rights Teeth: The Minimum Core and its Importance” (2002) 119 SALJ 484 486-487. 
69 A similar comparison of rights and rejection of a minimum core occurred in Minister of Health 
v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) paras 26-39, and in Mazibuko v City 
of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC) paras 46-68. See Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 146-
151. The Court’s approach has been criticised: Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 163-227, 
466-480; Bilchitz (2002) SALJ 484; Ssenyonjo Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 271. 




Makwanyane, relevant non-binding international law must always be considered in the 
interpretation of the substantive rights in the Bill of Rights. It could be decided that the 
international law position should in fact not be incorporated into the interpretation in 
question, but it must still at all times be considered. Thirdly, international law – whether 
binding or not – should especially be incorporated where its implementation would be 
harmonious and effective within the domestic constitutional regime. Grootboom thus 
provides strong support for considering and incorporating international instruments 
(such as the ICESCR and UNGPs) in the interpretation of substantive rights in the Bill 
of Rights. 
 
4 3 2 4 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa71 (“Glenister”) 
The Glenister case provides especially relevant contributions to the jurisprudence 
on section 7(2) of the Constitution, both as regards the State’s section 7(2) duty to 
respect, protect, promote and fulfil the Bill of Rights, as well as the dialogic interaction 
between the Bill of Rights and international law.72 The relevance of section 7(2) has 
already been largely considered in the previous chapter, and the relationship between 
constitutional and international law will be the current focus. In essence, the 
Constitutional Court was to consider whether the Bill of Rights placed an obligation on 
the State to create and maintain an independent anti-corruption unit, and confirmed 
such an obligation.73 While there is no express constitutional duty to establish an 
independent unit, Moseneke DCJ and Cameron J for the majority held that the 
constitutional scheme as a whole, when coupled with relevant international law, gives 
rise to the duty.74 International law thus informed the section 7(2) duty, and especially 
informed the standard of “reasonableness” used in assessing whether the State met 
this duty. There are a few important points that can be drawn from this part of the 
judgment, especially as they concern international law and companies. 
First, the majority held that the standard of reasonableness for the section 7(2) duty 
must be found by considering international law, as section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution 
 
71 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC). 
72 Du Plessis & Scott “The Role of International Law” in Public Interest Litigation 76-78. 
73 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) paras 160-251; J 
Tuovinen “The Role of International Law in Constitutional Adjudication: Glenister v President 
of the Republic of South Africa” (2013) 130 SALJ 66. 




requires.75 As considered above, Grootboom demonstrated that international law must 
be considered and, where appropriate, incorporated into interpretations of the 
substantive rights in the Bill of Rights. Glenister, however, shows that international law 
also informs the State’s overarching duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil 
substantive rights as a whole.76 Thus, where this overarching duty is concerned, 
reference need not be made to specific substantive rights, rights infringements, victims 
of those infringements, or duty-bearers of any such rights. The implication is that the 
State must take pre-emptive action to secure a system that effectively respects, 
protects, promotes and fulfils rights generally, rather than only acting casuistically. This 
approach, focusing as it does on the State’s overarching duty to rights-holders, is also 
particularly receptive to state-centric international human rights law considerations. 
That is, where international human rights law focuses on describing the content of the 
State’s duty to respect and protect rights, and to remedy infringements, such law easily 
informs the interpretation of section 7(2) of the Constitution. This is a crucial 
observation for the present study, as it implies that state-centric international human 
rights instruments can inform section 7(2) directly, without necessarily being impeded 
by the complex questions of duty-bearer considered in the previous chapter. As will be 
seen, this wider non-casuistic approach to the State’s duty also lends itself to the 
preventative systemic intervention against violations by companies, as sought by 
current international human rights law trends and the transformative systemic 
approach as discussed.77 
Second, the majority specifically noted the difference between international law that 
“binds the Republic”, and international law which becomes domestic law within the 
Republic.78 In the case, the Court was faced with binding but unenacted international 
instruments, but still used these to inform the section 7(2) duty.79 The majority 
emphasised that international law which is not enacted into domestic law may still have 
“domestic constitutional effect”, if used for its interpretative value by section 39(1)(b) of 
the Constitution.80 In fact, they held that law that “binds the Republic” has particularly 
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76 Paras 175-176. 
77 See chapter two part 2 4, and chapter three parts 3 2, 3 3 and 3 4. 
78 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) para 182. 
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convincing interpretative power.81 If the particular obligation of international law is 
binding, the Constitution “appropriates the obligation for itself” and binds the State 
domestically via the Bill of Rights, even if not enacted as domestic law.82 Moseneke 
DCJ and Cameron J took pains to note that this was not a case of making the 
Constitution subject to external norms, or of enacting international law into domestic 
law without following the proper section 231 process for enactment. Rather, finding the 
meaning of constitutional provisions by using international law is a process wholly 
mandated by and internal to the Constitution itself.83 This perspective avoids seeing 
the Constitution as defensive or antagonistic towards international law, and is thus 
consistent with transformative constitutionalism’s dialogic openness. 
Third, while the majority focuses on binding international law principles, their point 
was that there would have to be a particularly convincing reason to not integrate 
binding principles into Bill of Rights interpretations. This does not imply the inverse – 
that non-binding principles are less persuasive simply because they are non-binding. 
As considered under Makwanyane and Grootboom, above, and cited again in 
Glenister,84 both binding and non-binding international law principles can have 
powerful interpretative value when reading the Bill of Rights, and must be considered. 
Fourth, Moseneke DCJ and Cameron J make an important point regarding 
constitutional interpretation and international law. They emphasise that the Court must 
consider international law in interpretation, but imply that international law cannot be 
used to narrow the Constitution’s provisions. Even if the international law provisions 
were not relevant, or could not be used in interpretation, the domestic provisions 
themselves point to a duty to tackle corruption.85 This is reinforced by the Court’s earlier 
consideration of the negative impact of corruption, entirely apart from the question of 
how binding international law instruments influence interpretation.86 There is thus a 
deep respect for the South African Constitution and its transformative context, while 
appreciating the Constitution’s openness to international norms.87 
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The majority summarises this approach as follows: 
 
 “The point we make is this. It is possible to determine the content of the obligation section 
7(2) imposes on the state without taking international law into account. But section 39(1)(b) 
makes it constitutionally obligatory that we should. This is not to use the interpretive 
injunction of that provision, as the [dissenting] judgment suggests, to manufacture or create 
constitutional obligations. It is to respect the careful way in which the Constitution itself 
creates concordance and unity between the Republic’s external obligations under 
international law, and their domestic legal impact.”88 
 
The conclusions that can be drawn from Glenister for the present context of 
business and human rights, then, are as follows. International law informs both 
substantive rights and the State’s overarching section 7(2) duty, even without specific 
reference to particular rights or duty-bearers. Binding international law principles on 
business and human rights – especially those that are textually linked to the relevant 
Bill of Rights provision – have particular persuasive power in influencing the content of 
a provision’s interpretation. It would be difficult to deliberately exclude the contribution 
of such binding international law to Bill of Rights provisions. However, non-binding 
international law on business and human rights is also persuasive. Moreover, other 
international legal sources can also provide sufficient guidance where binding 
international law is insufficiently developed – even unratified international sources or 
other normative material. 
A clear observation, following Makwanyane, Grootboom and Glenister, is that 
international law need not be domestically enacted or binding to influence the 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights. This is particularly important as far as the area of 
business and human rights is concerned. As already noted, the field is still developing, 
and so many of the international contributions are neither formally enacted nor strictly 
binding (as will be shown in the case of the ICESCR and the UNGPs).89 Indeed, despite 
the recent developments, international law is only beginning to develop dedicated 
accountability systems for companies’ human rights violations. By contrast, South 
Africa’s 1996 Constitution and its transformative purpose and context provide 
mechanisms with the potential to transform company regulation to better respect, 
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protect, promote and fulfil human rights.90 Moreover, if international business and 
human rights law indeed follows a “state-centric” approach,91 non-binding international 
law necessarily relies on being domestically integrated and enforced if it is to be 
effective. Following jurisprudence, then, the South African Constitution and its purpose 
and context remain the starting-point and foundation of any interpretative exercise, 
while simultaneously remaining open to progressive human rights developments in the 
field, whatever the source or its nature.92 
 
4 3 2 5 University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic v Minister of Justice and 
Correctional Services93 (“Legal Aid Clinic”) 
The specific and active use of international law on business and human rights in 
constitutional interpretation was prominently seen in the recent High Court (Western 
Cape Division) judgment of Legal Aid Clinic.94 This case has already been considered 
in terms of section 8 of the Constitution,95 and so the focus will be placed on the 
international law dimensions here. The case concerned the validity of legislation 
allowing emoluments attachment orders issued by court clerks. The judgment thus 
required both statutory and constitutional interpretation, for which the High Court relied 
on foreign and international law on business and human rights as required by section 
39(1)(b) and (c) of the Constitution. It first noted that South Africa’s regime for 
emoluments attachment orders did not meet the standards set in several other 
jurisdictions.96 It proceeded to consider the International Labour Organisation’s 
Protection of Wages Convention of 194997 as binding customary international law,98 
focusing on how it informed the State’s duty to prevent human rights abuses by 
 
90 See chapter three part 3 4 for analysis and critique of the present doctrinal approach to Bill 
of Rights application where non-state entities are concerned. 
91 See part 4 2 of this chapter, above. 
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94 See L Smit (2016) “Binding Corporate Human Rights Obligations: A Few Observations from 
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businesses under its jurisdiction. The Court proceeded to consider non-binding 
instruments, including the UNGPs (discussed later in this chapter) and United Nations 
Human Rights Council Resolution 26/22 of 2014.99 The court emphasised that both 
these instruments make clear that the State must eliminate legal barriers to remedy for 
business human rights abuses. With reference to the influence of international law on 
the interpretation of the State’s duties, therefore, the court stated: 
 
“While reports of the UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council are not binding, they 
are highly persuasive and generally express the current consensus among States. 
It seems to be firmly established in international law that states have a duty to protect their 
citizens against the abuse of human rights by business enterprises in their territory. Where 
such abuses do occur, states have a duty to provide victims with an effective remedy. These 
duties should be taken into account in the interpretation of the [Magistrates’ Court Act 32 of 
1944] and the Constitution.”100 
 
The court does not mention Makwanyane, Grootboom or Glenister. Nor does it 
expressly link the international contributions to the interpretation of the justiciable State 
duty in section 7(2) of the Constitution, or to any part of section 8. However, the 
emphasis on the State duty to protect rights and provide a remedy, and the ultimate 
remedy of invalidation of statute, imply that both sections 7(2) and 8 (concerning the 
binding of law and the State) were effectively involved. This case can thus be seen as 
one of the earliest to rely on the incorporation of international instruments on business 
and human rights in the interpretation of the State’s own constitutional duties – 
especially its duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil human rights – and to use 
these instruments to test and invalidate domestic legislation. 
After the High Court gave its order, the case proceeded to the Constitutional Court 
for confirmation in terms of section 167(5) of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court 
considered neither foreign nor international law in reaching its decision. However, it 
agreed with the High Court’s interpretation and conclusion, although it chose to read-
 
99 United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution 26/22 Human Rights and Transnational 
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in words rather than sever them as a remedy.101 The High Court judgment thus still 
retains some value for its use of international instruments on business and human 
rights, and for its elaboration of the State’s duty to protect against human rights 
infringements by companies.  
 
4 3 3 Summary of the implications of transformative constitutionalism and 
jurisprudence considered 
Based on a synthesis of case law and constitutional provisions against the backdrop 
of transformative constitutionalism, it is evident that international law plays a significant 
role in the interpretation of substantive rights in the Bill of Rights. Further, the 
overarching section 7(2) State duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil human rights 
is also closely linked to and informed by international law norms, especially where 
business and human rights are concerned. When interpreting the Bill of Rights, it 
seems that it is for the court in the final instance to weigh the various dialogic inputs’ 
relevance, and then reach a conclusion as to how it will interpret the relevant Bill of 
Rights provision. 
The guiding light for this process is the Constitution’s own transformative spirit and 
context, a necessary part of which is an openness to pluralism and international norms. 
International law which has been enacted domestically, or that is ratified and binds the 
Republic, is especially persuasive when considering interpretations of the Bill of Rights. 
However, non-enacted or non-binding international law, or indeed any other 
transformative considerations both domestically and internationally, cannot simply be 
ignored. Where relevant, these should equally be incorporated into interpretations. As 
the Constitutional Court has held, such an approach to interpretation is part of the 
Court’s own constitutional obligations – not only in terms of section 39(1) of the 
Constitution, but also in terms of the State’s section 7(2) duty to respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil human rights. Generally, case law indicates that positive and 
transformative contributions in the field of international business and human rights law 
should be considered on substantive merit, rather than simply dismissed formalistically 
due to their source or nature. 
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Finally, international law centred on State enforcement of human rights obligations 
appears to support a focus on substantive rights and the State’s overarching duty to 
protect them. The perceived domestic dichotomy between the binding of the State and 
the binding of non-state entities has already been considered, as has been the support 
for transcending this dichotomy and moving towards a rights-centric approach.102 The 
case law on the State’s overarching duty to protect as interpreted with international 
legal sources – especially concerning infringements by non-state entities such as 
companies – further supports a move towards a rights-centric approach. It thus moves 
away from an atomistic “company duty-bearer” approach which focuses only on 
whether a duty should be imposed on a specific company, and which ignores the 
systemic role and duties of the State. In particular, constitutional jurisprudence on the 
influence of international law on domestic law suggests an approach operating through 
the overarching duty of the State to respect, protect, promote and fulfil rights in terms 
of section 7(2) of the Constitution. This approach appears to answer the question of 
what the duty (and thus who the duty-bearer) should be by first establishing the 
relevant rights – even in terms of the Bill of Rights as a whole – and an effective 
remedy. In other words, the Bill of Rights and what would constitute an effective 
remedy for its breach determines the duties and duty-bearers, rather than the other 
way around. 
This rights-centric approach relying on the State’s duty to protect remains a new 
and ongoing development, and aligns fully with current initiatives under international 
law to require states to regulate companies. It also points to a critical systemic 
conceptual approach implicating State action and legal reform.103 It thus holds much 
promise for a transformative approach to the Bill of Rights and company law. This 
chapter will thus conclude by specifically considering the ICESCR and UNGPs, and 
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4 4 The implications of the ICESCR and UNGPs for domestic business and 
human rights law 
This chapter has thus far laid the theoretical basis for the use of international law in 
interpreting the Bill of Rights. The remainder of this chapter will consider the specific 
implications of the ICESCR and UNGPs for Bill of Rights interpretations. These two 
instruments have been chosen for their prominence in the field of business and human 
rights, and for recent and ongoing developments stemming from them. Thus, these 
instruments will first be briefly introduced. Thereafter, their substantive content and 
implications for the State, companies and company law will be considered.104 
 
4 4 1 Overview of the instruments under consideration  
4 4 1 1 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(“ICESCR”)105 
The ICESCR is a treaty which has been both signed and ratified by South Africa,106 
and so is binding on the Republic.107 It has not formally been enacted into South African 
law, however.108 Nonetheless, as the prior discussion of constitutional provisions and 
jurisprudence has shown, the ICESCR still has overwhelming persuasive value in 
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105 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) United Nations 
Treaty Series 993 3. 
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January 2015. For an overview of the ICESCR in South Africa, see Ssenyonjo Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights 268. For a historical contextual overview of the ICESCR, see M 
Odello & F Seatzu The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Law, 
Process and Practice (2013) 4-11; M Langford & JA King “Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: Past, Present and Future” in M Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: 
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 36-39. 
107 Odello & Seatzu Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 11. 
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constitutional and statutory interpretation. It thus must play a crucial role in the 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights, and it would be difficult to refute its incorporation. 
Importantly, the interpretative value of the ICESCR goes beyond the pure text of the 
ICESCR itself. General Comments on the interpretation of the ICESCR by the 
instrument’s Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the “CESCR”)109 are 
not binding, but remain persuasive.110 Similarly, views adopted by the CESCR with 
regard to communications submitted to them under the Optional Protocol to the 
ICESCR111 also inform interpretations of Covenant provisions. 
The ICESCR contains provisions relating both to the general duties of States with 
regard to rights,112 and to the content of substantive rights themselves. Articles 6 
through 15 detail various substantive socio-economic rights. Article 2(1) provides an 
overarching duty for States parties with regard to these substantive rights. It holds that: 
 
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to 
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”113 
 
The ICESCR thus informs both the interpretation of the substantive rights of the Bill 
of Rights and the interpretation of the State’s overarching duty to respect, protect, 
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promote and fulfil those rights.114 This is especially important as concerns business 
and human rights. The CESCR’s General Comment No 24 on state obligations in the 
context of business activities,115 for instance, does not focus on the content of specific 
substantive rights. Rather, it concerns itself with the regulation of business and human 
rights generally. As such, it is highly relevant to informing the meaning of the duty on 
the State in terms of section 7(2) of the Constitution, even though it is not directly 
relevant to the interpretation of specific substantive rights. Where applicable, however, 
other comments on substantive rights must be read together with General Comment 
No 24.116 Similarly, Article 2(1) (described above) could also inform section 7(2), rather 
than a specific right. As discussed previously, this implies that systemic change (such 
as law reform) should take place without reference needing to be made to a specific 
instance of a rights violation by a specific company as a duty-bearer. An exclusive 
focus on a single rights abuse in a case, with an offending company being seen as the 
sole-duty bearer, could obscure the State’s duty to (for instance) take steps to the 
maximum of its available resources to have avoided the violation. Again, the 
implication is that a holistic approach to reform is necessary, with less emphasis on 
who is the duty-bearer.  
As concerns the enactment of the ICESCR into domestic law, the Minister of Justice 
and Correctional Services stated to Parliament in late 2016 that the Bill of Rights is 
“based on the ICESCR”, and that “[socio-economic] and cultural rights are also 
promoted in myriad pieces of legislation”.117 Accordingly, he has stated the 
government’s belief that there is “therefore no additional legislation required to 
implement the tenets of the ICESCR”.118 Despite these comments, as has been 
previously demonstrated, the regulatory framework for company law has not been 
extensively regulated by human rights considerations, whether domestic or 
international.119 It is thus unclear whether the ICESCR still needs to be enacted as 
 
114 Langford & King “Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” in Social Rights 
Jurisprudence 484-496; Ssenyonjo Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 31-36. 
115 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No 
24: State Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in the Context of Business Activities UN Doc E/C 12/GC/24. 
116 Para 2. 
117 National Assembly of South Africa Internal Question Paper 43/2016, para 1 of reply to 
question 2718. 
118 Para 1 of reply to question 2718. 




domestic law as regards business and human rights. Most likely, the existing company 
law regulatory framework should be judicially interpreted as far as possible to be 
consistent with the ICESCR and its interpretive texts (such as General Comments)120 
– especially if the executive does not presently intend to introduce further legislation in 
this regard. Where such consistency is impossible, however, it will have to be decided 
whether further reform should come from the judiciary, executive or legislature, and 
how each of these bodies should work and cooperate to achieve such reform.121 
Regardless of enactment, however, the ICESCR still informs the interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights, which itself would inform the interpretation of legislation and the 
development of the common law.122 It would also inform any assessments of the 
constitutional validity of existing legislation, and thus may be given effect through 
judicial action on a case by case basis. 
 
4 4 1 2 The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
(“UNGPs”)123 
Unlike the ICESCR, the UNGPs are simply guidelines endorsed by the United 
Nations Human Rights Council.124 They are considered the most prominent instrument 
on international business and human rights law, being part of the final report of the 
extensive work by the then Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other 
businesses enterprises. They provide the “Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework” 
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as developed by the Special Representative125 and unanimously adopted by the 
Human Rights Council in 2008.126 While the UNGPs apply to “all States and to all 
business enterprises”,127 they do not generate binding legal obligations for companies 
at international law.128 The framework rather relies on, firstly, a State duty to protect 
against human rights abuses, including by companies, through various means; 
secondly, companies’ non-legal responsibility to respect human rights and avoid 
infringing them; and thirdly, the need to provide victims with access to both judicial and 
non-judicial remedies for violations. The absence of direct human rights obligations 
imposed on companies is the result of the political failure of an earlier instrument, the 
“Norms on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises”.129 These 
were produced by an expert subsidiary body of the former Commission on Human 
Rights, but were rejected by the Commission as having no legal standing after 
objections by business advocacy groups and governments.130 Seeking to avoid a 
similar fate, the UNGPs avoid placing any direct obligations on companies at 
international law, and instead rely on a state-centric approach. Without domestic 
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enforcement by the State, reliance must be placed on companies’ voluntary 
commitment to human rights.131 For this reason, the UNGPs refer to a non-legal 
corporate “responsibility” (in constrast with the State’s legal “duty”) to respect rights. 
As discussed earlier, this has led to a great deal of criticism at the level of international 
law.132 
Nonetheless, the UNGPs bear a great deal of relevance for the inherently state-
centric domestic human rights regime. While not creating any new obligations,133 they 
refer to two already-existing international human rights law obligations which bind the 
Republic. The first is the traditional international human rights obligation of States, 
namely being to “protect against human rights abuse within their territory and/or 
jurisdiction by third parties, including business enterprises.”134 The second is part of 
this duty to protect, and obliges States to “take appropriate steps to ensure, through 
judicial, administrative, legislative or other appropriate means, that when such abuses 
occur within their territory and/or jurisdiction those affected have access to effective 
remedy.”135 
The UNGPs are thus binding on South Africa as far as these two obligations are 
concerned, as these are simply re-statements of existing international law obligations. 
In other words, while the UNGPs are generally a “non-binding” instrument, they do rely 
on two existing binding obligations, and are binding in this narrow respect.136 However, 
it should be noted that a significant portion of the UNGPs is effectively an elaboration 
and explication of these two State obligations in the context of business activities.137 
That is, much of the detailed UNGP provisions explain and flesh out the content of the 
State’s existing international law duties to protect and provide effective remedy where 
companies are concerned. It can thus be argued that these other provisions are also 
binding, as far as they are an elaboration of the content of the two existing 
obligations.138 In other words, wherever the UNGPs describe the role of the State in 
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regulating companies, this can be seen as a description of how States are to meet their 
existing international law duties. This does not make the UNGPs binding on companies 
directly; if companies are affected, it is only indirectly, through the State being bound 
and obliged to regulate companies.139 This is consistent with the nature of the UNGPs 
as a “state-centric” instrument, as discussed.140 Regardless of their binding nature, 
however, the UNGPs hold great persuasive power in constitutional interpretation.141 
Finally, as with General Comment 24 of the CESCR, it is important to note that the 
UNGPs do not deal extensively with substantive rights. Rather, they deal generally 
with the State duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil rights. They would thus likely 
be most necessary and useful in informing section 7(2) of the Constitution, as in 
Glenister.142 Again, an approach that turns too heavily on the question of a single right 
and duty-bearer may neglect the value of this overarching State duty. 
 
4 4 2 Implications of the instruments considered 
Both the ICESCR (via, for instance, General Comment 24) and the UNGPs cover a 
wide number of issues concerning business and human rights. The UNGPs, in 
particular, give a great number of detailed operational principles aimed at realising an 
effective business and human rights regime. The ICESCR, for its part, also deals 
extensively with substantive rights. A full consideration of either instrument is beyond 
the scope of this study, which only aims to introduce them and their relevance to the 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights in the context of business and human rights. 
However, some remarks can be made of the implications of these instruments for the 
Bill of Rights, and thus for companies and company law. 
 
4 4 2 1 Implications for the State 
As noted, the ICESCR and UNGPs follow a state-centric approach to the field of 
business and human rights. As a result, it is at all times for the State to ensure that the 
desired change in company behaviour is realised. The UNGPs, for instance, hold that 
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the State has a duty to protect against abuses by businesses, and must take 
appropriate steps to prevent, punish and remedy such abuses through effective 
policies, legislation, regulation and adjudication.143 Moreover, Principle 3(a) of the 
UNGPs holds that the State should enforce laws that “are aimed at, or have the effect 
of, requiring business enterprises to respect human rights”, perform assessments of 
laws at appropriate intervals, and address regulatory gaps where appropriate. 
This is evidently only a guideline interpretation of the international law duty to 
protect, as evidenced by the use of “should”. However, it is nonetheless a strong 
recommendation that the UNGP guidelines for the corporate “responsibility” to respect 
become enforceable domestic obligations.144 In other words, the content of the 
UNGPs’ (non-enforceable) corporate “responsibility” to respect rights can be seen as 
a guideline for an enforceable domestic business and human rights regime. This is 
especially the case if a transformative approach is followed, with rights being prioritised 
above business interests. Enforcing the corporate “responsibility” to respect could thus 
conceivably be viewed as an important and integral part of the State’s own duty to 
protect. As a result, while the UNGPs do not themselves create binding obligations for 
business, a transformative approach to the State’s duties under the UNGPs may in 
effect transform the corporate “responsibility” into a duty enforced by the State. 
Where the State owns, controls or supports companies, additional steps to guard 
against rights violations should be taken.145 This is reminiscent of the organ of state 
approach, as discussed in the previous chapter.146 Importantly, however, even where 
the State merely contracts with or legislates for companies to provide services that 
“may impact upon the enjoyment of human rights”,147 the State should exercise 
adequate oversight to meet its own obligations. This must be be interpreted broadly, 
given the number of services that could be seen as relating to human rights, and the 
possible meanings of “contracts with” and “legislates for” (since all South African 
companies are born of enabling legislation). Moreover, the accompanying commentary 
to this Principle holds that the State does not relinquish its international human rights 
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obligations when it privatises the delivery of such services.148 At its most robust, this 
provision implies that the State must exercise adequate oversight over a company in 
two circumstances in particular: first, wherever the State outsources the provision of a 
human rights service to the company; and second, where the company’s services may 
impact on human rights in any way. Indeed, Principle 6 holds that the State should use 
their contracts with companies to promote respect for human rights, including through 
contractual terms. 
With regard to policy coherence, the State should ensure that all state organs that 
shape business practice understand and observe the State’s human rights 
obligations.149 The State should also leave policy space to meet these obligations, and 
should not unduly narrow the space for human rights duty fulfilment (either for itself or 
for companies) through contracts, investment treaties or as members of relevant 
multilateral institutions.150 
It can be recalled that the ICESCR is a human rights treaty, binding on states that 
have ratified it.151 As a result, the ICESCR (like the UNGPs) focuses on the obligations 
of the State, rather than any primary obligation of companies themselves.152 The 
ICESCR shows that, for the State to meet its human rights obligations, it must reform 
its domestic company law regulation accordingly.153 This reform entails introducing and 
enforcing domestic legal obligations for companies. Domestic regulation is thus the 
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means by which the ICESCR reaches companies and affects their behaviour.154 On 
this point, the Committee recently noted: 
 
“States parties do not only have the obligation to respect Covenant rights, and, it follows, to 
refrain from infringing them, but they also have the obligation to protect them by adopting 
measures to prevent the direct or indirect interference of individuals in the enjoyment of 
these rights. If a State party does not take appropriate measures to protect a Covenant 
right, it has a responsibility even when the action that undermined the right in the first place 
was carried out by an individual or a private entity. Thus, although the Covenant primarily 
establishes rights and obligations between the State and individuals, the scope of the 
provisions of the Covenant extends to relations between individuals.”155 
 
As with the UNGPs, then, the State may be considered responsible for the action or 
inaction of businesses in various ways. A State may directly violate its own duty to 
respect rights where a company acts under State instructions or control (such as with 
public contracts); where the State empowers the company with governmental authority 
by legislation or the company fulfils governmental functions; or where a State party 
acknowledges and adopts the company’s conduct as its own.156 This is again similar 
to the organ of state approach in domestic law. Importantly, however, the State may 
also directly violate its duties under the ICESCR by prioritising business or business 
policies over ICESCR rights without adequate justification, or by concluding trade or 
investment treaties that conflict with the ICESCR.157 
In terms of the State duty to protect, the State must thus take active measures to 
effectively prevent infringements of ICESCR rights in the context of business activities, 
and provide remedies where they occur.158 This also extends to any public or private 
corruption that may facilitate the abuse of rights, and thus specialised and effective 
anti-corruption measures (including whistle-blower protection) are necessary.159 More 
broadly, measures to meet the duty to protect should variously take the form of criminal 
and administrative sanctions by the State, and enable victims to pursue civil suits as 
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well.160 Direct regulation and intervention may also be necessary, such as in the 
restriction of marketing goods that are detrimental to public health, the control of rents 
in private housing markets, and the establishment of a liveable and fair minimum 
wage.161 As with the UNGPs, strict regulation is especially necessary where public 
sectors are privatised, and non-state businesses performing public services should still 
meet the standards required by the public nature of such services.162 Crucially, the 
profit motive should not negatively affect the price or quality of goods or services 
necessary for the enjoyment of basic rights, as this would intensify economic 
segregation.163 On the contrary, these goods and services must be adequate and 
accessible to all, and individuals must be able to participate in assessing whether this 
is the case. 
As is already evident, both the UNGPs and the ICESCR also give attention to the 
matter of remedies for victims of violations. While remedies concern the State and 
companies both, they can be better seen as a corollary of the State’s duty to protect.164 
Thus, while having access to adequate remedy as a separate third pillar from the State 
duty and business responsibility, the UNGPs state the remedial foundational principle 
in terms of the State’s duty foremost. The UNGPs accordingly hold that the State must 
take “appropriate steps” to ensure, through judicial, administrative, legislative or other 
appropriate means, that those affected by abuses in its territory or jurisdiction have 
access to effective remedy.165 This requires promoting, and removing barriers to, state-
based judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, and non-state grievance mechanisms 
(such as those internal to companies).166 Guidelines and criteria are also given for 
assessing the effectiveness for all these mechanisms. In particular, judicial 
mechanisms should not be obstructed by difficulties in financial costs, obtaining legal 
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representation, using class action procedures, ensuring state prosecutor expertise and 
resources, and legal complications such as attribution of responsibility amongst the 
members of a corporate group.167 
The ICESCR also provides extensive guidelines for how States are to meet their 
obligations where remedies are concerned. Importantly, the treaty strongly aligns with 
a proposed notion of a rights-centric approach with multicentric binding of the State, 
companies and law, as discussed in this thesis.168 The ICESCR obliges States parties 
to provide appropriate redress to victims of corporate violations, and to ensure 
corporate accountability.169 States must take all necessary measures to prevent such 
violations, and where such measures fail, States must investigate and take action 
against offenders.170 Critically, victims must be provided with effective access to justice 
and remedies, including reparation, regardless of who ultimately bears responsibility 
for the violation.171 Further, while violations of Covenant rights normally allow for 
victims to claim against the State, it should also be possible for victims to directly sue 
a company for violations.172 The ICESCR also binds all branches and organs of state 
to its obligations.173 Furthermore, legal structuring must not formalistically protect 
violators and thereby lead to a denial of justice.174 In particular, the corporate veil 
should not deny victims a remedy by allowing parent companies or shareholders to be 
shielded from liability.175 
A further significant advance presented by the ICESCR concerns the State’s duty 
to fulfil rights, which requires that States parties mobilise the operations and resources 
of companies in their territory to ensure that rights are fulfilled.176 This again points to 
a systemic intervention, recognising the role of State force and law in political economy, 
and implicating both State and companies in rights fulfilment. This also ensures that 
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companies are not formalistically shielded from duties by virtue of their nature as non-
state entities. Finally, a variety of remedies should be developed and promoted in both 
private and public law, allowing matters to be pursued by affected parties and state 
agencies.177 Existing administrative bodies in the Companies Act, such as the 
Companies Commission,178 should thus be reformed to effectively prevent violations 
and provide remedies.179 Collectively, then, the ICESCR points to a substantive (rather 
than formalistic) and rights-centric (rather than duty-bearer-centric) approach to 
remedies for corporate violations. It thus further aligns with some degree of holistic and 
systemic intervention, and holds much promise for a transformative approach to 
companies and human rights.180 
 
4 4 2 2 Implications for companies and company law 
The preceding section has considered the State duty to respect, protect, promote 
and fulfil human rights, and how this duty calls for domestic regulation and enforcement 
of business activities. This will necessarily lead to a change in company regulation, 
and thus in the behaviour of companies themselves. The details of this change will now 
be considered. 
As noted previously, the UNGPs refer to a “corporate responsibility to respect” rights 
which may be seen as a guideline to the regime the State should implement to meet 
its own duty. On the content of this responsibility, the UNGPs hold that businesses 
should, firstly, avoid causing or contributing to “adverse rights impacts”181 (whether 
actions or omissions), and address any such impacts.182 Secondly, businesses should 
seek to prevent or mitigate any such impacts that are “directly linked” to their 
operations, products or services, even if the business has not contributed to these 
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impacts.183 This applies to all businesses, regardless of size, ownership or structure, 
although the scale and complexity of the steps taken to meet this responsibility may 
vary accordingly.184  
Businesses should have appropriate policies and processes in place to meet their 
responsibility, including a policy commitment, a due diligence process, and processes 
to enable remediation of adverse rights impacts they cause or contribute to.185 The 
policy commitment should be informed by expertise, be approved by the most senior 
management, stipulate expectations of all parties directly linked to the business or its 
operations or services, be internally and publicly communicated and available, and 
should be reflected in operational policies and procedures.186 
Central to the recommended change in company regulation is the concept of due 
diligence.187 Both the UNGPs and the ICESCR refer to this as the minimum standard 
by which companies should be regulated so the State’s duty to protect rights can be 
met.188 In other words, the State is under a positive duty to adopt a legal framework of 
due diligence for companies in its jurisdiction.189 Companies, for their part, are then 
under a positive obligation to implement the due diligence framework.190 Due diligence 
is an ongoing and responsive process of assessment of risk and impact, done by the 
company.191 It should both draw on human rights expertise, and involve meaningful 
engagement with affected groups and stakeholders.192 The CESCR has emphasised 
that this is particularly important where indigenous people are concerned: companies 
should seek free, prior and informed consent through these peoples’ own 
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representative institutions before the relevant business activities are commenced.193 
Mechanisms should also be found to share the benefits derived from such activities 
with the indigenous peoples of the territory.194 
The findings of these impact assessments and interactions should be effectively 
integrated into the company’s functions and processes, with decision-making, budget 
allocations and oversight assigned to assist in taking appropriate action.195 Where 
necessary, such action should be prioritised to prevent and mitigate the most severe 
impacts, or impacts which may be irremediable without urgent action.196 As part of the 
accountability for their impacts, companies should effectively report to, and 
communicate with, affected stakeholders.197  
Collectively, then, due diligence forms a mechanism of interrelated steps to be taken 
to address human rights impacts by businesses. The UNGPs phrase the non-legal 
corporate responsibility to respect rights in terms of this responsibility to perform due 
diligence.198 However, care would need to be taken in how due diligence is 
implemented by the State. If the State transformed this “responsibility” into a domestic 
legal duty for companies, it could be in the form of a legal duty to reasonably perform 
due diligence.199 In other words, if a company infringed human rights, they would not 
be liable for the infringement directly. Nor would they be liable for any negligence in 
failing to prevent the infringement. Rather, they would be liable only if they 
unreasonably failed to produce an effective due diligence system. On its own, such an 
approach to the duty would provide companies with means by which to avoid liability 
for human rights abuses. A company could avoid liability by proving that it acted 
reasonably in producing its due diligence system, even if that system could not 
reasonably prevent harm or factually did not do so. Such a formalistic delictual 
approach to the duty would doubly shift the burden onto the victims of rights 
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infringements. Letting loss lie where it falls in this way may be undesirable, considering 
the likely economic and power disparities between companies and victims. 
A rights-centric approach to due diligence is thus suggested instead. Such an 
approach would see due diligence regulations as being a procedural obligation on 
companies, assisting them to avoid rights infringements. However, while it would assist 
companies to avoid rights infringements, it would not serve as a defence should the 
companies nonetheless infringe on rights despite having performed their due diligence. 
This could allow a right to be remedied (such as by the company giving compensation 
to victims) even where a company acted entirely reasonably in producing its due 
diligence system. In other words, where circumstances call for it, some form of strict 
liability may be necessary. This important point is supported by the commentary to 
Principle 17 of the UNGPs, which notes that companies should not assume that due 
diligence by itself will absolve them of liability for abuses. In this way, the focus remains 
on rights and effective remedies, rather than on providing corporate defences and 
leaving loss to lie where companies cause it to fall. 
Importantly, due diligence is a normative framework, and courts must thus exercise 
care when evaluating company conduct. The State’s positive duty to implement due 
diligence requires assessing the reasonableness of the company in implementing a 
due diligence system. Such reasonableness is not determined empirically, but is rather 
a normative question. It will thus effectively be for courts to set the normative standard 
of “the reasonable company” that companies will be expected to meet. Again, an 
approach that errs in favour of the significantly more vulnerable victims of violations 
would likely be needed, rather than one that is too deferent to companies. Setting a 
low standard for company reasonableness could significantly weaken the 
implementation of the State’s due diligence framework. 
Finally, some attention is given to the question of true positive duties, or duties to 
actively fulfil socio-economic rights, as imposed on companies.200 The CESCR has 
noted the increasing role and impact of non-state entities in traditionally public 
sectors.201 It has held that these non-state entities should attract “public service 
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obligations”202 – a concept similar to that of the South African organ of state, as 
discussed.203 Companies which are involved in fulfilling rights, especially in cases of 
privatisation, must thus be strictly regulated.204 The fulfilment of rights must not be 
compromised for profits, or conditional on the ability to pay.205 Further, in order to meet 
its own duty to fulfil, the State should seek business’ aid and cooperation in fulfilling 
rights.206 The State should also, where necessary, direct company efforts towards 
performing positive rights fulfilment.207 It should also again be noted that the State must 
ensure that its business regulation framework and policy do not hamstring its own 
ability to fulfil rights.208 The State may thus be required to implement an effective 
progressive tax system affecting companies.209 It may also be the case that the State 
has to impose a limited legal obligation to fulfil rights on companies where appropriate, 
such as a duty to fulfil certain basic employee needs or to help indigenous peoples 
benefit from local activities.210 This accords with the ICESCR’s stressing that rights 
must be protected, respected and fulfilled, with effective remedies provided.211 The 
financial interests of companies must be deprioritised in favour of rights. This is an 
evidently transformative approach, especially in light of the supremacy of the Bill of 
Rights.212 It implicates both the State and companies in the fulfilment of rights, and 
does not allow for companies to be shielded from involvement simply because they 
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are non-state entities. This is especially important given the role of the State in 
facilitating company business through state policy, law and enforcement.213 These 
implications of the State duty to fulfil must thus be strongly integrated into our domestic 
human rights regime. 
As has been shown in this overview, both the ICESCR and the UNGPs hold a great 
deal of value for the field of business and human rights. More specifically, both 
instruments extensively inform the interpretation of the overarching State duty to 
protect and respect rights. The ICESCR further informs the substantive rights in the 
Bill of Rights and elaborates on the State duty to fulfil rights, and on how this implicates 
companies. This field is in the process of developing, and so further research and 
legislative attention is certainly necessary here. 
 
4 5 Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to consider the value of international business and human 
rights law for the domestic human rights regime. It first distinguished the present “state-
centric” approach at international law from the inherently state-centric domestic 
approach followed by the Bill of Rights. This chapter proceeded to specifically consider 
how international law informs interpretations of the Bill of Rights, following examples 
set by domestic case law. Transformative constitutionalism implies that the 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights should be open to international law. As a result, the 
Bill of Rights cannot be read or interpreted without considering international law 
instruments, even when they are not domestically enacted or binding. 
In particular, international business and human rights law informs the overarching 
State duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil human rights as stated in section 7(2) 
of the Constitution. This aligns closely with the rights-centric approach considered 
previously,214 focusing on State enforcement and the fulfilment of rights rather than on 
the question of duty-bearer. It also points to some degree of systemic intervention in 
the legal structure supporting companies and their economic activity. International law 
also informs, where relevant, the content of any applicable substantive rights. As a 
result, the ICESCR and United Nations Guiding Principles can both be seen as 
persuasively informing the meaning of these provisions in the Bill of Rights. These 
international instruments thus have important implications for the State, which must 
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take steps to reform company law so that rights are protected from infringement by 
business actors, with effective remedies also provided to victims. These instruments 
also necessarily implicate domestic companies and company regulation, such as by 
requiring the introduction of (at least) a due diligence framework for companies. 
Wide and coordinated systemic reform of company law is likely necessary to align 
South Africa’s regulation with the content of these international instruments. 
Importantly, however, such reform is evidently necessary for the State to meet its own 
duties, both at international law and under the Constitution. Accordingly, these 
instruments should be used as catalysts and core guides to transforming South African 
company law in line with the Bill of Rights.  
Thus, in light of these findings and those of the previous chapters, the following 
chapter will present some salient implications and recommendations – both theoretical 





Chapter 5: Towards the transformation of company law: Implications 
and recommendations 
 
5 1 Introduction 
The previous chapters have demonstrated that a transformative interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, (“the 
Constitution”) points to the need for wide reform of company regulation in South Africa, 
centred on human rights. However, as discussed,1 such reform has not yet taken place. 
This chapter aims to consider the implications of the previous chapters’ findings, and 
to make recommendations for reform in the field of business and human rights law. 
The chapter will first consider the theoretical and doctrinal implications of the study. 
It will consider the shortcomings of the present Bill of Rights application doctrine where 
companies are concerned, and make recommendations for how this can effectively be 
addressed. It will then consider the more fundamental question of the conceptual 
approach to companies in the field of human rights law, advocating for a systemic 
approach in place of a more atomistic approach. The chapter will then turn to practical 
proposals for regulatory reform, from both a judicial and legislative perspective. It will 
consider how existing mechanisms can possibly be reformed by judicial interpretation, 
and note the regulatory implications of incorporating international human rights law into 
our domestic company law system via the Bill of Rights. It will conclude by broadly 
outlining possible legislative interventions that could begin to harmonise company law 
regulation with the Bill of Rights. 
 
5 2 Theoretical implications and recommendations 
5 2 1 A coherent and rights-centric approach to non-state entities 
This thesis has shown that there is a great deal of confusion in the application of the 
Bill of Rights to non-state entities, and particularly so for companies.2 It can be 
concluded that the Bill of Rights binds the State, companies and company-related 
actors (such as directors, managers and shareholders), and company law.3 This 
occurs at once, and variously, through several mechanisms in the Constitution: the 
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section 7(2) duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil rights; the binding of the State 
and law in section 8(1); the binding of non-state entities in section 8(2); the 
interpretation of statute and development of the common law in accordance with 
constitutional values, in section 39(2); and the treatment of companies as organs of 
state through section 239. The first primary implication from this study is that, despite 
the confusion and overlap, it must be possible to seek effective remedies against 
companies or company-related actors in court through any (or several) of the 
provisions discussed. These remedies may arise from direct constitutional obligations 
being placed on companies; from companies being indirectly regulated through 
company law, so that the State meets its own human rights obligations and the law be 
rendered consistent with the Bill of Rights; or from a combination of both of these 
approaches. Regardless, company law will have to be reformed to give proper effect 
to these complex multicentric obligations – with the Bill of Rights binding and 
implicating companies, company-related actors, the State and company law – and thus 
to give effect to rights. As will be argued below, legislative change in this regard is likely 
necessary to address the complexity of these obligations, both so that rights can be 
given effect and so that there is regulatory certainty and guidance for companies and 
victims. 
Further, it is suggested that the judiciary and legislature take active steps to clarify 
the application of the Bill of Rights where companies are concerned. In particular, there 
is need for doctrinal clarity, coherence and consistency in the scope and use of 
sections 7(2), 8(1), 8(2), 39(2) and 239 of the Constitution. This makes it difficult for 
victims to effectively claim against companies for rights violations, and is a prominent 
impediment to the transformation of company law. This thesis recommends that reform 
in this area be achieved by moving away from a formalist duty-bearer-centric approach 
that focuses on the burdens imposed on companies. Such a duty-focused approach 
tends to focus on the formalist question of who should be the duty-bearer, rather than 
on the victim’s rights. As such, it conceptually takes for granted existing legal-economic 
relations – and thus favours them – instead of treating them as subordinate to human 
rights, and thus not allowing those relations to be critiqued and reformed.4 In particular, 
this approach facilitates a reluctance to interfere with companies’ legal structuring and 
interests in making profit – with the accompanying reluctance to impose human rights 
obligations on non-state entities regardless of the scale or influence of the company in 
 




question, and the State’s obligations not being considered at all. This latter duty-
bearer-centric approach thus significantly reduces the scope of rights, subordinating 
them to existing ordinary law (such as the common or statute law of companies) and 
legal conceptions (such as the capitalist conception of the company as a wholly for-
profit and “private” institution) – both of which are left unscrutinised.  
This thesis has thus instead proposed a rights-centric approach with multicentric 
duties. As discussed,5 this would first consider the full, substantive and transformative 
interpretation of the right – or even the scheme of the Bill of Rights as a whole – which 
the victims claim has been infringed. Once an infringement is established – agnostic 
of the question of duty-bearer – an effective remedy for the violation would be decided 
as a matter of policy. In other words, the remedy (and accompanying obligations) arise 
from a policy decision of how best to give effect to the right as substantively interpreted, 
rather than the formalist question of duty-bearer being used to narrow down the scope 
of the right. Such a transformative remedy will likely effectively give rise all at once to 
obligations on companies, their related business actors (such as directors and 
employees), and the State, and further bind company law itself as well. 
The rights-centric approach is also coherent across all of the above mentioned 
constitutional provisions, and with a rich and substantive conception of transformative 
constitutionalism.6 Further, it accords well with a more systemic understanding of 
companies and company law, as considered below. Finally, it allows for the Bill of 
Rights to be harmonised with international law. As discussed, international law must 
deeply inform the substantive rights in the Bill of Rights, as well as the overarching 
State duty in section 7(2), if transformative constitutionalism is to be adhered to.7 The 
approach of using state regulation and action informed by international law to ensure 
that rights are fulfilled coheres with the above rights-centric approach with multicentric 
obligations on the State, companies and other business actors (in addition to the 
ordinary law being bound by human rights law).8 This approach amounts to a 
fundamental normative shift in favour of rights. It is thus recommended as a means of 
effectively transforming company law, and of ensuring that formalist reasoning and 
ideology does not defeat human rights. 
 
 
5 See chapter three parts 3 3 5 and 3 4. 
6 See chapter three parts 3 2, 3 3 and 3 4. 
7 See chapter four parts 4 3 and 4 4. 




5 2 2 Transformative constitutionalism as requiring a systemic approach to 
companies and company law 
As discussed, the approach to business and human rights law in South Africa has 
generally tended to be atomistic, rather than systemic.9 As a result, space restrictions 
in this study have not allowed for a meaningful consideration of the systemic approach 
without compromising the presentation of the current state of the field. Practically, the 
atomistic approach means that the field has focused on the conduct committed by 
individual companies; considered whether and on what grounds such conduct may 
amount to a violation; and explored what remedies could be ordered for such individual 
violations. Focus has also primarily been placed on considering how existing company 
law mechanisms could be reformed to better give effect to human rights in cases of 
individual abuses. The above-mentioned rights-centric approach with multicentric 
duties has generally not been considered, with the emphasis rather placed on 
interpreting existing company regulations to be more compliant with the Bill of Rights.10 
However, it has nonetheless been shown that a critical and contextual systemic 
approach accords far more deeply with transformative constitutionalism than an 
atomistic approach does.11 Such a systemic approach views companies, the law, the 
economy and the State as part of a complex and integrated system. The effects of this 
system are then examined for whether they give rise to violations, rather than scrutiny 
being placed solely on individual companies. The systemic approach thus avoids the 
pitfalls of the duty-bearer-centric approach, such as the conceptual or ideological 
reluctance to impose burdens on juristic persons or to scrutinise the role of State power 
and law in facilitating “private” profit.12 The systemic approach further aligns well with 
an openness to international law in the field of business and human rights.13 An 
important implication here is that the present atomistic approach to business and 
human rights law is insufficiently critical of South Africa’s historical colonial-capitalist 
political economy, and is thus not meaningfully transformative. Indeed, this failure is 
arguably a significant shortcoming of the present state of constitutionalism and human 
rights law internationally, and has been extensively critiqued at home and abroad for 
 
9 See chapter two part 2 4. 
10 See part 5 3 below. 
11 See chapter two part 2 4, and chapter three part 3 2 2. 
12 See chapter three parts 3 2 2, 3 3 5 and 3 4. 




its role in inequality and the negation of democracy.14 Critically, if transformative 
constitutionalism relies on the meaningful transformation of South Africa’s political-
economic system, a failure in this regard amounts to a failure in the transformative 
constitutional project.15 It is thus recommended that further research be done to 
consider the implications of a systemic transformative approach to companies and 
company law. Thereafter, human rights law and doctrine should be reformed 
accordingly, and thus rendered meaningfully effective where South Africa’s political 
economy is concerned. 
In particular, it is recommended that human rights law and academia take 
cognisance of political economy and the material conditions of systemic inequality in 
South Africa, rather than rely on formalist principle and doctrine in the abstract. Further, 
company law should be considered as deeply linked to other fields of law – most 
prominently property and contract – and thus as part of a wider system that has 
implications for human rights. Pistor’s recent work indicates an early step in this 
direction.16 She considers the systemic and contextual role of the law, including 
company, property, contract, insolvency, and intellectual property law. She pairs this 
with the systemic context of the concentrated institutional power of the legal profession 
itself, and thereby assesses the legal system’s role in creating wealth inequality and 
negating democracy worldwide. Human rights law must necessarily incorporate and 
further this research if the field is to be meaningfully effective and transformative. 
Practically speaking, the findings of a study that follows a different conception of 
business and human rights would likely give rise to significantly different implications 
for companies and corporate regulation. For instance, an atomistic approach may 
consider how directors can take human rights into account when making decisions 
 
14 See JM Modiri “Law’s Poverty” (2015) 18 PER 224; S Sibanda “Not Purpose-Made! 
Transformative Constitutionalism, Post-Independence Constitutionalism and the Struggle to 
Eradicate Poverty” (2011) 22 Stell LR 482; A Rafudeen “A South African Reflection on the 
Nature of Human Rights” (2016) 16 AHRLJ 225; S Terreblanche Lost in Transformation (2012) 
101-115; S Terreblanche A History of Inequality in South Africa: 1652-2002 (2002) 95-149; T 
Madlingozi “Social Justice in a Time of Neo-Apartheid Constitutionalism: Critiquing the Anti-
Black Economy of Recognition, Incorporation and Distribution” (2017) 123 Stell LR 123; JM 
Modiri “Towards a ‘(Post-)apartheid’ Critical Race Jurisprudence: ‘Divining Our Racial 
Themes’” (2012) 27 SAPL 231 237; S Moyn Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World 
(2018) 212-220; P Joseph The New Human Rights Movement: Reinventing the Economy to 
End Oppression (2017). 
15 See chapter three part 3 2. 




over the significant capital they control, while a systemic political-economic approach 
may find that directors (and indeed companies and shareholders) should in the first 
place not have such extensive control over South African society through their 
immense concentration of wealth. A systemic approach may also see large companies 
as both relying on and perpetuating South Africa’s extreme economic inequality, and 
may thus perceive the mere existence of companies of certain degrees of economic 
and political influence – mobilising their immense “private” concentration of capital for 
their “private” profit – as an inherent systemic human rights violation or affront to 
democracy.17 Concluding implications may thus be that far more extensive legal (and 
thus economic) transformation is necessary, extending to the fundamental 
restructuring of companies and company law as it is currently conceived. The systemic 
approach thus allows a far more critical structural analysis of what constitutes a human 
rights violation, and of how these violations arise and can be addressed.  
Importantly, even following an atomistic approach, it can be noted that companies’ 
spheres of influence and control are determined by their wealth. As a result, it is 
unlikely that human rights violations by companies can be adequately addressed 
without equally addressing wealth inequality in South Africa. It is thus recommended 
that human rights violations by companies never be viewed in isolation, but that they 
be considered as part of a broader South African legal-economic context. It is also 
recommended that wider economic issues in South Africa, such as wealth inequality, 
be practically addressed. In particular, further study is needed on the real implications 
of wealth inequality and South Africa’s political economy for the meaningful fulfilment 





17 See, for instance, Moyn Not Enough 212-220; Joseph New Human Rights Movement; S 
Ashman, B Fine & S Newman “The Crisis in South Africa: Neoliberalism, Financialization and 
Uneven and Combined Development” (2011) 47 Socialist Register 174 182; S Terreblanche A 
History of Inequality in South Africa: 1652-2002 (2002) 8-17, 56-65, 153-415; S Terreblanche 
Lost in Transformation (2012); H Wolpe “Capitalism and Cheap Labour-Power in South Africa: 
From Segregation to Apartheid” (1972) 1 Economy and Society 425; RL Hale “Coercion and 
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5 3 Practical recommendations for regulatory reform 
5 3 1 Recommendations for judicial intervention 
As previously discussed,18 the present literature on business and human rights law 
in South Africa has generally focused on judicially interpreting existing company law 
mechanisms so that they may better give effect to the Bill of Rights. These academic 
efforts are thus primarily focused on section 7(a) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 
(hereafter the “Companies Act”). This section, added late in the drafting process of the 
Companies Act, states that one of the purposes of the Act is to promote compliance 
with the Bill of Rights in the application of company law.19 This thesis has shown how, 
even without the addition of such a section, the regulatory regime would necessarily 
have to be made coherent with the complex and novel nature of human rights 
obligations where companies are concerned.20 Following the concession theory of 
companies, the State is always able to regulate companies as it sees fit.21 More 
fundamentally, however, the State, law and companies are all equally subject to the 
Constitution.22 Indeed, the State is under human rights obligations in terms of the 
Constitution and international law to regulate companies and thereby give effect to 
human rights.23 Thus, existing mechanisms must as far as possible be reformed to 
give effect to rights. Where possible, then, the judiciary must interpret legislation or 
develop the common law to give effect to substantive rights. Where the present 
regulatory regime cannot be interpreted or developed to give effect to rights, it must be 
 
18 See chapter two part 2 4; D Bilchitz “Corporate Law and the Constitution: Towards Binding 
Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations” (2008) 125 SALJ 754 780-783, 786-789; C 
Samaradiwakera-Wijesundara “Business and Human Rights: To What Extent Has the 
Constitution Transformed the Obligations of Business? Conference Paper: Twenty Years of 
South African Constitutionalism” (14-11-2014) New York Law School Law Review Papers 4-5, 
24 <http://www.nylslawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/11/Samaradiwakera-
Wijesundara.pdf> (accessed 25-09-2019); M Gwanyanya “The South African Companies Act 
and the Realisation of Corporate Human Rights Responsibilities” (2015) 18 PER 3102; J 
Katzew “Crossing the Divide Between the Business of the Corporation and the Imperatives of 
Human Rights – The Impact of Section 7 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008” (2011) 128 SALJ 
686; L Smit “Binding Corporate Human Rights Obligations: A Few Observations from the South 
African Legal Framework” (2016) 1 Business and Human Rights Journal 349. 
19 See chapter one part 1 1 3. 
20 See chapter two, and chapter three parts 3 3 5 and 3 4. 
21 Chapter two part 2 5 2. 
22 See chapter two part 2 3 and 2 5 2, and chapter three part 3 2. 




declared invalid and systemically reformed. The potential nature of such systemic 
reform has already been considered above.24 The implications for narrower reform of 
certain prominent mechanisms and doctrines, introduced earlier,25 will thus be 
considered here. 
Firstly, as concerns the corporate veil,26 it is recommended that the remedy be 
developed so that human rights remedies can be ordered against those “behind” the 
company’s veil.27 This is the case for both the development of the common law remedy 
and the interpretation of the legislative remedy, in section 20(9) of the Companies 
Act.28 This will allow for holding controlling parent companies liable, where subsidiaries 
infringe rights and cannot adequately provide compensation.29 For example, where a 
subsidiary company is under the control of a parent company, and thus is run to provide 
profit for that parent company, it might infringe rights in the pursuit of that profit. As 
subsidiaries are smaller companies than their parents, the subsidiary may not possess 
the necessary funds to compensate victims for the harm it caused to them. As the 
parent company is a separate juristic person, no claim for harm could ordinarily be 
made against it. This “corporate veil” would thus ultimately allow the parent company 
to shield itself from liability and reduce the economic risks involved in profit-making. 
Normally, this would mean that the loss would remain with the victims, as there would 
be insufficient funds to compensate them. However, if the corporate veil can be 
pierced, the larger parent company may also be claimed against, and be made to 
compensate the victims and thus give adequate relief. The “unconscionable” abuse of 
juristic personality justifying the piercing of the veil in terms of section 20(9) of the 
Companies Act in this case would be the outsourcing of risk and loss to victims while 
retaining the profits. In the context of ordinary company law, Stevens has already 
argued for a limited rebuttable presumption that parent companies be conceived as a 
single economic and legal unit with their subsidiaries, rather than as separate legal 
 
24 See part 5 2 of this chapter. 
25 See chapter two part 2 4. 
26 See chapter two part 2 4 1. 
27 Katzew (2011) SALJ 700-704; Bilchitz (2008) SALJ 786-789; Samaradiwakera-Wijesundara 
“Business and Human Rights” NYLSLRP 10-11; Smit (2016) BHRJ 350-352. 
28 The common law and legislative forms of the remedy are discussed in chapter two part 2 4 
1. 




persons.30 Such a presumption would be extremely valuable in human rights matters 
as well, and would especially aid vulnerable victims in claiming relief. 
Importantly, Katzew emphasises that the decision to pierce the veil is ultimately a 
normative one, and that the balance should weigh generally in favour of human rights 
and piercing the veil.31 However, emphasis must also be placed on the multicentric 
human rights obligations that already fall on other business actors (such as directors, 
managers and shareholders).32 That is, even in the ordinary presence of the corporate 
veil, all business actors are already under obligations to not infringe human rights.33 
The norm is not that shareholders and parent companies are shielded from human 
rights obligations except where the veil is pierced, but that they are always under 
human rights obligations. The conceptual focus should thus be less on formalistically 
finding a veil to pierce, and thereby reducing human rights obligations to reified 
company law concepts such as juristic personality. Rather, focus should be on the 
policy question of how an effective remedy can be given, and against whom it should 
be ordered. In other words, where it is appropriate from a human rights perspective to 
order that shareholders or parent companies pay compensation, this can and should 
be ordered, without having to assess the requirements for piercing at common law or 
statute. As discussed earlier, rights and effective remedy should be central to any 
analysis, rather than questions of duty-bearer. 
A potentially more far-reaching reform concerns the duty of directors to act in the 
best of interests of the company.34 Several authors have suggested that this provision 
must now be interpreted to mean that directors must prioritise human rights above the 
pure financial interests of the company.35 As examined in this thesis, this means that 
companies cannot infringe on rights in the pursuit of profit, but also amounts to positive 
 
30 RA Stevens The External Relations of Company Groups in South African Law: A Critical 
Comparative Analysis LLD dissertation Stellenbosch (2011) 281-288. Stevens gives an 
extensive survey and analysis of the principle of limited liability as it applies to groups of 
companies, and proposals for reform from a company law perspective. 
31 Katzew (2011) SALJ 703. 
32 See chapter three part 3 4, and chapter two parts 2 2 and 2 3 on the nature of legal 
personhood. 
33 Samaradiwakera-Wijesundara “Business and Human Rights” NYLSLRP 11-12. 
34 See chapter two part 2 4 2. 
35 Bilchitz (2008) SALJ 780-783; Samaradiwakera-Wijesundara “Business and Human Rights” 





duties being placed on companies, such as the duty to perform due diligence36 or even 
positive duties to fulfil rights.37 This reform is a necessary implication of the fact that 
companies and their actions arise entirely from the law, and the law is wholly subject 
to the Bill of Rights.38 Accordingly, a company’s best interests – as a product of the law 
– cannot extend to the infringement of rights. It thus follows that a company can have 
no legal financial interest in infringing rights. This is not to say, conceptually, that 
human rights obligations are somehow limiting the scope of company profits. Rather, 
profit itself can only legally exist once human rights obligations have been fully 
accounted for. In other words, there is no question of balancing profits against human 
rights, as profit arises from ordinary law and is thus itself wholly subordinate to human 
rights. If profit is given any priority, it is only through the justifiable limitation of rights 
(per section 36 of the Constitution), and such limitation must be closely scrutinised.39 
Bilchitz observes that this is not simply a question of imposing obligations on 
companies.40 Rather, it is effectively a “radical” change in the nature of companies 
themselves, as they are no longer run for profit in the traditional sense41 (at least in 
terms of law, if not presently in fact). 
Two details concerning the director’s duty must be noted here. First, directors can 
raise a defence in terms of the Act if it is claimed that they breached their duty to act 
in the company’s best interests. In terms of section 76(4), directors are deemed to have 
acted properly if they have (amongst other conditions) taken reasonably diligent steps 
to become informed about the matter, and had a rational basis to believe the action 
was in the company’s best interests. This “business judgement rule” protects directors 
from judicial interference in business decisions, and is a very forgiving threshold in its 
present incarnation.42 This defence naturally cannot be interpreted to be a defence in 
human rights matters concerning directors’ duties, unless this provision can be 
considered to be a justifiable limitation of rights in terms of section 36 of the 
Constitution. Regardless, a transformative approach to human rights claims should not 
 
36 See chapter four part 2 5 2 2. 
37 See chapter three part 3 3 5. 
38 See chapter two part 2 3. 
39 Samaradiwakera-Wijesundara “Business and Human Rights” NYLSLRP 15-21. 
40 Bilchitz (2008) SALJ 780-781. 
41 Bilchitz (2008) SALJ 780-781. 
42 R Stevens & P de Beer “The Duty of Care and Skill, And Reckless Trading: Remedies In 




see them evaded with the defence of business judgement. Second, as discussed,43 
only the company can claim against the directors for breach of their duties. Other 
stakeholders can at best bring a derivative action in terms of section 165 of the Act, 
but this must still be to “protect the legal interest of the company”.44 As the company 
may have no incentive or interest in suing directors for breach, this leaves victims 
without a remedy. As there is less threat of legal action, there is less incentive for 
directors to act in the interests of human rights. It is thus likely necessary to broaden 
the basis of standing in terms of the duty. This can be achieved through legislative 
reform, or through interpreting section 218(2) of the Act for this purpose, as will be 
considered below. 
Prioritising human rights above profit accords well with transformative 
constitutionalism, and is to be fully commended in the South African context of extreme 
economic inequality.45 Further, the imposition of the duty on directors to prioritise 
human rights above company profits accords with the aforementioned multicentric 
approach to human rights regulation in the field of company law, where the company, 
directors, managers and shareholders are all equally under human rights obligations. 
The primary difficulty here lies in the lack of clarity in how directors are to prioritise 
human rights above profit. Due diligence, as required by international law,46 would be 
a minimum standard that directors would have to meet when courts interpret the duty. 
However, due diligence itself does not adequately convey the extent to which directors 
must sacrifice profits in meeting their positive duties to fulfil rights, for instance. More 
importantly, the extent to which profits must be sacrificed for rights fulfilment is also a 
normative question.47 It could be required of directors that they wholly sacrifice the 
financial viability of their companies and direct the full machinery of their capital 
towards the fulfilment of rights. It could equally be (as is currently the case in fact) that 
the profit motive and day-to-day operations of companies remain effectively unaffected 
by human rights considerations, except where companies commit extremely 
unconscionable offenses and they can be sued. There is no empirical method to decide 
one or the other – the question is rather one of normative judgment as decided by the 
State. In other words, it is for the State to decide and implement a policy effectively 
 
43 Chapter two part 2 5 2 2. 
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45 See chapter three part 3 2. 
46 See chapter four part 4 4 2 2. 




setting the extent to which companies are still “run for profit” in South Africa. The extent 
to which company law is transformed will thus ultimately be set by judges and 
legislators, in how they shape the law governing this directors’ duty and decide how 
far profits must be subordinated to the pursuit of human rights. It is of course 
recommended that courts take a critical and transformative approach, centred on and 
prioritising rights foremost, rather than an approach that prioritises profits and 
prevailing capitalist-colonialist economic relations.  
It is also recommended that the civil and criminal mechanisms under the Companies 
Act48 be interpreted to actively give effect to rights and provide remedies. In particular, 
contravention of human rights where companies are concerned – whether committed 
by companies or related business actors like directors or managers – should be 
understood as also contravening the Act. Such an interpretation would ensure that 
some of the Act’s remedies are able to be mobilised for human rights purposes, and 
thus brings the Act into greater compliance with the Bill of Rights. For instance, section 
218(2) of the Act provides an action for loss or damage caused by any person who 
violates a provision of the Act. If infringing on rights is considered a violation of the 
purpose of Bill of Rights compliance in section 7(a) of the Act, section 218(2) would 
provide compensation for any human rights victims, as ordered against any person 
who caused the violation.49 As noted above, for instance, this should allow for victims 
of human rights violations to claim against directors for breach of their duty to act in 
the best interests of the company (as interpreted to include human rights). Again, this 
supports a multicentric approach to duty-bearers, with the company, directors, 
managers and so on all equally bound by human rights obligations. Similarly, as 
discussed,50 compliance notices are issued to any person who contravenes the Act or 
who benefits from such a contravention,51 and non-compliance with such a notice is a 
criminal offence.52 Following the interpretation given above, any human rights violation 
should amount to a contravention of the Act, and thus should lead to a compliance 
notice, with further non-compliance being a criminal offence. 
 
48 See chapter two part 2 5 3. 
49 Samaradiwakera-Wijesundara “Business and Human Rights NYLSLRP 11; Katzew (2011) 
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An aspect that has not been adequately considered in the literature concerns the 
validity of company actions in the context of human rights. As discussed, companies 
and their actions arise entirely from the law, and the law is wholly subject to the Bill of 
Rights.53 Accordingly, any acts of a company would be invalid if these infringed on 
human rights, unless it can be argued that the role of company law in enabling such 
acts amounts to a justifiable limitation of rights as per section 36 of the Constitution. 
This would extend to any acts by those who have legal relationships with the company 
in terms of company law, such as shareholders, directors, managers and employees. 
These acts would include, for example, internal procedures (such as voting), and any 
decisions taken by the directing minds54 (such as the conclusion of a contract or 
internal restructuring). In effect, rather than simply holding that companies are 
prohibited from infringing on human rights, it could also be argued that companies and 
their related actors do not have the legal capacity to infringe on rights. In other words, 
companies and their related business actors can only legitimately act when doing so 
in accordance with rights obligations, and courts must be able to scrutinise the validity 
of company actions for their consistency with the Bill of Rights. The remedy for rights 
victims in such cases would arise from the invalidation of the company’s acts. For 
example, if the company made a decision to pollute the local environment, that decision 
could be deemed invalid by a court. If the company contracted with another company 
to pollute, the contract could be deemed invalid – not strictly because the contract itself 
was inconsistent with the Bill of Rights,55 but because the company could not have had 
the legal capacity to conclude a contract that led to rights being violated.  
Similarly, any decision by the directors not to assign resources to the positive 
fulfilment of rights (where such a duty to fulfil exists) could conceivably be deemed an 
invalid decision. In all these cases, beyond the relief granted in the invalidating of the 
decision, compensation could be claimed against the company for harm caused by its 
illegal actions – through section 218(2) as considered above, for instance. The 
possibility that business actors’ decisions may later be deemed invalid if they infringe 
on rights also acts as an incentive to avoid making such decisions. Once again, a 
multicentric duty-bearer approach would be supported by such a development, as the 
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acts of all business actors – directors, shareholders, managers and so on – are equally 
subject to being declared legally invalid if they infringe on rights. As will be discussed 
below, however, reform covering the invalidation of such actions would likely be 
necessary here, as uncertainty may lead to a chilling effect on business dealings for 
fear of their later being invalidated. 
Finally, as discussed, transformative constitutionalism demands the deep 
integration of international law into the domestic human rights regime.56 The previous 
chapter has thus suggested a number of potential reforms that are supplied through 
integrating international law into the Bill of Rights, with implications for the State, 
companies and company law.57 As discussed, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”)58 and the United Nations Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights (“UNGPs”)59 in particular require a set of 
critical regulatory reforms. It is thus recommended that courts take active steps to 
deeply incorporate these instruments into all interpretations of the Bill of Rights, and 
reform company law accordingly. For instance, a system of corporate due diligence 
must be introduced by legislation, as advised below, but courts must in the meantime 
incorporate the standard into evaluations of directors’ conduct (such as the duty to act 
in the “best interests of the company”).60 Importantly, a due diligence system must still 
allow for strict liability in certain cases, as even duly diligent companies must be 
ordered to provide remedies where it is deemed appropriate. Again, this would require 
an adequate normative standard being set by courts, and it is recommended that the 
normative standard be transformative and favour victims’ rights foremost. 
 
5 3 2 Recommendations for legislative intervention 
While judicial interpretation and development in line with human rights is necessary 
and must be pursued as far as possible, it will likely not be sufficient in many of the 
above cases of reform. In all of these cases, judicial interpretation involves putting 
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traditional company law conceptions and mechanisms to human rights uses – a 
purpose for which they were not initially conceived. As discussed, section 7(a) of the 
Companies Act – declaring that one of the Act’s purposes was to promote Bill of Rights 
compliance – was only introduced late in the drafting process. Thus, while the 
provisions can and must be interpreted to allow for human rights regulation and 
remedies, tailor-made legislation that specifically reforms companies and company law 
in accordance with human rights would be preferable. This is especially necessary in 
light of the confusion surrounding the many ways in which non-state entities in South 
Africa could be affected by the Bill of Rights.61 This lack of clarity, guidance and 
regulatory coherence is undesirable for all parties involved, and would not properly 
protect human rights norms. Further, as discussed, international law in the field of 
business and human rights is highly nuanced, with a great many technical implications 
for domestic regulation.62 A significant legislative initiative will thus also be necessary 
to specifically incorporate international human rights law into company law. Without 
such an initiative, the State is unlikely to meet its own duties under the Bill of Rights 
and at international law.63 
Finally, meaningful transformative changes to the economic structuring of South 
Africa are likely to be disruptive, and would require policy research and planning to an 
extent that courts cannot supply. This is especially the case if these are to be truly 
systemic changes, rather than merely atomistic. The scale of structural transformation 
needed to subordinate business to human rights is immense in a historically capitalist-
colonialist political-economic system such as South Africa’s.64 Accordingly, it is 
recommended that reform of these company law mechanisms take place via 
legislation, rather than only through judicial interpretation. 
Such a new human rights regime for companies should be holistic, and address at 
once all of the reforms necessary to better harmonise company law with the Bill of 
Rights. It is recommended that this regime follow a rights-centric approach with 
multicentric duties on the State, companies and other business actors (such as 
 
61 See chapter three parts 3 3 5 and 3 4. 
62 See chapter four part 4 4. 
63 Of course, the State is always able to integrate international law into domestic regulation in 
any case, without the intermediate step of Bill of Rights interpretation. However, this thesis 
studies Bill of Rights obligations in particular, and thus focuses on the incorporation of 
international law through the Bill of Rights. 




directors, shareholders, managers and external contractors) all at once. As discussed 
above, it must prioritise the substantive interpretation of rights and the provision of 
effective remedies and remedial mechanisms, both as informed by international human 
rights law.65 Victims of violations should have easy access to courts, and have the 
necessary standing to claim effective remedies. This is especially important given the 
probable extreme inequality in litigation power between wealthy corporations and 
poorer victims.66 Remedies should be able to be ordered against any of the relevant 
actors where it is deemed appropriate to vindicate the right – whether those actors be 
State or non-state. Multicentric duties thus supply a sort of human rights approach to 
corporate veil-piercing and the directors’ duty to act in the “best interests of the 
company” both, as all business actors are equally bound to rights. 
Further, specific regulatory mechanisms supplied by international law via the Bill of 
Rights – such as due diligence – must equally form part of this legislative initiative. 
These have been considered in some depth,67 and so will not be repeated here. 
Critically, these reforms must not be perceived as transformative regulations lying 
parallel to company law, but must rather be considered as fundamental 
transformations of company law itself to give effect to the Bill of Rights and relevant 
international law, with existing legislation and the common law both implicated. This 
must produce a single transformed system of law, founded centrally on human rights.68 
It is thus recommended that the Companies Act be significantly amended. The statute 
should not merely have some of these reforms appended onto its existing form, but 
should be fundamentally restructured to have the Bill of Rights and human rights 
regulations at its centre, with all other regulations shaped around these. While 
remedies should naturally be supplied by courts, the regulatory bodies in the Act (such 
as the Companies Commission) should also be involved in the full enforcement of 
these provisions.69 
 
65 See chapter four. 
66 See chapter four part 4 4 2 1; J Dugard “Courts and the Poor in South Africa: A Critique of 
Systemic Judicial Failures to Advance Transformative Justice” (2008) 24 SAJHR 214; S 
Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication Under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 
92-93. 
67 See chapter four part 4 4. 
68 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In re Ex Parte President of the 
Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 44. See chapter three part 3 2. 
69 These bodies are established in chapter 8 of the Act. D Davis & W Geach (eds) Companies 




The social and ethics committees of influential companies should also be reformed 
to play a far stronger role in making human rights part of day-to-day operational 
culture.70 They should be given stronger powers in their respective companies, 
including, for instance, the power to compel directors to direct funding towards the 
positive fulfilment of human rights. They should themselves receive sufficient company 
funding to research and assess the human rights impact of their companies, and can 
thus play a strong role in the due diligence system. A limitation of these committees, 
however, is that they still amount to companies regulating themselves, rather than 
being externally subjected to human rights norms. Moreover, while these committees 
may be reformed to dilute the central power of the board of directors, this will still not 
distribute control to human rights stakeholders outside of the company. Thus, the 
reform of the social and ethics committees must be accompanied by the 
abovementioned substantive changes in company regulation generally, with effective 
remedies guaranteed to external victims. The goal should be that the very nature and 
daily operation of companies (and, by extension, South Africa’s economic activity more 
broadly) be founded on, and conducted in line with, the Bill of Rights. Violations of 
rights must be prevented, on the one hand, but the active fulfilment of rights must also 
be facilitated. 
A complication for these reforms is that many regulations are likely to be context-
sensitive, depending especially on the extent to which their companies exert influence 
over rights victims. For example, it may be less appropriate to require that very small 
local companies provide housing and sanitation to their employees, while such 
standards would be wholly appropriate for large listed companies on whom entire 
communities depend. Such context-sensitive differentiation is already partly the case 
in South Africa, as social and ethics committees are only required for companies of 
certain degrees of influence.71 However, far more detailed regulation would be needed 
to allow these contexts to be taken into account, for both regulatory effectiveness and 
certainty. For instance, it must be clear to directors how exactly they must go about 
meeting their positive duties to fulfil, depending on their operational context. 
 
70 See chapter two part 2 5 2 2; HJ Kloppers “Driving Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
Through the Companies Act: An Overview of the Role of the Social and Ethics Committee” 
(2013) 16 PER 166; Gwanyanya (2015) PER 3113-3114; M Havenga “The Social and Ethics 
Committee in South African Company Law” (2015) 78 THRHR 285. 
71 See chapter two part 2 5 2 2; Kloppers (2013) PER; Gwanyanya (2015) PER 3113-3114; 




Importantly, this context-sensitivity assumes a transformative rights-centric approach, 
focusing on the fullest interpretation of the right regardless of the nature or identity of 
the duty-bearer.72 If a formalistic duty-bearer-centric approach is followed, such context 
is easily erased, and burdens on larger and wealthy companies may seem 
conceptually similar to those on smaller companies, or even natural persons.73 Again, 
these are also normative questions – rather than questions of principle – which must 
be decided upon as a matter of effective policy by the legislature and courts. It is of 
course recommended that such policy be as transformative as possible, preferring 
meaningful change over the preservation of historical capitalist-colonialist economic 
relations. It is thus further recommended that these proposed regulatory changes be 
accompanied and underpinned by, and fully incorporate, the doctrinal and conceptual 
developments argued for in this chapter. In particular, these include a systemic 
approach to company regulation, and a normative shift prioritising human rights above 
legal-economic relations. 
 
5 4 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of the implications raised by the findings of 
this study. It has noted the lack of doctrinal clarity in the application of the Bill of Rights 
where companies are concerned, and recommended that coherence and consistency 
be sought in this regard. It has also recommended the full inclusion of international 
human rights law concerning companies into the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. 
Importantly, this chapter has specifically proposed a rights-centric approach to Bill of 
Rights application in the context of companies, which focuses on rights and effective 
remedy and leads to the multicentric binding of the State, law, companies and 
company-related actors. Critically, a systemic approach to companies and company 
law (and their effects on human rights) has been recommended as a necessary area 
of further development, with significant implications for the transformation of South 
Africa’s political economy in line with human rights and democracy. 
This chapter has also provided specific recommendations for courts on the 
interpretation and development of existing company law doctrines and mechanisms, 
following the preceding theoretical and doctrinal implications. Finally, this chapter has 
 
72 See chapter three parts 3 3 5 and 3 4, and chapter four part 4 4 2 2. 





noted that some reform by judicial interpretation or development may be possible, but 
that significant legislative intervention is necessary. It has thus broadly outlined the 
features of a potential future system of company law designed with the Bill of Rights at 
its centre, and incorporating international human rights law. Such a system is also in 
line with the proposed theoretical and doctrinal developments. These developments 
themselves ultimately rely on a normative shift in favour of human rights, however, and 
this shift has therefore been proposed as core to the meaningful transformation of 




Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
This thesis examined the implications of the South African Bill of Rights for 
companies and company law. It specifically utilised the lens of transformative 
constitutionalism to consider how human rights obligations affect companies and 
corporate regulation in South Africa, while providing a theoretical analysis and 
recommendations for reform. 
As products of the law, companies and company law itself are fully subject to the 
Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“the 
Constitution”).1 The question is rather of how precisely the Bill of Rights applies where 
they are concerned. This study illustrates that the current business and human rights 
law literature generally follows an atomistic approach to understanding companies. 
This approach focuses on companies as individual entities capable of committing 
violations. As a result, dominant discourses in the relevant literature focus on 
interpreting and developing existing company law doctrines and mechanisms to give 
effect to rights. 
However, South Africa’s project of transformative constitutionalism is the core lens 
through which the Bill of Rights must be interpreted, and so it is through this lens that 
companies and company law must be assessed.2 Transformative constitutionalism 
necessitates the fundamental restructuring of South African society, including its legal 
and economic relations. Without this restructuring, transformation will not be 
meaningful, and it is therefore central to the legitimacy of the constitutional project. 
This study finds that transformative constitutionalism requires a critical and contextual 
systemic understanding of companies as part of a holistic political economic system. 
Such a system implicates companies, company law, the wider economy and the State 
in an alternative paradigm that is more transformative than the atomistic approach. 
Present jurisprudence and literature on the Bill of Rights identifies several 
constitutional provisions that are implicated where companies and company law are 
involved.3 Section 7(2) of the Constitution is independently justiciable and places a 
general duty on the State to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the substantive rights 
in the Bill of Rights. Section 8 variously binds the State, law and non-state entities 
 
1 See chapter two. 
2 See chapter three. 




(such as companies) to the Bill of Rights. Section 39(2) requires that courts interpret 
legislation or develop the common law according to the Bill of Rights’ normative 
framework. Finally, section 239 of the Constitution allows companies to qualify as 
organs of state, and thus to accrue some of the State’s human rights obligations. These 
constitutional mechanisms often overlap, and the jurisprudence on them is generally 
doctrinally unclear. However, recent cases indicate an early yet promising shift towards 
a transformative and rights-centric approach to business and human rights. The 
evolving jurisprudence in this regard will hopefully lead to a greater prioritisation of 
substantive rights, rather than formalist deference to “private” business practices. 
Additionally, this thesis advances that the implications of the Bill of Rights discussed 
herein likely extend to all actors involved in companies – such as directors, employees, 
shareholders and external contractors – as well as to other types of business 
structures. 
International human rights law is critical where companies and company law are 
concerned.4 In South Africa, a transformative approach to constitutional interpretation 
requires integrating international human rights law instruments as an inherent part of 
the fabric of the Bill of Rights. This thesis argues that the interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights where companies are concerned must involve the full consideration of these 
instruments, and that these instruments should be incorporated into the interpretation 
as far as possible. This study contends that the State must reform company law to 
ensure coherency with the Bill of Rights and international human rights law. This 
requires the introduction of a system of due diligence for companies, and the greater 
imposition of positive duties to fulfil on companies, amongst other specific reforms. 
In light of this study’s findings, there are significant theoretical implications for the 
field of human rights and business.5 Critically, there is a need to address the lack of 
clarity in the present Bill of Rights application doctrine where companies are 
concerned. This thesis accordingly proposes a transformative rights-centric doctrinal 
approach with simultaneous multicentric binding of the State, companies, and law as 
a means of facilitating this process. This multicentric binding must extend to all 
business actors involved with companies, including directors, shareholders, parent 
companies, managers and even external contractors. A further recommendation is that 
a transformative, systemic approach to South African companies be prioritised over 
 
4 See chapter four. 




the present atomistic human rights approach. The systemic effects of companies and 
South Africa’s political economy on human rights and democracy should also be 
considered. Ultimately, these findings should be integrated into the human rights 
regime if it is to be meaningfully transformative. Importantly, the rights-centric approach 
lends itself well to systemic analysis, and vice versa. It is thus recommended that these 
be simultaneously implemented. 
State intervention in several areas is also essential. Company law mechanisms and 
doctrines must be judicially reformed where possible, although legislative reform will 
be crucial to meaningful and effective regulatory transformation. This thesis thus sets 
out the contours of such legislative reform, following a transformative approach. Such 
an intervention must be rights-centric and systemic; informed by international law; 
include a due diligence system with provision for strict liability; be context-sensitive to 
company operations; and describe when companies must actively and positively fulfil 
rights. In addition to these interventions, South Africa’s severe poverty and inequality 
rates must be practically addressed if the systemic nature of corporate violations and 
control is to be meaningfully transformed. 
This thesis identifies several areas warranting further study. Most prominently, it is 
urgently necessary to study how systemic political-economic insights could be 
integrated into human rights law theory. Such an approach is critically necessary to 
rendering the Bill of Rights regime meaningfully transformative in the context of 
business activities. Further research is also needed on the material effect of South 
Africa’s political economy on the implementation of the Bill of Rights, and on its effects 
on democracy more widely. Related thereto, this study emphasises that law is a historic 
and sociological product, and that there are thus deep historic links between the 
colonial-capitalist and neoliberal ideologies and the law. A critical area for further study 
thus concerns the effect of ideology on the law, and the role of the law in sustaining 
ideology. Finally, the extraterritorial application of the Bill of Rights represents a vital 
area warranting further research. Although this study is limited to human rights 
infringements committed within South Africa’s borders, the question of extraterritorial 
human rights obligations – especially where multinational corporations are involved – 
is critically important in a time of global corporate dominance. Given the political and 
economic prominence of South Africa and its companies on the continent, further study 
of the extraterritorial application of the Bill of Rights is essential. 
The field of business and human rights law in South Africa is rapidly evolving to 




There is potential for such transformation to take place via the Bill of Rights, but the 
Bill of Rights must be actively put to this use if the constitutional project is to be 
meaningful and legitimate. Regrettably, the Companies Act 71 of 2008 has not 
provided the reform required by the Constitution. Accordingly, there must be a 
deliberate and significant effort to provide this transformation, reaching to the 
fundamental nature of the company in South Africa. Throughout this reform process, it 
must be borne in mind that companies and their profits are products of the law, and 
must be made wholly subject to the Bill of Rights. This will not only require a change 
in how the law and companies are conceived, but relies on a fundamental normative 
shift in favour of human rights foremost. While there have been some promising 
developments, the field of human rights and company law is still in its infancy, and 
requires substantial further development and academic study. It is hoped that this 
thesis provides a valuable contribution to this process, and that it has identified 
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